A bit of a security hole in the HTML DB interface (apparently just XE)

When logging in to XE via the Database Home Page using a user that was created outside of XE (Raptor, SQL*Plus, TOAD, etc.) XE cleverly adds the Oracle user name to the 'companies' and 'developers' HTML DB tables.
However, it not-so-cleverly changes system privileges for the Oracle user.
Scenario:
In SQL*Plus...
create user outsider identified by sight;
grant create session to outsider;
select * from dba_sys_privs where grantee = 'OUTSIDER';
GRANTEE PRIVILEGE ADM
OUTSIDER CREATE SESSION NO
after login via the Databae Home Page:
SQL> r
1* select * from dba_sys_privs where grantee = 'OUTSIDER'
GRANTEE PRIVILEGE ADM
OUTSIDER CREATE VIEW NO
OUTSIDER CREATE JOB NO
OUTSIDER CREATE PROCEDURE NO
OUTSIDER CREATE SESSION NO
OUTSIDER CREATE ANY CONTEXT NO
OUTSIDER CREATE DATABASE LINK NO
OUTSIDER CREATE DIMENSION NO
OUTSIDER CREATE TYPE NO
OUTSIDER CREATE MATERIALIZED VIEW NO
OUTSIDER CREATE TRIGGER NO
OUTSIDER CREATE CLUSTER NO
OUTSIDER CREATE INDEXTYPE NO
OUTSIDER CREATE OPERATOR NO
OUTSIDER CREATE LIBRARY NO
OUTSIDER CREATE SEQUENCE NO
OUTSIDER CREATE SYNONYM NO
OUTSIDER CREATE TABLE NO
fortunately, TS quotas are not changed -- but this behavior hijacks control from the DBA.
this does not appear to happen in non-XE HTML DB, since the workspace (company) is a required element when supplying login credentials

I'm guessing supporting roles requires a revision to DBMS_SYS_SQL?Yes, exactly.Joel,
is the difference between executing a statement with DBMS_SYS_SQL.parse_as_user (as HTMLDB_PUBLIC_USER or ANONYMOUS or even sys) and executing the same statement as the current user using dbms_sql documented somewhere?
The obvious difference I have observed is the use of the pseudocolumn USER, which will not show the parsing user but either HTMLDB_PUBLIC_USER or ANONYMOUS.
Thanks,
~Dietmar.
Message was edited by:
daust_de

Similar Messages

Potential Security Hole with 802.1x and Voice VLANs?

I have been looking at 802.1x and Voice VLANs and I can see what I think is a bit of a security hole.
If a user has no authentication details to gain access via 802.1x - i.e. they have not been given a User ID or the PC doesn't have a certificate etc. If they attach a PC to a switchport that is configured with a Voice VLAN (or disconnect an IP Phone and plug the PC direct into the switchport) they can easily see via packet sniffing the CDP packets that will contain the Voice VLAN ID. They can then easily create a Tagged Virtual NIC (via the NIC utilities or driver etc) with the Voice VLAN 802.1q Tag. Assuming DHCP is enabled for the Voice VLAN they will get assigned an IP address and have access to the IP network. I appreciate the VLAN can be locked down at the Layer-3 level with ACL's so any 'non-voice related' traffic is blocked but in this scenario the user has sucessfully bypassed 802.1x authentication and gain access to the network?
Has anyone done any research into this potential security hole?
Thanks
Andy

Thanks for the reply. To be honest we would normally deploy some or all of the measures you list but these don't around the issue of being able to easily bypass having to authenticate via 802.1x.
As I said I think this is a hole but don't see any solutions at the moment except 802.1x on the IP Phone, although at the moment you can't do this with Voice VLANs?
Andy

Although I turned off WiFi, set as 'require admin password to turn on and off wifi, when I turn on my MacBook Pro, retina latest model, just got for a month, it turns on wifi automatically, is this a back door or virus or security hole? Thank you

I have my all networks at 'Off' status in the system panel, never use Bluetooth either, also in the top status bar, and set as 'require admin password to turn on and off WiFi', but when I turn on my MacBookPro 15" retina newest model only one month old, it goes on to WiFi automatically by itself.
Is this a back door? Security hole?
The other day, I was taking a break for five minutes, when I came back, the Microsoft outlook is open for setting up an account, I never use outlook, it is there only because it comes with the office package. Also, iTunes was playing music, I don't use iTunes when I'm working. Both were not on before I left for the break.
What is the problem?

I have my all networks at 'Off' status in the system panel, never use Bluetooth either, also in the top status bar, and set as 'require admin password to turn on and off WiFi', but when I turn on my MacBookPro 15" retina newest model only one month old, it goes on to WiFi automatically by itself.
Is this a back door? Security hole?
The other day, I was taking a break for five minutes, when I came back, the Microsoft outlook is open for setting up an account, I never use outlook, it is there only because it comes with the office package. Also, iTunes was playing music, I don't use iTunes when I'm working. Both were not on before I left for the break.
What is the problem?

Can you confirm a security hole in file sharing?

I have found a very annoying security hole, and I wonder if it is unique to my setup. I have my mini set up with file sharing turned on. It has 5 accounts, one administrator, rest ordinary users. My login for the administrative user on my laptop is the same as on the mini. I have not turned on "Back to my Mac."
From my laptop I navigate to the mini using either (a) the network panel in finder, (b) the local IP (afp://192.168.0.xxx), or the global IP (afp://64.xxx.xxx.xxx). (My router is set up to forward the appropriate ports to the mini's local IP). I mount the administrative user's home directory under apple file sharing. Now I have full access to these files. I DO NOT SAVE THE PASSWORD IN KEYCHAIN. All this is as it should be.
Now I eject the administrator disk.
From now on (until I reboot my laptop), I can mount that same disk without a password!
Can someone confirm?

{quote:title=William Lloyd wrote:}This is not a security hole.{quote}
While I can understand that some may consider Kerberos automagically creating what is essentially a keychain without the users express knowledge or consent a "feature", I definitely consider it a bug and a huge security hole.
The kerberos ticket should not live longer then the user is actually connected to the machine. Currently, if the user clicks the Disconnect button the Kerberos ticket lives on and any future connections to that server will user that ticket. This is not what users (especially novice to intermediate) would expect. If the user clicks the Disconnect button, then they would expect that they are completely disconnected and any further connections to that server would require authentication. Otherwise they leave their machine wide open, hense the security hole.
The other thing that makes this so nasty is that if the OS decides not to use kerberos, for whatever reason, the behavior is different. It behaves as the user would expect. Clicking Disconnect does completely disconnect you from the server and any future connections will require authentication. So at a minimum there is a dangerous inconsistency in behavior between when the OS uses Kerberos and when it doesn't. That, at a minimum, should be fixed.

Disable preferences option to temporarily save documents (security hole?)

Hi Adobe Community,
we have a project where we want to use Adobe Acrobat X as Scan-Software for secure content. With the help of a predefined action, the scan gets directly encrypted.
The problem that we have with this approach, is that there is a preference option that allows to temporarily save the document in regular time periods (1-99 minutes). If this option can be activated by the end-user, there may be secure content on the hard drive of the PC without encryption. This would be a security hole - therefore the question:
Can this preference be deactivated by default from the central IT. Effectively, only 2 workstations in a special secure area need to have this special configuration.
Thanks & Best Regards
Kristian

Simple answer - no. Users can always access their preferences.

Does ethical hacking give security divisions motive to withhold security holes?

Snufykat wrote:
I removed my first, not helpful, comment.
No worries. I acutally forgot to change this to a discussion post instead of an answer post, wasn't really looking for the answer, because I was pretty sure I knew already but I wanted to hear the input from some others that might know more about the subject than I do.

So, as we all know, software and hardware is going to have some kind of a security hole or concern after its release no matter what happens. I have seen a lot of posts about ethical hacking and the like. I was just wondering what the community's thoughts were on this: if we're more concerned about "being on the offensive" as the US government has said they intend to be, does it give motive to withhold security holes in software that might be used internationally?Say, for example, MS Word, which is used around the globe is found to have a security hole. The US discovers this. They want to use this security hole to their advantage thus they keep the security hole to themselves. Meanwhile, some hacker from China had already discovered the security hole and was exploiting it for the previous year. Now the US is withholding security...
This topic first appeared in the Spiceworks Community

Any security hole in this programm?

The code below is a benchmarking harness for sorting algorithms.
//a driver
public class TestSort {
     static Object[] testData = {
          0.3, 1.3e-2, 7.9, 3.17
     public static void main(String[] args) {
          // TODO Auto-generated method stub
          Sort bsort = new SimpleSortDouble();
          SortMetrics metrics = bsort.sort(testData);
          System.out.println("Metrics: " + metrics);
          for (int i = 0; i < testData.length; i++)
               System.out.println("\t" + testData);
//used for storing statistic data
public class SortMetrics implements Cloneable {
     public long probeCnt,               //data probes
          compareCnt, //comparing two elements
     swapCnt;     //swapping two elements
     public void init()
          probeCnt = swapCnt = compareCnt = 0;
     public String toString()
          return probeCnt + " probes" + compareCnt + " compares" + swapCnt + " swaps";
     /**overriding clone */
     public Object clone()
          try
               return super.clone();
          catch (CloneNotSupportedException e)
               throw new InternalError(e.toString());
//this is the main framwork
public abstract class Sort {
     private Object[] values;
     private final SortMetrics curMetrics = new SortMetrics();
     /** Invoked to do the full sort*/
     public final SortMetrics sort(Object[] data)
          values = data;
          curMetrics.init();
          doSort();
          return getMetrics();
     public final SortMetrics getMetrics()
          return (SortMetrics)curMetrics.clone();
     protected final int getDataLength()
          return values.length;
     protected final Object probe(int i)
          curMetrics.probeCnt++;
          return values[i];
     protected final int compare(int i, int j)
          curMetrics.compareCnt++;
          Object d1 = values[i];
          Object d2 = values[j];
          if (d1 == d2)
               return 0;
          else
               return (Double.parseDouble(d1.toString()) > Double.parseDouble(d2.toString()) ? -1 : 1);
     protected final void swap(int i, int j)
          curMetrics.swapCnt++;
          Object tmp = values[i];
          values[i] = values[j];
          values[j] = tmp;
     protected abstract void doSort();
//used to define a sorting alogrithm
public class SimpleSortDouble extends Sort {
     @Override
     protected void doSort() {
          // TODO Auto-generated method stub
          for (int i = 0; i < getDataLength(); i++)
               for (int j = 0; j < getDataLength() - i; j++)
                    if (compare(i, j) > 0)
                         swap(i, j);
This is a question in �the java programming language(Third Edition) Page102�. I was required to find at least one security hole in �Sort� class that would let a sorting algorithm cheat on its metrics without being caught, assuming that the sorting algorithm author doesn�t get to write method �main�.
In my naive opinion this framework is well-designed, since I find all the access method that shouldn�t be extended are declared final. It�s really hard for me to figure out any security problem.
I�m very eager to know the answer, please enlighten me!

How about this
Object[] theList = new Object[getDataLength()];
for(int i=0; i<theList.length; i++){
theList[i] = probe(i);
// we now have a local copy of the list.
// we can do as many comparisions as we like on our local copy,
// and just mirror the swaps with the sorting algorithm.
for (int i = 0; i < getDataLength(); i++)
for (int j = 0; j < getDataLength() - i; j++)
      if (theList.compareTo(theList[j] > 0)
swap(i, j);
Thus we can falsify the number of comparisions we actually do.
With a bit more effort, you can sort the list, figure out the minimum number of swaps needed to move the original list to the sorted one, and apply those ones.
The trick is to avoid calling probe, compare and swap as much as possible.By calling probe once for each element, we no longer have to call compare to compare them.

Adobe Flash security hole

As we all now, there's a huge security hole in flash. It's not a question, what to upgrade urgently in 32-bit systems, but the crap company Adobe didn't provide us a 64bit version of this new flash beta. The question is: In 64bit systems wouldn't it be better to package the nspluginwrappered nonsecholed version of flash? Or would it be too difficult, and it would even need a wiki entry? And from about when will be secure packages of flash will be available from arch repositories?

berbae wrote:It's not clear to me why nspluginwrapper would be needed, because there is in AUR the package lib32-flashplugin-prerelease 10.1.53.64-8, which has less dependencies.
Cannot that package work on x86_64 arch without nspluginwrapper, if all the needed lib32 libraries are installed ?
Please can someone give me explanations, thanks.
Already try that one. In short: it doesn't work.
Apparently, 64bit Firefox could not recognize 32bit plugin, even if all the necessary lib32 packages are installed, which is why we need nspluginwrapper to act as a "middle man" between Firefox and Flash (someone please correct me if I'm wrong on this).
Anyway, don't let the huge dependency list scares you, both nspluginwrapper-debian and nspluginwrapper-flash-prerelease combined requires roughly the same dependencies as lib32-flashplugin, it's just that PKGBUILD of nspluginwrapper-debian listed all dependencies, while lib32-flashplugin only list the highest level ones.
If you don't believe me, try issuing the following command (which is the dependencies of lib32-flashplugin):
lib32-libxt lib32-gtk2 lib32-nss lib32-curl
and take note that it pulls in roughly the same number of packages that nspluginwrapper-debian package requires.
Last edited by zodmaner (2010-06-14 11:31:44)

MS Office secretly connects to my Mac and scans my activity. How??? Security hole? Exploitable by hackers?

I have a strange problem. All by itself it's not so serious, but it concerns me that it reveals a security hole which can be exploited by hackers.
I may be over-reacting, so any reassurance or explanation would be appreciated.
Here's the situation:
I have a MacBook Pro running OSX 10.6.5. I also have a new MacBook Air also running 10.6.5. I recently used Migration Assistant to move all my applications from the MacBook Pro to the MacBook Air. The migration worked fine with one very troubling exception.
One of the applications that got migrated was MS Office 2008 (MSWord, Excel, etc.). When I just had my MacBook Pro, MS Office worked fine. Also, now, if my MacBook Pro is turned off and I'm just using my Air, MS Office again works fine.
HOWEVER...if I have my MacBook Pro open and running MS Office on it, and then I simultaneously open my Air and try to launch MS Office, I get an error message that says
"Microsoft Office 2008 for Mac cannot start because Microsoft Office is already in use.
An office program is being used by Apple Mac. Your installation exceeds the number of installations permitted by the license agreement."
However, if I then "Quit" MS Office on the Pro, and then try to launch it on the Air, I don't get the error message, and it works as normal. The same thing happens if I switch computers -- if it's running on the Air first, then I can't launch it on the Pro. Basically, only one of the computers can run MS Office at any one time.
Now, the issue about the MS license agreement is not what concerns me -- I guess the version of MS Office I bought back in 2008 was only supposed to be installed on one single computer, and never migrated to a new computer (I eventually plan to use the Air full time and retire the Pro). I'm probably going to get a newer version of MS Office eventually anyway, and also I almost never use both computers at the same time, so I'm not worried about being unable to use MS Office on both computes simultaneously. No, what worries me is this:
How does MS Office on one computer even know that my other computer is running and has MS Office open?
I'm not an expert on networks and sharing and connectivity and all that, so excuse me if I use inaccurate terminology, but...:
Both computers connect via AirPort to a cable modem and thus share the same wifi hotspot to connect to the internet.
But as far as I can tell, the two computers are not "connected" to each other. In the System Preferences for both computers, in the "Sharing" panel, all File Sharing is off. Also, none of the sharing boxes are checked.
Neither computer shows the hard drive of the other on its Desktop. If I wanted to, I could use Finder's "Go" menu, choose "Connect to server," then "Browse," then find the other computer, double-click on it, type in the admin password, and then connect the two computers. But I haven't done that, and MS Office is able to see what the other comoputer is doing, even when they aren't connected in any way (as far as I can tell).
I find this pretty disturbing. How in the world does the MS Office on one computer even know that the other computer exists? Furthermore, how does it know that the other computer is on and running? And lastly and more importantly, how does it know which programs are running on the other computer?
One extra detail: in order to try to diagnose this odd behavior, I installed a program called "Little Snitch" which monitors all network activity and notifies the user whenever any malware programs or other sneaky behind-the-scens apps try to send data over your connection without your knowledge. Little Snitch seems to work great but when I test the problem after installing it, Little Snitch did not even detect or report that MS Office was doing any surreptitious network snooping. So whatever MS Office is doing, it's doing it pretty sneakily.
Here is my worry: Could a hacker somehow exploit this capability of MS Office to monitor activity on my computer without my being aware of it? Or could someone re-adapt this snooping code from MS Office for more nefarious purposes?
Or am I completely misapprehending the situation somehow?
Any reassurance or explanation would be greatly appreciated! Thanks.

But my question is: How does the software do that?
It scans the local network for computers trying to "share" software that is only supposed to be licensed for one computer. I can't give you a technical answer, I can just tell you that's what it's doing.
then what's preventing less ethical coders from deploying similar but more sinister malware with the same capability?
Nothing. Any vendor of any software, from a one person shareware or freeware app to a company the size of Apple, Microsoft or Adobe could sneak in damaging code. Any company that wants to stay in business though would never allow it.
In a typical software company (particularly larger ones), you have not only the people who write the code, but also system analysts who review the code looking for flaws or anything else that shouldn't be there.
Now I have the fear that if I'm using a wifi hotspot in a cafe or wherever, someone else with hacking skills on that same hotspot could basically see what I'm doing on my computer, without my knowledge.
The software to pry (they hope undetected) into other folks' computers on an open network like that has been around for years. That's why you at least need to have your firewall enabled when using a wifi hotspot.

Possible Login Screen Security Hole in Lion?

I think that I have found a glitch in the login screen in Lion that allows a user to hack in to an account without a password! It appears to occur on Macbooks with OS X Lion and here is how to reproduce it:
Make sure that you account is password-protected and that you require a password 5 seconds after the screen saver/sleep begins. Also, be sure that you have the default "hot corner" settngs and OS X Lion. Lastly, make sure that Finder is on the farthest left icon on your dock and that your screen saver is set to spectrum!
Close all open windows to see your desktop.
Now, close you Macbook lid, wait 10 seconds, and open it up. You should see a screen similar to the one shown below, but with your wallpaper & info:
Now forcefully (yes, forcefully) restart your Mac by pressing down command, control, and the power button at the same time.
Wait for your Mac to start up and you should see the same screen you saw (like the image above.)
Click in the battery/time/wifi signal/etc. area in the top right corner without mousing over the courner.
Now, mouseover the top right corner of the screen, as it will launch some kind of odd "mission control". From there, ANYONE can control your Mac without seeing your screen. From there, mouse over where you think Finder is on the dock (in the bottom-left corner of the dock) without mousing over and corners of the screen and click it. That SHOULD launch finder on your Mac.
The login screen should reappear! (Odd, isn't it?)
Now, mouseover the bottom-left corner and hold esc as soon as the screen turns completely dark. If sucessful, you should see your screensaver show up. While holding esc, move your mouse around towards the bottom-right corner. You should see your cursor over top of the "wheel of doom".
The screen should flicker and you have hacked in to your account! Funny, isn't it?
You should see finder over top of your desktop if you located finder correctly in step 7! Cool?
If you are not sucessful, restart the entire process from step 4 and skip steps 7-8. If it doesn't work out for you after a few attemps, give up! Let's not waste any time on hacking in to an account (unless you are a hacker.)
Is it just me or can anyone else reproduce this? If it occurs (or not), please list your Macbook's specs and details in a reply.

jonathan_2005 wrote:
One of the options in the security panel permits a user to require that a username and password be entered to login once the screen saver locks your account.
The option is "Require password to wake this computer from sleep or screen saver"
Although one would assume that the credentials required to wake the computer is the username/password of the account that was being used when the computer went into sleep mode or the screen saver.
Never assume
WRONG!!! Anyone with an account on the machine can enter their username/password and wake the computer and voila that user now has control of the machine as the former user. That's right you guessed it HUGE security hole.
Anyone with a standard user account? Are you quite sure?
Anyone thinking that they can wake away from their machine and have the screen saver or sleep mode protect their account after a specified period of time is sadly mistaken. Anyone with an account on the machine can enter their own username and password and drop right into your account right where you left off.
I never think that way. A more secure lock is ensured by using the screen lock feature of the keychain.
Can you believe this stuff?
Not sure what stuff you refer to.
No warning, no release note to tell you of such a poorly designed "security" option.
Would you believe that anyone can access your computer? Stolen computers are regularly started up without much problem.
Apple please fix what must have been an oversight or at least tell people about this intentional design BEFORE they find anyone can wake the computer and become you as a user.
You are writing to other users like yourself here, not Apple.
I also presume you are new to the Mac world.

IGS: Vulnerability "security hole in level 3"

Hi!
We are using SAP ERP 6.0 system with an ingetrated IGS 7.0
We already changed IGS according to sap note 896400 to the version 7.00 (Patch 15)
When we run scan on demand we get the following information:
A security hole in level 3 was found at server ServerX.
Vulnerability-Level [highest]: 3
Vulnerability-Level [highest counted]: 0
Vulnerability Details
Date: Sun 10 May 2009 1:26:13 MET
Vuln: 300803
Vulnerability: SAPXPG Remote OS Command Execution at sysnr 3
ToDo: Set up a project to implement access restriction rules to RFC programs
with the 'secinfo' and 'reginfo' (only available in SAP Netweaver) mechanism
CertRef: M906071, SAP 30/08
Tool Reference: proprietary CERT and IPINS scanner
Comment:
Counted in: 2009-07
Monitor:
Date: Sun 10 May 2009 1:26:17 MET
Vuln#: 100806
Vulnerability: External Server Registration is possible at sysnr 3
ToDo: Secure remote registration of RFC programs (only possible in SAP Basis
7.00 and later)
CertRef: M906071
Tool Reference: proprietary CERT and IPINS scanner
Comment:
Counted in: 2009-07
Monitor:
Date: Sun 10 May 2009 1:26:17 MET
Vuln#: 101802
Vulnerability: IGS HTTP Administration is enabled and this version has
reported vulnerabilities at sysnr 3
ToDo: Upgrade to a higher patch level, i.e., for BC-FES-IGS 6.40 Patch Level
17 or higher and for BC-FES-IGS 7.00 Patch Level 07 or higher
CertRef: SAP 34/09
Tool Reference: proprietary CERT and IPINS scanner
Comment:
Counted in: 2009-07
Monitor:
End of Vulnerability Details
Question:
What we have to do to avoid s security holein level 3?
Thank you very much!
regards

Do you solved tye probllem below. ??? Can you help me.
I have the same problem.
What the format of secinfo, reginfo and what value to to profile gw/reg_no_conn_info ??
Thanks,
Vulnerability Details
Date: Sun 10 May 2009 1:26:13 MET
Vuln: 300803
Vulnerability: SAPXPG Remote OS Command Execution at sysnr 3
ToDo: Set up a project to implement access restriction rules to RFC programs
with the 'secinfo' and 'reginfo' (only available in SAP Netweaver) mechanism
CertRef: M906071, SAP 30/08
Tool Reference: proprietary CERT and IPINS scanner
Comment:
Counted in: 2009-07
Monitor:

IGS: Vulnerability (security hole in level 3 was found)

Hi!
We are using SAP ERP 6.0 system with an ingetrated IGS 7.0
We already changed IGS according to sap note 896400 to the version 7.00 (Patch 15)
When we run scan on demand we get the following information:
A security hole in level 3 was found at server ServerX.
Vulnerability-Level [highest]: 3
Vulnerability-Level [highest counted]: 0
Vulnerability Details
Date: Sun 10 May 2009 1:26:13 MET
Vuln: 300803
Vulnerability: SAPXPG Remote OS Command Execution at sysnr 3
ToDo: Set up a project to implement access restriction rules to RFC programs
with the 'secinfo' and 'reginfo' (only available in SAP Netweaver) mechanism
CertRef: M906071, SAP 30/08
Tool Reference: proprietary CERT and IPINS scanner
Comment:
Counted in: 2009-07
Monitor:
Date: Sun 10 May 2009 1:26:17 MET
Vuln#: 100806
Vulnerability: External Server Registration is possible at sysnr 3
ToDo: Secure remote registration of RFC programs (only possible in SAP Basis
7.00 and later)
CertRef: M906071
Tool Reference: proprietary CERT and IPINS scanner
Comment:
Counted in: 2009-07
Monitor:
Date: Sun 10 May 2009 1:26:17 MET
Vuln#: 101802
Vulnerability: IGS HTTP Administration is enabled and this version has
reported vulnerabilities at sysnr 3
ToDo: Upgrade to a higher patch level, i.e., for BC-FES-IGS 6.40 Patch Level
17 or higher and for BC-FES-IGS 7.00 Patch Level 07 or higher
CertRef: SAP 34/09
Tool Reference: proprietary CERT and IPINS scanner
Comment:
Counted in: 2009-07
Monitor:
End of Vulnerability Details
Question:
What we have to do to avoid s security holein level 3?
Thank you very much!
regards

Do you solved tye probllem below. ??? Can you help me.
I have the same problem.
What the format of secinfo, reginfo and what value to to profile gw/reg_no_conn_info ??
Thanks,
Vulnerability Details
Date: Sun 10 May 2009 1:26:13 MET
Vuln: 300803
Vulnerability: SAPXPG Remote OS Command Execution at sysnr 3
ToDo: Set up a project to implement access restriction rules to RFC programs
with the 'secinfo' and 'reginfo' (only available in SAP Netweaver) mechanism
CertRef: M906071, SAP 30/08
Tool Reference: proprietary CERT and IPINS scanner
Comment:
Counted in: 2009-07
Monitor:

Java security? shellcode, the different overflows ect...

I am under the impression that pretty much all exploiting, shellcoding, the overflows and related terms are pretty much C, C++ and assembly. maybe a couple other really old languages i forgot to add.
i read that the new languages including java has massive protection from this as it is an interpreted language, making exploitation with those languages near impossible. am i to believe once the older languages are phased out, all the security holes will be phased out as well? I really find that hard to believe, can someone give me some insight to that theory?
with the faster hardware speeds hitting the market every day, the best reasons for keeping C I believe was speed. when will the old languages like C / C++ or assembly be completely phased out? will that eliminate exploiting?

You are wasting peoples time here because:
a) you're asking someone to help you achieve something unethical (gimme >teh codez so i can hack teh jav)
b) didn't take the time necesry to research this yourself.a) i am not a script kiddie (anymore :P). I also never asked for something unethical like an exploit to a java program that can be loaded into metasploit or whatever. i simply asked the difference between java and the older languages in regards to exploiting. also asked where the security in that regard might go if the older languages got phased out. (did not expect a full apa style paper). paraphrasing the l33t talk is completely false. I never asked for 'code to hack java'. Sorry for being curious about the topic though. (sarcasm not sorry)
b) i looked in many different places and even watched full videos on the topic but all had to do with C... java might be a little new for that. (you guys even posted stories about it being a new thing proving that point). Ive downloaded docs, books, and many other ways all mainly saying c assembly and so on. i think the two simple questions were justified along with the duke points.
I would like to thank DrClap for not complaining and answering perfectly. If you take a look at his answer, youll find he gave me no info to get the garbage file. I will also look into that cached ip page that seems to have what I was looking for. Once again sorry for missing a cached google page. (not sorry) :) I do plan on becoming a hacker (im aware not yet, and I mean real hacker not cracker).
i do believe 'learn how to use google 'java exploit' seems like sarcasm and / or mockery. especially when the results were simple news stories that didnt really help. might just be me though. i have been known to be too sensitive. :P
Thanks again DrClap

SSL Security Hole in Safari 3

I noticed a security hole in Safari 3.2.2 regarding a webpage delivered over SSL when including content from a non-secure location. Ironically, I found this in the developer login for the iPhone developer login.
The login page, which shows as being on a SSL page with an https delivery is trying to load images, such as http://devimages.apple.com/login/images/hero.png. Notice that it is asking from the non-SSL http site.
Under the new IE8, it is now warning about this issue and gives option to block or not block the non-secure content.
Under Safari, it shows without warning.
The risk of displaying mixed content is that a non-secure webpage or script might be able to access information from the secure content, creating a security hole.
Running Safari under Vista Business X64
Lance

Do you solved tye probllem below. ??? Can you help me.
I have the same problem.
What the format of secinfo, reginfo and what value to to profile gw/reg_no_conn_info ??
Thanks,
Vulnerability Details
Date: Sun 10 May 2009 1:26:13 MET
Vuln: 300803
Vulnerability: SAPXPG Remote OS Command Execution at sysnr 3
ToDo: Set up a project to implement access restriction rules to RFC programs
with the 'secinfo' and 'reginfo' (only available in SAP Netweaver) mechanism
CertRef: M906071, SAP 30/08
Tool Reference: proprietary CERT and IPINS scanner
Comment:
Counted in: 2009-07
Monitor:

HUGE SECURITY HOLE IN LOGIN FROM SCREEN SAVER

One of the options in the security panel permits a user to require that a username and password be entered to login once the screen saver locks your account.
The option is "Require password to wake this computer from sleep or screen saver"
Although one would assume that the credentials required to wake the computer is the username/password of the account that was being used when the computer went into sleep mode or the screen saver. WRONG!!! Anyone with an account on the machine can enter their username/password and wake the computer and voila that user now has control of the machine as the former user. That's right you guessed it HUGE security hole.
Anyone thinking that they can wake away from their machine and have the screen saver or sleep mode protect their account after a specified period of time is sadly mistaken. Anyone with an account on the machine can enter their own username and password and drop right into your account right where you left off.
Can you believe this stuff? No warning, no release note to tell you of such a poorly designed "security" option.
Apple please fix what must have been an oversight or at least tell people about this intentional design BEFORE they find anyone can wake the computer and become you as a user.
Thanks,
JH

jonathan_2005 wrote:
One of the options in the security panel permits a user to require that a username and password be entered to login once the screen saver locks your account.
The option is "Require password to wake this computer from sleep or screen saver"
Although one would assume that the credentials required to wake the computer is the username/password of the account that was being used when the computer went into sleep mode or the screen saver.
Never assume
WRONG!!! Anyone with an account on the machine can enter their username/password and wake the computer and voila that user now has control of the machine as the former user. That's right you guessed it HUGE security hole.
Anyone with a standard user account? Are you quite sure?
Anyone thinking that they can wake away from their machine and have the screen saver or sleep mode protect their account after a specified period of time is sadly mistaken. Anyone with an account on the machine can enter their own username and password and drop right into your account right where you left off.
I never think that way. A more secure lock is ensured by using the screen lock feature of the keychain.
Can you believe this stuff?
Not sure what stuff you refer to.
No warning, no release note to tell you of such a poorly designed "security" option.
Would you believe that anyone can access your computer? Stolen computers are regularly started up without much problem.
Apple please fix what must have been an oversight or at least tell people about this intentional design BEFORE they find anyone can wake the computer and become you as a user.
You are writing to other users like yourself here, not Apple.
I also presume you are new to the Mac world.

A bit of a security hole in the HTML DB interface (apparently just XE)

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