DV7-4069wm ACPI table reset/recovery

Question

I have been unable to reset my acpi tables to factory defaults (firmware, not software).
They were modified remotely via rootkit on win7 and BIOS was flashed backwards to F23 from F28.
I cannot determine if I am running on flashed bios or a shadow variant as BIOS admin is locked out from all advanced features.
I am no longer able to do a recovery BIOS flash with win+b keys either from a EFI util created USB key or HP_TOOLS drive partition, nor a prepared efi HP_TOOLS CD. "remove any disks and press any key to reboot" message, which does not reboot - requires power reset. No BIOS recovery screen at all, simply disk/usb seeks, then message. Using the four arrow key combination, did result in a seemingly successful forceflash update of BIOS stamp, however did not display any BIOS recovery screen, nor fan speedup as expected during a classic flash.
In old win64 premium install, user admin context was overridden, and due to acpi injection any reinstall on windows is also compromised. In windows with SVM disabled in BIOS, all ata/usb runs via usb subsystem drivers, in Linux it always does. With SVM enabled in BIOS, windows reports ATA drivers, however ATA disk to disk traffic in either OS maxes out at 20Mb/s - usb2 speeds.
In Ubuntu 12.04 I see cyclic processes running with no userid, no pid which may correlate with bootlog messages of cwd, cmd as the kernel comes up.  I also see iterative ip scans from link-local to active wlan0 in the upper UDP ranges. IE. my hardware is scanning my (whichever) OS. When booting with a Hiren's boot CD in minixp -  process explorer reports 12,000 lsass.exe listings (via buffer overflow access) by the time I can get it open. This happens with NO HDDs at all and continues until the system BSODs. This is not a hardware problem...
I have pulled the cmos battery and generated a cmos checksum error and subsequent reboot, but cannot rid my machine of this malware. While I suspect it is in fact a variant of this:
Deactivating BIOS rootkit
I cannot confirm this and until it is removed the machine remains unsecured despite locked down ubuntu denying access. Hardware doesn't need to ask permission after all, and even ubuntu doesn't report hardware processes not under it's control.
So, my questions are:
1) How can I access the advanced BIOS menu on my dv7-4069wm (f10 then 'A') is fail.
2) Are ACPI tables updated via BIOS flash?
3) Are ACPI tables erased with CMOS battery removal?
4) How can I ensure my BIOS is not shadowed while reflashed with no BIOS menu to disable it?
5) How can I disable (or reset to dormant) the absolute firmware embedded in my bios for theft recovery because it seems like someone has stolen my hardware from my control. While this was purchased legally, troubleshooting this problem may have produced a similar race condition to activate computrace, or it may be the vehicle for my problems.
I have tested memory thoroughly, tried four (two new) HDDs, zero'd MBR w/live ubu cd between installs.
I welcome any input on this (links please) but leave this as a warning in the event  I do not see any.
There is BIOS malware out there, and even the stuff with best of intent (link above) holds little encrypted/authenticated security that it may be easily circumvented and taken over. I'm not looking to convince anyone, rather seeking help from those who understand the problem (or any portion herein). It seems many remain in denial that this can happen to them, and honestly it may have and you would never know until remote folks got sloppy (In my case rootkit w/popups - they got greedy)
TIA
-Hyar

Answer 1

Further History:
At one point I was (it seemed) able to flash using the win+b keys, and even successfully flahsed the version stamp using the arrow key "forceflash". The platform.ini it appears has no bearing on this type of flash however as it's not necessarily there and as such the "rom protected areas" reported by BIOS (and currently under remote owner control) do NOT get updated.
There is provision for updating portions of ROM including those reported protected using the platform.ini file called by the insyde win-flash tool, however it seems those now in charge have made provision to handle this.
In my user rights curcumvented windows, I am able to run the BIOS update extraction tool (runas admin), and subsequent insyde flash utility all at once (decompress, and run via selfex package). No success as defaults are either being burnt to inneffective ghost ROM, or the default platform.ini file does not flash protected areas including acpi. If however, I edit platform.ini changing ANYTHING (even one flag) - the OS reports incompatibility of flash tool.
I prepared an SD card (only way to write lock the HP_TOOLS folder) and a win+b recovery flash boot will seem to switch to flash mode (no screen bios load) but will not recognize the flashfile, or fails to flash it.
With an ubuntu live cd, any creation of a fat32 usb drive was thwarted when the filesystem was named "HP_TOOLS" as it was rewritten to "HP_TOOLS nA" on save. Nice catch, hacker.
Futher, There are mutliple ACPI entries for "BIOS read, BIOS write which I cannot seem to confirm should exist in ACPI at all.
Currently running laptop with no battery and cmos battery out.
This is a nasty tick and well burrowed.
I don't know who is reading this, but I hope it helps someone.
If you have a clue/hint/lead to offer I do welcome another perspective.