Security Concern for PX_TXN table

ADF saves model state in PX_TXN table and for that application module have to connect to the database with user which have access to insert and select data from PX_TXN table. Now my question was is there any security thread in that because any other user by knowing can access it and change the information of other users saved state or corrupt it. Any thought?

Just protect the db account (don't give out the user name and password). It's no different than protecting any other db schema.
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BIG CONCERN for data table columns bound to property.

Here the issue.
I have a data table with many columns of which:
1/ first group bound directly to database table columns.
2/ Second group bound indirectly to database table columns through properties (I need some extra formatting depends on the data of the database table�s columns).
When I display the page the first time it appears correct but when I go back to the page previously displayed the second group columns all get the last value of the bound properties.
What I guess is:
- The first group of columns get data from database.
- The second group of columns just get the value of the properties they were bound , the getXXXXXX method does not get called again because the page was already loaded ?�..So my second group displayed with the wrong data (the last value of property they were bound to).
BIG ISSUE�.when I redisplay the previous page. For example I am on page 3 when I go back to page 1 or page 2 they display the wrong data�
Is it the way it supposed to work ? If so how to force the getXXXXXX method called again to get the right property�s value not the last property�s value?
Thanks.

Here is what I am trying to do (this is a real application not with Pointbase bundled with jCreator).
I want to display a iSeries (AS/400) table in a data table but some columns I need to format suitably:
For example: I have a few date columns in my database table are numeric fields not date fields so if its value is zero I don�t need to display. What I do to display in data table is:
1/ To bind its value to a property let�s call it enteredDate of type java.sql.date
public Date getEnteredDate() {
Object o = getValue("#{dealDetaiSWAPl.dealRowSet1.currentRow['$SEND']}");
return getMyDateFromDdMmYy(o); this method is to convert $SEND from numeric to Date field.
2/ To bind rendered attribute to enteredDateRendered
public boolean isEnteredDateRendered() {
Object o = getValue("#{dealDetaiSWAPl.dealRowSet1.currentRow['$SEND']}");
return dateRendered(o);
public boolean isDateRendered(Object o) { /* This method I reuse elsewhere */
int date = java.lang.Integer.parseInt(o.toString());
if (date == 0)
return false;
else
return true;
When I display page 1 : it looks correct.
Ex: ��date1�..
��date2�..
��date3�..
Display page 2: it looks correct.
Ex: ��date4�..
��date5�..
��date6�..
Go back to page 1: all columns date have the same value of the first row
Ex: ��date1�..
��date1�..
��date1�..
I did not change anything in page navigation method.
By the way I notice that each time I go to table layout screen JSC deletes all components I added in the navigation gridPanel. So if I change something in them I have to restart the whole thing again.
Can you give me your email I will send you screenshots of my application.
Thanks.

Security Concern for new Safari 8.0.2 Update

New update has the following fix:
Fixes an issue that could prevent history from syncing across devices if iCloud Drive is not on
Does this mean Safari will upload you browser history to Apple regardless if iCloud is on or off now (i never use iCloud)? I have noticed (and blocked) safari uploading to mzstatic.com which is an Apple address (even prior to this update).
If so, this information farming/spying has gone crazy.

If I am not using iCloud that is, I have not signed up for an account through "System Preferences" will Safari upload browser history to Apple anyway (to a temporary account based on computer GUID perhaps)?

BB Browser Cipher RC4 128 bit Security Concerns

When you check Browserspy from your BlackBerry browser via this link:
http://browserspy.dk/
Then select "Security" from the list
Then select "SSL Encryption Check"
For my Z30 I get RC4 128 bit (see picture.)
I also get the same results using this test:
https://www.fortify.net/
There are security concerns for RC4 128 bit to the extent Microsoft has recommended not using it. See these two links:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RC4
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc179125.aspx
I do not have any device connecting to the web using RC4 128 bit.
Is there a way to change the cipher strength or order for the BlackBerry browser?
(Just as a side note - because BlackBerry uses WebKit for the browser (Apple uses WebKit) a lot of the browser tester sites pick it up as Safari. I woder if browser testing to determine market share doesn't flag some of Blackberry as Apple due to this "confusion.")
Solved!
Go to Solution.

foryour information, here is what I get for my desktop browsers :
AES128 for Mozilla Firefox 36.0
AES128 for Google Chromium 42.0
AES256 for MS Internet Explorer 11
and also...
AES128 for Mozilla Firefox 35.0.1 APK on my Passport
The search box on top-right of this page is your true friend, and the public Knowledge Base too:

When I attempt to open a new private browsing window, an "Index to file" window opens and shows everything on my hardrive.Concerned for security. What can I do?

When I opened Firefox prior to the update, my homepage had an address "file:///" and labeled "Index to file". the window showed all my hardrive files with links to other files. Concerned for security, I contacted computer support where I was told it may be malware. They cleared my caches and updated my operating system. When I updated Firefox and clicked on the private browsing icon (mask icon) The index to file window showed up again. What do I need to do to stop this from happening?

Hello,
I am glad to hear that your problem has been resolved. If you haven't already, please select the answer that solves the problem. This will help other users with similar problems find the solution more easily.
Thank you for contacting Mozilla Support.

RE: Client Not Modifiable for Z Tables

Hi all,
One of our developer created 3 custom Ztables, when he is testing in testing environment, he is able to modify 2 of them using SM30, but for one table it says "Client status not modifiable". i checked his profile and he got access to SM30 and also to S_TABU_CLI--> Allowed (X).
I dont know why it is not allowing this table to change and allows other tables to change ( I dont think this is any thing wrong with his authorization)
I also checked in SE11 and his delivery class is type "A" like the other 2 tables.
what else i need to check?
thanks,
Sun
Edited by: sun on Nov 19, 2008 3:53 PM

There was a little bug in SOBJ a while ago which let you change the owner of the object in a development system without transporting. But that should be fixed - as it is simply not an option anymore, also in a production system.
The better (more transparent) option in my opinion is to use the current settings flag if these tables are going to serve a "customizing" type function of the application and you want the flexibility to change them system specifically within your landscape without having to transport it and not wanting to open the (productive or test) client just to make a change of something non-critical for the application.
But you need to pick and choose them carefully. There are also some other settings which you might want to tighten the control on - for example very application sensitive master data.
Now I don't know what these tables are used for, but you did mention S_TABU_CLI being required so they are even client independent (most likely)... at least as far as their maintenance is to be concerned.
As you are asking this in the security forum (and not the ABAP or Data Dictionary forums), you might want to review the technical design of this solution...
It is not unknown that the developer and customizing roles find their way to production and used there with reliance on the SCC4 client settings either, and as these are client dependent... what are the settings of the other clients and the authority of the users in them?
But that is up to you. Certainly training and experience helps as well (which includes learning the hard way
I prefer the current settings to the client settings where the "use case" is justified.
Cheers,
Julius
ps: The one table which could not be changed, was it being changed from a different client than the other two?

Proper security structure for Single Sign on Server

We are all used to how we design security structure for vCenter Server if you have had an existing VMware environment prior to 5.1. Who should have administrative privileges in vCenter Server, what roles, permissions, and so on should be assigned to what users and groups - these questions have already been addressed in our current configuration.
Now Single Sign on introduces a significant new point of consideration for determining issues of access and authentication.
I'd like to get some ideas on how this should be handled. For example, should previous VMware administrators by definition become Single Sign on Administrators? Should the administrators of the Active Directory domain now start to get involved with the Single Sign on Server?
For example, Single Sign on now forces VMware administrators to configure things like:
-Password Complexity Policy for SSO
-Password Expiration for SSO
-Lockout Policy
We already probably have these things tightly controlled in AD and locked down with group policy, but you can't apply group policy directly to an SSO server and make it receive a GPO from Active Directory. (You can make the Windows OS that SSO is running on have a GPO applied, but it won't configure SSO itself, just the OS).
VMware admins are looking at a new set of questions relating to authentication and authorization. Someone has to have written something or will be writing something to help us get the big picture of what is changing with SSO if anything and how we need to look at SSO from a security design and best practices.
Should we just make existing vCenter Server admins SSO admins or do we need to take a step back and reconsider?

Hello,
Actually, yes. SSO is fairly robust in 5.5. It has a few limitations around email of expired passwords, but that is mainly because some people do not use them. I use SSO to provide the usernames and passwords for all my VMware vCenter and related product service accounts. I.e. an account for vdp, Horizon, vCops, Log Insight, etc. This is more about keeping systems segregated once more with no real need for AD for services. But AD via SSO is used by users.
Read the documentation, and determine how SSO fits into your current password policy and take a long hard look at your virtualization management environment. Is there a 1 service account per service talking directly to vCenter? If not, SSO can help you implement that. The key is to match its functionality to your security policy.
Best regards,
Edward L. Haletky
VMware Communities User Moderator, VMware vExpert 2009, 2010, 2011,2012,2013,2014
Author of the books 'VMWare ESX and ESXi in the Enterprise: Planning Deployment Virtualization Servers', Copyright 2011 Pearson Education. 'VMware vSphere and Virtual Infrastructure Security: Securing the Virtual Environment', Copyright 2009 Pearson Education.
Virtualization and Cloud Security Analyst: The Virtualization Practice, LLC -- vSphere Upgrade Saga -- Virtualization Security Round Table Podcast

Help w/ Security Settings for Mobile Hotspot w/ 2.2

I posted this over on moto's forum yesterday, but so far I've gotten no response. I figured I go ahead & post it here also, to see if some(1) may be able to help me w/ it:
I've searched far & wide, & haven't been able to come up w/ an answer to this. I would very much appreciate any info, advice, or education on this.
When I travel, I use the X to connect my laptop (HP notebook w/ Vista home prem) to the net, thru the hotspot. I've only been able to connect thru the hotspot using the WEP security setting. Since updtg. to (2.2), still can only connect using WEP setting. Now the only post I've been able to find w/ anything @ all about the hotspot & the security settings, was just a post about the steps to initially set it up. That was here on this forum & there were screen shots of pages frm the vzw site that (1) of the vzw employees had posted to answer that question. It showed WAP - 2 being used.
Now frm what I've read & understand, from searching for info on the diff. between the (2) settings, is that WAP / WAP - 2 is a much more secure setting than WEP. Also, I try to read-up on this kind of stuff to learn it, however, I'm still doing just that, learning & don't completely understand the diff. frm a tech. standpnt. I do sometimes do banking & paying bills online while traveling, so this is a major concern for me.
Is the diff. between the security of the (2) settings enough to worry about, as far as the fact that I'm dealing w/ personal info? Obviously, I don't need somebody in next hotel rm., etc., being able to get into my connection & see my info on my laptop. Also, has any(1) had any luck connecting thru the hotspot w/ WAP or WAP - 2 on their laptop? If so, is the problem poss. settings on my laptop? Thank u in advance any help ya'll can offer.
pcw67427

Ahh, okay, P.C., I see what you are talking about.
Network security is something that I've thrown myself into pretty heavily this year as we are more and more deploying networks within our audio and lighting systems for shows and concerts. In one instance, we have digital mixing consoles that can be controlled via that console's editing software running on a PC (or Mac, if you will). There are times where, instead of having the typical huge mixing console, 3 or 4 racks of power supplies, processing and effects units, and other supplies, I have a nice, comfortable chair and my X200 tablet PC mixing the entire show. I use the basic Linksys router connected to my Gateway notebook, the console, or consoles, and the speaker systems' processors. Then I use the X200 and Remote Desktop to, well, remotely control all of that. One of my purchases later this year will be a real enterprise router, hopefully for more range and speed.
Naturally, it would suck to no end if someone were to hack into my WLAN network, thinking they were logging onto someone's network to steal some internet time. The havoc that this could cause could potentially be a show-stopper. Or in extreme cases, cause some damage from accidental overdriving something.
Unfortunately, I've only been able to learn some very basic things because of my work load, shows, and just time in general. But I have learned that WEP is fairly easy to crack, while WPA is much, much harder, and WPA-2 being even more secure. What I would learn to know is WHY this is the case. I have enabled the WPA-2 security features in all of my routers. I also use the MAC address filters, although, yes, MAC addresses can be spoofed without too much trouble. But it's another layer of protection.
As I mentioned in the PM, I plan to enable the hotspot feature on my account this week and play with the X's hotspot capability during our upcoming state fair. I'll be looking at the security settings pretty closely since I know how those road guys are (since I AM one, LOL), constantly hunting for a connection to log onto, LOL.
As I said, I'm woefully lacking in thorough knowledge about network security. I'll bet there are some real wizs (wizi?) around here that can be more help than I can. I have heard a couple of IT guys say that they never, ever do banking and financial business on ANY wifi connection, regardless of the security method used. One of these guys has said that he'd rather do banking over a good 3G connection that he would any kind of WLAN. Whether there's anything one way or the other to these claims, I simply don't know, but I'd love to find out.
One thing is for certain...Hotels are FULL of folks hunting for internet connections and logging onto anything they can, err, get their hands on. So it goes without saying that you need better encryption than WEP if you plan to do financial stuff online. I haven't looked, but can you turn off the SSID on the X's hotspot feature? That would at least, not tell the world about the network you have, LOL
Hopefully, I'll learn some more next week. In the meantime, I hope some IT types can comment on this subject, And thanx in advance,
Take care,
Geri O

Best Security Settings for Mac Newbie

Hello
I'm new Mac user (OS X 10.9) and am still trying to get to grips with Apple's OS.
Hopefully this question won't have been asked too many times before! Sorry
In 'settings' - 'security & privacy', how should I configure it?
It's just me using the computer and I guess I'm an average home user and don't have anything particulaly sensitive on the laptop. I have encryted my 'financial stuff' folder into a .dmg file? Plus I don't tend to access or download any dodgy stuff, pirated software/music, etc, or ****.
But I obviously I still want to try to prevent hackers, viruses, malware, etc. When I used to have a windows computer I used to use 3rd security software. Do I need to purchase similar for my Mac, and if so any recommndations?
Regards Richard

1. This is a comment on what you should and should not do to protect yourself from malicious software ("malware") that circulates on the Internet. It does not apply to software, such as keystroke loggers, that may be installed deliberately by an intruder who has hands-on access to your computer, or who has been able to log in to it remotely. That threat is in a different category, and there's no easy way to defend against it. If you have reason to suspect that you're the target of such an attack, you need expert help.
If you find this comment too long or too technical, read only sections 5, 6, and 10.
OS X now implements three layers of built-in protection specifically against malware, not counting runtime protections such as execute disable, sandboxing, system library randomization, and address space layout randomization that may also guard against other kinds of exploits.
2. All versions of OS X since 10.6.7 have been able to detect known Mac malware in downloaded files, and to block insecure web plugins. This feature is transparent to the user. Internally Apple calls it "XProtect."
The malware recognition database used by XProtect is automatically updated; however, you shouldn't rely on it, because the attackers are always at least a day ahead of the defenders.
The following caveats apply to XProtect:
It can be bypassed by some third-party networking software, such as BitTorrent clients and Java applets.
It only applies to software downloaded from the network. Software installed from a CD or other media is not checked.
As new versions of OS X are released, it's not clear whether Apple will indefinitely continue to maintain the XProtect database of older versions such as 10.6. The security of obsolete system versions may eventually be degraded. Security updates to the code of obsolete systems will stop being released at some point, and that may leave them open to other kinds of attack besides malware.
3. Starting with OS X 10.7.5, there has been a second layer of built-in malware protection, designated "Gatekeeper" by Apple. By default, applications and Installer packages downloaded from the network will only run if they're digitally signed by a developer with a certificate issued by Apple. Software certified in this way hasn't necessarily been tested by Apple, but you can be reasonably sure that it hasn't been modified by anyone other than the developer. His identity is known to Apple, so he could be held legally responsible if he distributed malware. That may not mean much if the developer lives in a country with a weak legal system (see below.)
Gatekeeper doesn't depend on a database of known malware. It has, however, the same limitations as XProtect, and in addition the following:
It can easily be disabled or overridden by the user.
A malware attacker could get control of a code-signing certificate under false pretenses, or could simply ignore the consequences of distributing codesigned malware.
An App Store developer could find a way to bypass Apple's oversight, or the oversight could fail due to human error.
For the reasons given above, App Store products, and other applications recognized by Gatekeeper as signed, are safer than others, but they can't be considered absolutely safe. "Sandboxed" applications may prompt for access to private data, such as your contacts, or for access to the network. Think before granting that access. Sandboxing security is based on user input. Never click through any request for authorization without thinking.
4. Starting with OS X 10.8.3, a third layer of protection has been added: a "Malware Removal Tool" (MRT). MRT runs automatically in the background when you update the OS. It checks for, and removes, malware that may have evaded the other protections via a Java exploit (see below.) MRT also runs when you install or update the Apple-supplied Java runtime (but not the Oracle runtime.) Like XProtect, MRT is effective against known threats, but not against unknown ones. It notifies you if it finds malware, but otherwise there's no user interface to MRT.
5. The built-in security features of OS X reduce the risk of malware attack, but they're not absolute protection. The first and best line of defense is always going to be your own intelligence. With the possible exception of Java exploits, all known malware circulating on the Internet that affects a fully-updated installation of OS X 10.6 or later takes the form of so-called "Trojan horses," which can only have an effect if the victim is duped into running them. The threat therefore amounts to a battle of wits between you and Internet criminals. If you're smarter than they think you are, you'll win. That means, in practice, that you always stay within a safe harbor of computing practices. How do you know when you're leaving the safe harbor? Below are some red flags that indicate danger.
Software from an untrustworthy source
Software of any kind is distributed via BitTorrent or Usenet.
Software with a corporate brand, such as Adobe Flash Player, doesn't come directly from the developer’s website.
Rogue websites such as Softonic and CNET Download distribute free applications that have been packaged in a superfluous "installer."
The software is advertised by means of spam or intrusive web popups.
Software that is plainly illegal or does something illegal
Software that you would otherwise have to pay for is "cracked" or "free."
An application helps you to infringe copyright, for instance by circumventing the copy protection on commercial software, or saving streamed media for reuse without permission.
Conditional or unsolicited offers from strangers
A telephone caller or a web page tells you that you have a “virus” and offers to help you remove it. (Some reputable websites did legitimately warn visitors who were infected with the "DNSChanger" malware. That exception to this rule no longer applies.)
A web site offers free content such as video or music, but to use it you must install a “codec,” “plug-in,” "player," "downloader," "extractor," or “certificate” that comes from that same site, or an unknown one.
You win a prize in a contest you never entered.
Someone on a message board such as this one is eager to help you, but only if you download an application of his choosing.
A "FREE WI-FI !!!" network advertises itself in a public place such as an airport, but is not provided by the management.
Unexpected events
You open what looks like a document and get an alert that it's "an application downloaded from the Internet." Click Cancel and delete the file or message.
An application does something you don't expect, such as asking for permission to access your contacts, your location, or the Internet for no obvious reason.
Software is attached to email that you didn't request, even if it comes (or seems to come) from someone you trust.
I don't say that leaving the safe harbor just once will necessarily result in disaster, but making a habit of it will weaken your defenses against malware attack. Any of the above scenarios should, at the very least, make you uncomfortable.
6. Java on the Web (not to be confused with JavaScript, to which it's not related, despite the similarity of the names) is a weak point in the security of any system. Java is, among other things, a platform for running complex applications in a web page, on the client. That was always a bad idea, and Java's developers have proven themselves incapable of implementing it without also creating a portal for malware to enter. Past Java exploits are the closest thing there has ever been to a Windows-style virus affecting OS X. Merely loading a page with malicious Java content could be harmful.
Fortunately, client-side Java on the Web is obsolete and mostly extinct. Only a few outmoded sites still use it. Try to hasten the process of extinction by avoiding those sites, if you have a choice. Forget about playing games or other non-essential uses of Java.
Java is not included in OS X 10.7 and later. Discrete Java installers are distributed by Apple and by Oracle (the developer of Java.) Don't use either one unless you need it. Most people don't. If Java is installed, disable it — not JavaScript — in your browsers.
Regardless of version, experience has shown that Java on the Web can't be trusted. If you must use a Java applet for a task on a specific site, enable Java only for that site in Safari. Never enable Java for a public website that carries third-party advertising. Use it only on well-known, login-protected, secure websites without ads. In Safari 6 or later, you'll see a lock icon in the address bar with the abbreviation "https" when visiting a secure site.
Stay within the safe harbor, and you’ll be as safe from malware as you can practically be. The rest of this comment concerns what you should not do to protect yourself.
7. Never install any commercial "anti-virus" or "Internet security" products for the Mac, as they all do more harm than good, if they do any good at all. If you need to be able to detect Windows malware in your files, use one of the free security apps in the Mac App Store — nothing else.
Why shouldn't you use commercial "anti-virus" products?
To recognize malware, the software depends on a database of known threats, which is always at least a day out of date. New threats are emerging on a daily basis. Research has shown that most successful attacks are "zero-day" — that is, previously unknown. Recognition-based malware scanners do not defend against such attacks.
Their design is predicated on the nonexistent threat that malware may be injected at any time, anywhere in the file system. Malware is downloaded from the network; it doesn't materialize from nowhere.
In order to meet that nonexistent threat, the software modifies or duplicates low-level functions of the operating system, which is a waste of resources and a common cause of instability, bugs, and poor performance.
By modifying the operating system, the software itself may create weaknesses that could be exploited by malware attackers.
8. An anti-malware product from the App Store, such as "ClamXav," has the same drawback as the commercial suites of being always out of date, but it does not inject code into the operating system. That doesn't mean it's entirely harmless. It may report email messages that have "phishing" links in the body, or Windows malware in attachments, as infected files, and offer to delete or move them. Doing so will corrupt the Mail database. The messages should be deleted from within the Mail application.
An anti-virus app is not needed, and should not be relied upon, for protection against OS X malware. It's useful only for detecting Windows malware, and even for that use it's not completely effective. Windows malware can't harm you directly (unless, of course, you use Windows.) Just don't pass it on to anyone else.
A Windows malware attachment in email is usually easy to recognize. The file name will often be targeted at people who aren't very bright; for example:
♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥!!!!!!!H0TBABEZ4U!!!!!!!.AVI♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥.exe
Anti-virus software may be able to tell you which particular trojan it is, but do you really care? In practice, there's seldom a reason to use the software unless an institutional policy requires it. Windows malware is so widespread that you should assume it's in every unknown email attachment until proven otherwise.
The ClamXav developer won't try to "upsell" you to a paid version of the product. Other developers may do that. Don't be upsold. For one thing, you should not pay to protect Windows users from the consequences of their choice of computing platform. For another, a paid upgrade from a free app will probably have all the disadvantages mentioned in section 7.
9. It seems to be a common belief that the built-in Application Firewall acts as a barrier to infection, or prevents malware from functioning. It does neither. It blocks inbound connections to certain network services you're running, such as file sharing. It's disabled by default and you should leave it that way if you're behind a router on a private home or office network. Activate it only when you're on an untrusted network, for instance a public Wi-Fi hotspot, where you don't want to provide services. Disable any services you don't use in the Sharing preference pane. All are disabled by default.
10. As a Mac user you don't have to live in fear that your computer may be infected every time you install software, read email, or visit a web page. But neither should you assume that you will always be safe from exploitation, no matter what you do. The greatest harm done by security software is precisely its selling point: it makes people feel safe. They may then feel safe enough to take risks from which the software doesn't protect them. "Hmmmm, this torrent is a crack of that new game I want. I think I'll download it. It could be a trojan, but the antivirus will warn me if it is." Then they wonder why their Mac is so slow all of a sudden. It's slow because it's running flat out mining bitcoins for a hacker who has already sold their credit card number and banking passwords to a criminal gang. Maybe a week later the antivirus does warn them, but what good does that do?
Nothing can lessen the need for safe computing practices.

RFC-enabled authorization checks for specific tables?

I am developing an Excel application which calls several BAPIs and RFC-enabled FMs, most notably RFC_READ_TABLE. While I will provide security at the FM level by checking S_RFC for these FMs, I need to find a way of restricting access for users to specific tables based on certain table fields? Is there any SAP-delivered FM/BAPI that will let me do this?
My understanding is that although RFC_READ_TABLE does check S_TABU_DIS, it only checks tables based on their belonging to a particular table classIt is not checking authorization for an individual table. What this means is that users will need to have access to the table class or classes to which the table or tables belong, for any tables that are being read by RFC_READ_TABLE.
Please correct me if I am wrong in my understanding, or if there is a standard solution for a situation like this.

Hi john,
1. What this means is that users will need to have access to the table class or classes to which the table or tables belong, for any tables that are being read by RFC_READ_TABLE.
U are perfectly right.
2. The users will have to be given rights
   NOT TABLE WISE,
   But authorisation group wise.
3. Note : S_TABU_DIS
   The main purpose of this authorisation object
   is for standard tools like sm30 only.
   Its also used in the FM RFC_READ_TABLE .
regards,
amit m.

Internet security suites for Mac

With the various internet security suites on the market, I wonder which one would be a good one to purchase? I tend to be very leery of the reviews I read of these various security suites. Therefore any feedback would be most appreicated. Thanks Dave

1. This comment applies to malicious software ("malware") that's installed unwittingly by the victim of a network attack. It does not apply to software, such as keystroke loggers, that may be installed deliberately by an intruder who has hands-on access to the victim's computer. That threat is in a different category, and there's no easy way to defend against it. If you have reason to suspect that you're the target of such an attack, you need expert help.
OS X now implements three layers of built-in protection specifically against malware, not counting runtime protections such as execute disable, sandboxing, system library randomization, and address space layout randomization that may also guard against other kinds of exploits.
2. All versions of OS X since 10.6.7 have been able to detect known Mac malware in downloaded files, and to block insecure web plugins. This feature is transparent to the user, but internally Apple calls it "XProtect." The malware recognition database is automatically checked for updates once a day; however, you shouldn't rely on it, because the attackers are always at least a day ahead of the defenders.
The following caveats apply to XProtect:
It can be bypassed by some third-party networking software, such as BitTorrent clients and Java applets.
It only applies to software downloaded from the network. Software installed from a CD or other media is not checked.
3. Starting with OS X 10.7.5, there has been a second layer of built-in malware protection, designated "Gatekeeper" by Apple. By default, applications and Installer packages downloaded from the network will only run if they're digitally signed by a developer with a certificate issued by Apple. Software certified in this way hasn't necessarily been tested by Apple, but you can be reasonably sure that it hasn't been modified by anyone other than the developer. His identity is known to Apple, so he could be held legally responsible if he distributed malware. That may not mean much if the developer lives in a country with a weak legal system (see below.)
Gatekeeper doesn't depend on a database of known malware. It has, however, the same limitations as XProtect, and in addition the following:
It can easily be disabled or overridden by the user.
A malware attacker could get control of a code-signing certificate under false pretenses, or could simply ignore the consequences of distributing codesigned malware.
An App Store developer could find a way to bypass Apple's oversight, or the oversight could fail due to human error.
For the reasons given above, App Store products, and other applications recognized by Gatekeeper as signed, are safer than others, but they can't be considered absolutely safe. "Sandboxed" applications may prompt for access to private data, such as your contacts, or for access to the network. Think before granting that access. OS X security is based on user input. Never click through any request for authorization without thinking.
4. Starting with OS X 10.8.3, a third layer of protection has been added: a "Malware Removal Tool" (MRT). MRT runs automatically in the background when you update the OS. It checks for, and removes, malware that may have evaded the other protections via a Java exploit (see below.) MRT also runs when you install or update the Apple-supplied Java runtime (but not the Oracle runtime.) Like XProtect, MRT is presumably effective against known attacks, but maybe not against unknown attacks. It notifies you if it finds malware, but otherwise there's no user interface to MRT.
5. XProtect, Gatekeeper, and MRT reduce the risk of malware attack, but they're not absolute protection. The first and best line of defense is always your own intelligence. With the possible exception of Java exploits, all known malware circulating on the Internet that affects a fully-updated installation of OS X 10.6 or later takes the form of so-called "trojan horses," which can only have an effect if the victim is duped into running them. The threat therefore amounts to a battle of wits between you and the malware attacker. If you're smarter than he thinks you are, you'll win.
That means, in practice, that you never use software that comes from an untrustworthy source, or that does something inherently untrustworthy. How do you know what is trustworthy?
Any website that prompts you to install a “codec,” “plug-in,” "player," "extractor," or “certificate” that comes from that same site, or an unknown one, is untrustworthy.
A web operator who tells you that you have a “virus,” or that anything else is wrong with your computer, or that you have won a prize in a contest you never entered, is trying to commit a crime with you as the victim. (Some reputable websites did legitimately warn visitors who were infected with the "DNSChanger" malware. That exception to this rule no longer applies.)
Pirated copies or "cracks" of commercial software, no matter where they come from, are unsafe.
Software of any kind downloaded from a BitTorrent or from a Usenet binary newsgroup is unsafe.
Software that purports to help you do something that's illegal or that infringes copyright, such as saving streamed audio or video for reuse without permission, is unsafe. All YouTube "downloaders" are in this category, though not all are necessarily harmful.
Software with a corporate brand, such as Adobe Flash Player, must be downloaded directly from the developer’s website. If it comes from any other source, it's unsafe.
Even signed applications, no matter what the source, should not be trusted if they do something unexpected, such as asking for permission to access your contacts, your location, or the Internet for no obvious reason.
6. Java on the Web (not to be confused with JavaScript, to which it's not related, despite the similarity of the names) is a weak point in the security of any system. Java is, among other things, a platform for running complex applications in a web page, on the client. That was always a bad idea, and Java's developers have proven themselves incapable of implementing it without also creating a portal for malware to enter. Past Java exploits are the closest thing there has ever been to a Windows-style virus affecting OS X. Merely loading a page with malicious Java content could be harmful.
Fortunately, client-side Java on the Web is obsolete and mostly extinct. Only a few outmoded sites still use it. Try to hasten the process of extinction by avoiding those sites, if you have a choice. Forget about playing games or other non-essential uses of Java.
Java is not included in OS X 10.7 and later. Discrete Java installers are distributed by Apple and by Oracle (the developer of Java.) Don't use either one unless you need it. Most people don't. If Java is installed, disable it — not JavaScript — in your browsers.
Regardless of version, experience has shown that Java on the Web can't be trusted. If you must use a Java applet for a task on a specific site, enable Java only for that site in Safari. Never enable Java for a public website that carries third-party advertising. Use it only on well-known, login-protected, secure websites without ads. In Safari 6 or later, you'll see a lock icon in the address bar with the abbreviation "https" when visiting a secure site.
Follow the above guidelines, and you’ll be as safe from malware as you can practically be. The rest of this comment concerns what you should not do to protect yourself from malware.
7. Never install any commercial "anti-virus" or "Internet security" products for the Mac, as they all do more harm than good, if they do any good at all. Any database of known threats is always going to be out of date. Most of the danger is from unknown threats. If you need to be able to detect Windows malware in your files, use the free software ClamXav— nothing else.
Why shouldn't you use commercial "anti-virus" products?
Their design is predicated on the nonexistent threat that malware may be injected at any time, anywhere in the file system. Malware is downloaded from the network; it doesn't materialize from nowhere.
In order to meet that nonexistent threat, the software modifies or duplicates low-level functions of the operating system, which is a waste of resources and a common cause of instability, bugs, and poor performance.
By modifying the operating system, the software itself may create weaknesses that could be exploited by malware attackers.
8. ClamXav doesn't have these drawbacks. That doesn't mean it's entirely safe. It may report email messages that have "phishing" links in the body, or Windows malware in attachments, as infected files, and offer to delete or move them. Doing so will corrupt the Mail database. The messages should be deleted from within the Mail application.
ClamXav is not needed, and should not be relied upon, for protection against OS X malware. It's useful only for detecting Windows malware. Windows malware can't harm you directly (unless, of course, you use Windows.) Just don't pass it on to anyone else.
A Windows malware attachment in email is usually easy to recognize. The file name will often be targeted at people who aren't very bright; for example:
♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥!!!!!!!H0TBABEZ4U!!!!!!!.AVI♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥.exe
ClamXav may be able to tell you which particular virus or trojan it is, but do you care? In practice, there's seldom a reason to use ClamXav unless a network administrator requires you to run an anti-virus application.
9. The greatest harm done by security software, in my opinion, is in its effect on human behavior. It does little or nothing to protect people from emerging "zero-day" threats, but if they get a false sense of security from it, they may feel free to do things that expose them to higher risk. Nothing can lessen the need for safe computing practices.
10. It seems to be a common belief that the built-in Application Firewall acts as a barrier to infection, or prevents malware from functioning. It does neither. It blocks inbound connections to certain network services you're running, such as file sharing. It's disabled by default and you should leave it that way if you're behind a router on a private home or office network. Activate it only when you're on an untrusted network, for instance a public Wi-Fi hotspot, where you don't want to provide services. Disable any services you don't use in the Sharing preference pane. All are disabled by default.

Security concern when selling broken 3G

I have an old iphone 3g that was submerged in water. I tried the "bag of rice" trick, but that didn't work so I bought a new 4S. My questions is: what are the security concerns of seeling the 3g on craigslist? I can't turn the phone on to reset it to factory settings. Is there anything I can do? Thanks for any input.

Oh you would be surprised lol. Check ebay and you'll see broken 3G's going around the $50 range. They're only good for spare parts i would think.

ORA-47401: Realm violation for create table on SYS.REGISTRY$HISTORY

Hi i have 10.2.0.4 db with db vault on RHEL4. I am applying jan2010 patch on it. After applying patch when i am trying to recompile views i am facing the below error.(I am executing this after starting up database in upgrade mode)
SQL> @$ORACLE_HOME/cpu/view_recompile/view_recompile_jan2008cpu.sql
BEGIN
ERROR at line 1:
ORA-47401: Realm violation for create table on SYS.REGISTRY$HISTORY
ORA-06512: at line 16
Disconnected from Oracle Database 10g Enterprise Edition Release 10.2.0.4.0 - Production
With the Partitioning, Oracle Label Security, OLAP, Data Mining,
Oracle Database Vault and Real Application Testing options
[oracle@rac1 view_recompile]$
Plese help me on this.
Regards,
snp

Perhaps you are tripping over Bug 6928496. I suspect best bet is to open a SR with Oracle rather than hope for similar occurance within the user community.

Fiori security concern

Hi All
We are now receiving security concerns from customer about FIORI.
1.Information Leakage:
     for instance , when we clicked an item , then it failed, and we got the error message which might cause information leakage.
     Is it possible that the backend could provide some general information with no sensitive information involved.
2.remember password option:
     after entering the password and username, the browser will prompt if you want to remember the password. there is security concern to remember password in browser. Is it possible to disable this pop-up window, that is , is it possible to Set auto complete off in every form that is getting submitted.
Thanks
Message was edited by: Michael Appleby

Hi Torren,
i don't want to be a smartass, but do you really think it's a good idea to post an image, where you can see a productive URL of a customer? When we talk about security, we should start to hide or obfuscate such information, which are absolutely not necessary to investigate an issue. I think the customer itself doesn't want to see this information in a forum, which is available for everyone in the internet. Besides: Never post a real User of a productive System in a forum!!! I couldn't believe, that your Test-User "TEST*****" is actual a real one. A hacker has now perfect premises to start an attack on this system!
Because i myself am a customer of SAP, i have the expectations, that SAP always works confidential with my data.
Sry, if i can't answer your questions, but this topic is very important for me!
Regards
Michael

Security Enclosure for Time Capsule?

I'm concerned about losing my iMac to theft, so I back it up on a Time Capsule. The only problem is that the TC is only slightly less prone to being stolen than the iMac, since I hide it under my desk.
I've looked around for some kind of secure enclosure for it that could be bolted to the floor or underneath the desk, but have only been able to find fireproof safes and security boxes that don't have air and cabling openings to allow the unit to run while it's enclosed.
Anyone know of a secure enclosure for a (running) Time Capsule?

Can you not just use the security slot on the back of it and attache a cable lock to it?

Security Concern for PX_TXN table

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