Is cfinsert and cfupdate open to SQL Injection

Hello All,
I'm looking for a real answer on if cfinsert and cfupdate are vulnerability to SQL Injection. The closest thing I can find from Adobe is Ben Forta's Personal recommendation. I was hoping to find some form of "official note" in the live docs to indicate there is a SQL Injection issue with cfinsert - cfupdate. (Other than someone's post to Ben's Blog)
http://www.forta.com/blog/index.cfm/2006/10/3/Use-CFINSERT-And-CFUPDATE
In this forum I have seen this question asked, and the only answer is "You should validate your inputs". Yes, you should, but that does not answer the question of if cfinsert and cfupdate is vulnerability to SQL Injection.
I have found this blog entry that if I interpret is correctly from his findings cfinsert and cfupdate where only vulnerability to SQL Injection IF you did not give cfinsert - cfupdate the list of fields to take action on. -Is this true?
http://blog.securityps.com/2009/05/demystifying-cfinsert-sql-injection.html
Also, on a closely related note, is cfinsert - cfupdate on ColdFusion 9 also vulnerable? If so, why? Seems like a BUG that could be easly addressed by the CF server team.
Thank you,

I do agree with you here. But to be devil's advocate for a second: the same could be said of <cfquery>. One has to take additional measures to ensure the same vulnerabilities are mitigated with that.
I'm not sure that it's really news that these two tags are not the most well-thought-out features in the CF arsenal, and if you listen to most opinions in the community regarding <cfinsert> and <cfupdate>, it's: "don't use them".
They're great for quick and dirty insert/update processes in internal or test code, but I'd never use them in production.
It also remains a fact that any external input (form fields, URL param) must be validated as being kosher and within expected margins before they're used in any way. That is just common sense. And if one neglects to do that: one brings any eventuality onto one's self. The problem here really is with people not doing their "due diligence" on externally sourced data, not specififcally with <cfinsert>, <cfupdate> or <cfquery>.
Still: I think Adobe should make it more clear in the docs that additional measures need to be take to make them safe. And by that time... one might as well use a <cfquery> to do the SQL.
Adam

Similar Messages

SQL injection embeded .js file to execute CF hack

I am a programmer sent to investigate suspicious activity at
a client's web application. I cannot attach a file in case of
infection potential. The Coldfusion code is open to SQL injection
attack which is how we believe the Apache web server became
infected. Upon investigation we found javascript files which had
been written with CFML code programatically scripted to fit within
a .js javascript file and write and read data from the server.
Has ANYONE seen this type of attack before? I cannot disclose
the client or specific data as we are under a NDA (Non-Disclosure
Agreement), however, I need help of other Coldfusion programmers to
fully understand this attack. Has anyone seen CFML code programmed
into a .js javascript file and run by calling the .js javascript
file before?
We have found japanese or chinese language within the code
and within files on the server. The client states they have NOT
installed any language packs or anything referencing other
languages than English. There have been japanese characters found
on the database server. There are hundreds of .js and .xml files on
the server which reference japanese. Furthermore, we have found
many XML files on the server,but the client does not use .xml so
these .xml files would then be foreign and potentially
programatically scripted by the server launching code to write
these files under the un-knowing eyes of the client.
So we need to understand the limits or potential threats:
1. Can CFML scripting be embedded into a .js javascript file
2. If database parameters are not locked, what are the
possible attacks available to SQL injection
Any help would be appreciated.
Thank you in advance.
Alex Dove

1. Only if the server is set to parse a .js file as CFML
2. A lot!
http://www.forta.com/blog/index.cfm/2008/7/22/For-Goodness-Sake-Use-CFQUERYPARAM-Already
http://www.forta.com/blog/index.cfm/2008/7/23/Hacker-Webzine-Recommends-Use-Of-CFQUERYPARA M
Ken Ford
Adobe Community Expert - Dreamweaver/ColdFusion
Fordwebs, LLC
http://www.fordwebs.com
"ajdove" <[email protected]> wrote in
message news:[email protected]...
>
> I am a programmer sent to investigate suspicious
activity at a client's web
> application. I cannot attach a file in case of infection
potential. The
> Coldfusion code is open to SQL injection attack which is
how we believe the
> Apache web server became infected. Upon investigation we
found javascript
> files which had been written with CFML code
programatically scripted to fit
> within a .js javascript file and write and read data
from the server.
>
> Has ANYONE seen this type of attack before? I cannot
disclose the client or
> specific data as we are under a NDA (Non-Disclosure
Agreement), however, I need
> help of other Coldfusion programmers to fully understand
this attack. Has
> anyone seen CFML code programmed into a .js javascript
file and run by calling
> the .js javascript file before?
>
> We have found japanese or chinese language within the
code and within files on
> the server. The client states they have NOT installed
any language packs or
> anything referencing other languages than English. There
have been japanese
> characters found on the database server. There are
hundreds of .js and .xml
> files on the server which reference japanese.
Furthermore, we have found many
> XML files on the server,but the client does not use .xml
so these .xml files
> would then be foreign and potentially programatically
scripted by the server
> launching code to write these files under the un-knowing
eyes of the client.
>
> So we need to understand the limits or potential
threats:
> 1. Can CFML scripting be embedded into a .js javascript
file
> 2. If database parameters are not locked, what are the
possible attacks
> available to SQL injection
>
> Any help would be appreciated.
> Thank you in advance.
> Alex Dove
>
>

SQL Injection -- DBA role..

Hi all,
I'm working as a SQL Server DBA,Now a days we are facing issue with attacks(SQL Injection),most of attacks are taken care by Firewalls but still some attacks hitting Database.
As a DBA How to check whether database got effected
Please help me by providing hints and tips to analysis SQL injection.
Thanks in advance

There is no easy ways to detect sql injection. You should analyze activity against databases and work with developers to address it.
Basically, you can capture sql_completed/rpc_completed events in XEvent or SQL Trace and review them. Anything, which is not parameterized, could be the subject of injection attach (it depends on Client Code and implementation).
As the side note, script below provides you the list of the databases together with number of cached execution plans that were used just once. SQL Injection targets non-parameterized queries. So the databases with large number of single-used plans are more
likely to be affected. In any case, do not rely on output much - large number of single-used plans could be just the sign of bad design rather than being affected. As I said, you need to review client app code just to be sure.
select
epa.value as [DB ID],
db_name(convert(int,epa.value)) as [DB Name],
count(*) as [Single Use Plans]
from
sys.dm_exec_cached_plans p
cross apply sys.dm_exec_plan_attributes(plan_handle) AS epa
where
p.usecounts = 1 and
p.objtype in ('Adhoc','Prepared') and
epa.attribute = 'dbid'
group by
epa.value
option (recompile)
Thank you!
Dmitri V. Korotkevitch (MVP, MCM, MCPD)
My blog: http://aboutsqlserver.com

CS3/CS4 protecting against SQL Injection

Hi:
I was wondering if the newer versions of Dreamweaver like CS3/CS4 do a good enough job to protect against SQL Injection when using the built in Insert/Update/Delete behaviors or should I use Commands with Stored Procedures (MS SQL)?
Thanks!
Mitch

David , Günter - many thanks for your help !
In my ignorance I appear to have been misled by my website host who, in response to a related problem, informed me as follows:
"your website's scripting does appear to be highly vulnerable to SQL injection attack, this can be easily seen via the following example:
/s-sub_detail.php?cat_id=TEST
As you can see, arbitrary data entered as the cat_id variable of the shopping cart script is being passed unchecked to the SQL server, which is then returning a notice relevant to the data passed (in the above example case this is an "unknown column" error) - This effectively demonstrates that your shopping cart script performs no validation on variables used within the script and passes them directly to the SQL server, which means arbitrary commands can potentially be added as variable data for the SQL server to execute.
In order to correct this all variables and any other posted data used by the shopping cart script must be fully validated by the script itself before being passed to the SQL server so that SQL commands cannot be executed by simply manually entering these as a script variable".
Thanks to David I understand the issue with the need for data validation but the response above appears to indicate that they believe there is more to it.
David and Günter - I would welcome your response to the above and perhaps recommendations for SQL injection vulnerability testing.
Kind regards
J

CFInsert/Update: protection against SQL injection?

Hello,
I'm trying to find out if the use of CFInsert or CFUpdate
offers any protection against a SQL Injection attack. We are on a
project that uses many CFInserts and Updates, and lack the time to
rewrite new queries using CFQueryParam. Will a CFInsert or Update
handle the situation?

Validate every field before you get to the cfinsert/cfupdate
tag, something you should have been doing anyway.

SQL Injection - cfqueryparam and other techniques to stop abuse?

We have been having a lot of issues with SQL injection lately and so we are trying various methods to secure the data better.
First off we have been utlizing cfqueryparam on the queries that are being hit. I am also optimizing the data tables so that more maxlengths are in place.
What else can be done to improve security? I have looked up everything and anything on the internet and keep seeing the cfqueryparam.
Does changing the variables or table names make any difference? We are trying that, but I want to make sure it is not a waste of our time.
Thanks for any other suggestions.

CFqueryparam is a good fist step, though you should note that it will not protect some queries. For example if you have a sort by or order by that is dynamic, cfqueryparam wont help in that case. You will need to review data and validate for that.
You should also be checking for XSS vulnarabilities.
http://www.12robots.com/index.cfm/2008/8/4/Persistent-XSS-Attacks-and-countermeausures-in- ColdFusion
The blog above has a great number of CF sercurity related posts.
Pete Freitag has a nice security scanner that will look at your CF server and highlight any missing patches and some other issues
http://www.petefreitag.com/item/721.cfm
There are some open source projects that will also filter out common sql injection and xss attacks on a code level.
http://portcullis.riaforge.org/
Finally there are several conferences in the CF world coming up, and all surely have some security sessions. You may want to attend.

ADF and SQL-Injection?

Hi
As I understand there is no any protection!!! Do view parameters work as parameters in JDBC prepared statement? I looked at examples and it looks they are just replaced with string as parameter value to make new string !!!
Andrius

Andrius,
to my knowledge only prepared statements provide you some level of safety and even herte I would recommend caution. The recommended approach for SQL Injection is to filter it either in a Servlet filter (which may be hard to do, but there is a library called mod_security by Ian Ristic that is open source and can be configured for additional security). In addition you can add custom code to the BC code that sets the parameters for the parameterized query to check for SQL injection. This can be done with Regular Expressions:
As an example:
Pattern p = Pattern.compile("(?i)\\bcreate|insert|delete|drop|update\\b");
Matcher m = p.matcher(username);
if (m.find())
// reject the request
Note that the example doesn't check for all possible patterns
Depending on your front end, additional checks can be provided. If e.g. in teh future you build applications with JSF, you could create a RegEx Validator to filter SQL injections.
Oracle ADF V2 comes with a declarative validator on the data binding level that support Regular Expressions defined on the attribute level. This I think should provide you the level of security you will expect.
Frank

SQL Injection and variable substitutions

Hello helpful forum, I'm trying to understand what really goes on "behind" the scenes
with the variable substitutions in order to protect from sql injections.
I'm using apex 3.0.0.00.20
The trickiest component seems to be a Report of type "pl/sql returning sql", since
multiple dynamic sql interpretations are done there.
consider the following innocent looking disaster:
DECLARE
l_out VARCHAR2(2000);
BEGIN
l_out := 'select * from test_injection t where t.name like ''%' || :NAME || '%''';
RETURN l_out;
END;
if NAME is a single quote the report will return:
failed to parse SQL query: ORA-00911: invalid character
which hints to the fact that NAME is not escaped, and you are in fact able to access db functions
as in: '||lower('S')||'
I also tried to put there a function that runs in a autonomous transaction to log its calls, and
I see that it's called five times for each request.
consider now the similar solution (notice the two single quotes):
DECLARE
l_out VARCHAR2(2000);
BEGIN
l_out := 'select * from test_injection t where t.name like ''%'' || :NAME || ''%''';
RETURN l_out;
END;
with this second example nothing of the above is possible.
So my theory (please confirm it or refute it) is that there is a first variable substitution done
at the pl/sql level (and in the second case :NAME is just a string so nothing is substituted).
Then the dynamic sql is executed and it returns the following string:
select * from test_injection t where t.name like '%' || :NAME || '%'
now another substitution is done (at an "APEX" level) and then query is finally executed to return
the rows to the report.
The tricky point seems to be that the first substitution doesn't escape the variable (hence the error
with the single quote), while the second substitution does.
Please let me know if this makes sense and what are the proper guidelines to avoid sql injection with
the different kinds of reports and components (SQL, pl/sql returning sql, processes, ...)
Thanks

Giovanni,
You should build report regions like this using the second method so that all bind variables (colon followed by name) appear in the resultant varchar2 variable, l_out in your example, which will then be parsed as the report query. This addresses not only the SQL injection problem but the shared-pool friendliness problem.
Scott

SQL Injection with CF7 and MS SQL 2005

I looked through a bunch of SQL injection posts and couldn't
find a definitive answer to this...
Let me introduce this by saying that I know I should be using
CFQUERYPARAM with EVERY CF variable in a CFQUERY tag. No excuses.
But for a necessary quick fix, if I only use it for numeric
DB fields, is SQL injection still possible (using MS SQL 2005)?
I've yet to successfully perform SQL injection while manipulating a
variable surrounded by single quotes in the query.
Scenario 1) select * from users where user_id=#form.user_id#
...is a gimme to hack, but
Scenario 2) select * from users where
password='#form.password#' ...is another story
Has anyone ever heard of a successful SQL injection attack in
a Scenario 2 situation.
I'll fix everything up eventually, but I've got a Pen Test
coming up soon, and a lot of raw code to review.
Thanks

quote:
Originally posted by:
Dan Bracuk
What others can do is more relevent than what we think. When
in doubt, test.
very true, although my final solution went more like, "When
in doubt, manually add about 600 cfqueryparams in 406 cfquery
tags".

XML Validation using java for SQL Injection and script validation

I have an input coming from xml file.
I have to read that input and validate the input against sql injections and scripts.
I require help now how to read this xml data and validate against the above two options.
I am a java developer.
in this context what is marshelling?

http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/library/x-javaxmlvalidapi.html?ca=dgr-lnxw07Java-XML-Val
http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.5.0/docs/api/javax/xml/validation/package-summary.html
The following code validates the xml against a xml schema
// define the type of schema - we use W3C:
String schemaLang = "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema";
SchemaFactory factory = SchemaFactory.newInstance(schemaLang);
Schema schema = factory.newSchema(new StreamSource("sample.xsd"));
Validator validator = schema.newValidator();
// at last perform validation:
validator.validate(new StreamSource("sample.xml"));Message was edited by:
haishai

[ask] about oracle sql injection and escalation

Hello,i'm student , i'm studying oracle,now i want to research about oracle sql injection,i had read some tuttorial such as *'Hacking Oracle From Web,Advanced SQL Injection In Oracle Databases,Oracle Hacker HandBook ...'* but when i try to demo on localserver (11.0.1.6) but not run,and this is my demo
-- first,i created table users
create table users (name nvarchar2(50),pass nvarchar2(50))
-- then i created procedure with system user
create or replace procedure system.adduser(u nvarchar2,p nvarchar2)
as
begin
insert into users values(u,p);
end;
-- grant execute privilege to oc user
grant execute on adduser to oc
-- login with user oc and create a procedure
create or replace procedure sqli
as
begin
execute immediate 'grant dba to oc';
end;
-- and then,i run system's procedure
declare
begin
system.adduser('admin','admin'' ; execute immediate ''declare begin sqli() end;');
end;
i hope oracle master help me to i can understand and improving my knowledge
Thanks

The best forum for this is probably Forum Home » Java » SQLJ/JDBC
Presumably you are refering to oracle.sql.TIMESTAMP. While this is intended to (and does) correspond to java.sql.Timestamp it can't be a subclass because it needs to be a subclass of oracle.sql.Datum.

SQL Injection and Java Regular Expression: How to match words?

Dear friends,
I am handling sql injection attack to our application with java regular expression. I used it to match that if there are malicious characters or key words injected into the parameter value.
The denied characters and key words can be " ' ", " ; ", "insert", "delete" and so on. The expression I write is String pattern_str="('|;|insert|delete)+".
I know it is not correct. It could not be used to only match the whole word insert or delete. Each character in the two words can be matched and it is not what I want. Do you have any idea to only match the whole word?
Thanks,
Ricky
Edited by: Ricky Ru on 28/04/2011 02:29

Avoid dynamic sql, avoid string concatenation and use bind variables and the risk is negligible.

SQL injection and SQLFury

We have recently had an SQL injection attack on our site. The web form in question was calling a second cfm with a post command. The second cfm did the actually db insert. After extensive research and revamping of the web form I believed that I had shut it down rather convincingly. I did the following to secure the form:
- implemented the cfqueryparam tag on all applicable fields being entered in the form
- introduced a hidden, random numeric variable for verification before completing the insert; it tests for its existence and if it is numeric
- consolidated the two cfms into one page so the entry and insert are done in one cfm (to eliminate injection going directly thru insert cfm)
However, I am still getting intermittent injection errors into my MS SQL table. I don't believe it is getting in through the revised web form and am at a loss as to how it's getting through.
I am now at the point that I am looking for a utility that will scan through my site or specific pages to identify SQL injection vulnerabilties. I found something called SQLFury and downloaded it; however, there is literally no documentation with it and I have no idea how to run it. I've researched the web and found no assistance on how to use this utility. Is anyone familiar with this utility or does anyone know of any other utility that will assist with validating ColdFusion methods?
Any assistance would be very much appreciated.

Ian:
Thanks for the information. The utility is helpful and confirmed for me that my page was secure from SQL injection. The additional insight you provided has lead me to discover that my issue was not an SQL injection, but a Cross Scripting attack. A web vulnerability utility from Acunetix helped me determine that.
Thanks again,
...Wes

SQL Injection and cfqueryparam

I was told to look into <cfqueryparam> to assist in
fighting sql-injection
and it makes perfect sense, up until I thought of a different
scenario...
This tag seems great when you are dealing with numbers or
text that you can
restrict the number of characters, but what if you have a
textarea that
allows for a large amount of text to be entered? I.E. a
search field for
records that uses keywords.
How you stop someone from entering damaging sql into an area
that accepts
this?
Thanks for any education.
Wally Kolcz
MyNextPet.org
Founder / Developer
586.871.4126

WebDev wrote:
It works because <cfqueryparam ....> tells the DBMS
that this data is a
value NOT SQL. The DBMS will then never process it as SQL.
When you
write the SQL and Values straight into the code, then the
DBMS does not
know what is what and assumes it all must be SQL.
An Example...
<cfquery ....>
SELECT aField FROM aTable WHERE aField = '#aValue#'
</cfquery>
With this code, ColdFusion process the entire body of the
<cfquery...>
tag into a string and sends that entire string to the DBMS as
SQL. The
DBMS then processes what it was given. If somebody can modify
the
aValue variable to change the SQL string - that is what is
processed.
<cfquery ...>
SELECT aField FROM aTable WHERE aField = <cfqueryParam
value="#aValue#"...>
</cfquery>
With this code ColdFusion process the SQL and the queryParam
as separate
things. It sends the DBMS the SQL with parameters and a list
of values
to be used in those parameters. The DBMS knows the parameters
are not
SQL and will not process it as SQL and if the parameter
contains SQL it
will just be used as a value and not parsed.
FYI... That is how <cfqueryparam...> can improve
performance. By
knowing what parts of the SQL are variables, it can cache the
SQL and
just use different variables when they are passed to the
DBMS.
HTH
Ian

SQL Injections and XSS - Escaping Special Characters

Hi, hope someone can help in regards to security and SQL Injections and XSS.
We are using APEX 4.0.2 on Oracle 11.2.0.2.
1. It seems the special characters we have entered into normal 'Text Items' 'Text Areas' etc are not being escaped (ie <,>,&, '). If I enter them into the field (ie Surname) they are saved as is into session state and the database - no escaping. Am I missing something such as an environment setting as I thought the "smart" oracle escaping rules would cater for this.
Surely I don't have to manually do each of then.
Just to confirm, am I looking in the correct places to assess if the characters are escaped or not - ie should they show as '&<>' in session state and/or the database ?
2. Also, for the Oracle procedures such as '‘wwv_flow.accept’ , ‘wwv_flow.show’ , 'wwv_flow_utilities.show_as_popup_calendar' - do these escape special characters. If not, then they must be vulnerable to SQL Injections attacks.
Thx
Nigel

Recx Ltd wrote:
Just to pitch in, escaping values internally (either in the database or session state) is extremely problematic. Data searches, string comparison, reporting and double escaping are all areas which suffer badly when you do this.
Stripping characters on input can also cause problems if not considered within the context of the application. Names such as "O'Niel", statistical output such as "n < 300", fields containing deliberate HTML markup can be annoying to debug. In certain situations stripping is totally ineffective and may still lead to cross-site scripting.
Apex applications that share the database with other applications will also be affected.
The database should contain 'raw' unfettered data and output should be escaped properly, as Joel said, at render time. Either with Apex attributes or using PLSQL functions such as htf.escape_sc() as and when required.Do not needlessly resurrect old threads. After a couple of months watches expire and the original posters are not alerted to the presence of your follow-up.
Shameless plug: If you are in the game of needing to produce secure Apex code, you should get in touch.This crosses the line into spam: it violates the OTN Terms of Use—see 6(j).
Promotional posts like this are liable to be removed by the moderators.

Is cfinsert and cfupdate open to SQL Injection

Similar Messages

Maybe you are looking for