R/3 security for a BW developer

Hello all,
What authorizations have to be granted to a BW developer in R/3? How do I go about it? Does a BW developer get all the access as an R/3 developer or is it restricted?
Thanks.

Hi,
I would say it depends on the standards of the organization.
BW developers can have the same authorizations as R3 developers, but then they don't need authorizations to say access Smartforms or SAP scripts, create screens, or do CATT, BDC or LMSW programs. In Prod may it be R3 or BW developer, access to Tcodes like SE38, SA38, SE11, etc should always be restricted to display and execute only.
In addition, BW developers would also have additional authorizations like RSO2, RSA5, RSA3...basically all authorizations needed to confgure and set up BW on the source system side, which the R3 developers may not necessarily have.
Cheers,
Kedar

Similar Messages

SQL Developer Feature Request :: Tool Security for DBAs

TOAD has a feature that our DBAs like. It is called TOAD Security. In effect the tool looks at a table (on a per instance, per schema basis) to determine what menu options and features should be enabled/disabled. DBA's are provided with a GUI interface to manage the permissions, however once the table changes are noted, then the activity can be scripted for other schema/instances.
If it is not already in the plans, then it would be an excellent feature to add to SQL Developer. With something like this in place, we could defintely consider moving to SQL Developer as our tool of choice.

thats understandable. The expense of TOAD is small peanuts compared to the larger sums of monies being spent in IT, however, IMHO there is no sense spending it if a proper match can be found. I am just watching and waiting as the Oracle product continues to mature. Having the ability for tool to be controlled via an external security model, would be a plus.
To give an idea, DBA's basically took away abilities that were too easy to accidentally do but had bad results..
* Drop an object.... they prefer us to physically write the statement... no oops click the button accidentally. This applies to a test environment as well as production.
* Kill a Session..... again, test (not in production) we can kill a process thread, but they didn't want it to be so easy as a click of a button.
... I could go on... but you get the idea. At first they went overboard, and essentially turned our TOAD tool into an expensive Notepad clone. After working with them, the permissions were readjusted and we have been fine since then. The feature makes a good companion to the database level security for things that the Database Security setup does not cover.

Unable to validate security for resource 'EXTRANETLOOK'

We have UCM 10gR3 installed. We have Extranetlook component installed along with WebDAV. Currently when the users take any action that they don't have privilege to, they come accross Unable to validate security for resource 'EXTRANETLOOK'error message. Before it use to give exact error message so that it was easy for us to troubleshoot. Recently due to some changes in the settings in the system, we started seeing this error message instead of actual error message something like Unable to retrieve page. User 'abc ' does not have sufficient privileges. Is there a way to suppress thie Extrenet look error message so that the actual message comes through?
thanks,

Thanks for the response Bernhard. I'd like to address some of the points you mentioned:
possibly you have not the permissions to add resources
-I am an owner of both the PWA and the project subsite
there are no resources inside your project plan (you have to use the "Build Team" in the Ribbon)
-I checked the "Build Team" list and confirmed there are a dozen users in there
not each view allows you to edit each field
-I've tried switching views and noticed that there are other fields that I cannot add values into including: Actual Start, Actual Finish, Baseline Finish, % Work Complete. I am able to change the Task Name, Start, Finish.
Very strange problem. Im still doing development on it but obviously cant roll this into production when users cannot add information to tasks.

How to add security for webservice invoke

Hi All,
Please let me know how to invoke the webservice in BPEL process with security details.
Thanks,
Suresh

Hi Santhosh,
You may add security for your API's by using:
Mutual certificate authentication
Using OAuth 2.0
Manage developer accounts
Regards,
Manu Rekhar

SAP Role Security for BSP

Hello Experts,
I am developing BSP application in BW Environment for some custom table maintenance which doesn't involve Portal.
I call the BSP Application with "CALL_BROWSER" FM from Programs.They want to control the access to the users based on Role or Auth Objects or others inside the system.
Because, if some user knew the URL for the BSP the security is pretty open.
Is there anyway to do security for BSP based on roles?
Best Regards
Arun Prasad

Hi,
Here are the step:
1. Create the Role in PFCG with following detail Auth Obecjt:
2. Create the Authorization Check for ICF Access Internet communication Framework (S_ICF) & with Field ID is ICF_FIELD. Chcek the checkbox SERVICES. For the same Auth Object create another Field ID "ICF_VALUE", here assign you BSP Application ID lets say MYBSP.
3. Then goto SICF transaction, goto your BSP Application node, undere service data mention this ID as MYBSP against SAP Auth.
4. Now you need to check Auth obejct before calling the FM CALL_BROWER the way you do if for normal ABAP Report.
Hope this will solve your problem. Let me know if you have any questiion.
* Reward each useful answer
Raja T
Message was edited by:
Raja T

It was advised on a radio program to get Security for Macs as they are becoming a target. Is this the case?

It was advised on a radio program to get Security for Macs as they are becoming a target. Is this the case?

Mac users often ask whether they should install "anti-virus" software. The answer usually given on ASC is "no." The answer is right, but it may give the wrong impression that there is no threat from what are loosely called "viruses." There is a threat, and you need to educate yourself about it.
1. This is a comment on what you should—and should not—do to protect yourself from malicious software ("malware") that circulates on the Internet and gets onto a computer as an unintended consequence of the user's actions. It does not apply to software, such as keystroke loggers, that may be installed deliberately by an intruder who has hands-on access to the computer, or who has been able to take control of it remotely. That threat is in a different category, and there's no easy way to defend against it.
The comment is long because the issue is complex. The key points are in sections 5, 6, and 10.
OS X now implements three layers of built-in protection specifically against malware, not counting runtime protections such as execute disable, sandboxing, system library randomization, and address space layout randomization that may also guard against other kinds of exploits.
2. All versions of OS X since 10.6.7 have been able to detect known Mac malware in downloaded files, and to block insecure web plugins. This feature is transparent to the user. Internally Apple calls it "XProtect."
The malware recognition database used by XProtect is automatically updated; however, you shouldn't rely on it, because the attackers are always at least a day ahead of the defenders.
The following caveats apply to XProtect:
☞ It can be bypassed by some third-party networking software, such as BitTorrent clients and Java applets.
☞ It only applies to software downloaded from the network. Software installed from a CD or other media is not checked.
As new versions of OS X are released, it's not clear whether Apple will indefinitely continue to maintain the XProtect database of older versions such as 10.6. The security of obsolete system versions may eventually be degraded. Security updates to the code of obsolete systems will stop being released at some point, and that may leave them open to other kinds of attack besides malware.
3. Starting with OS X 10.7.5, there has been a second layer of built-in malware protection, designated "Gatekeeper" by Apple. By default, applications and Installer packages downloaded from the network will only run if they're digitally signed by a developer with a certificate issued by Apple. Software certified in this way hasn't necessarily been tested by Apple, but you can be reasonably sure that it hasn't been modified by anyone other than the developer. His identity is known to Apple, so he could be held legally responsible if he distributed malware. That may not mean much if the developer lives in a country with a weak legal system (see below.)
Gatekeeper doesn't depend on a database of known malware. It has, however, the same limitations as XProtect, and in addition the following:
☞ It can easily be disabled or overridden by the user.
☞ A malware attacker could get control of a code-signing certificate under false pretenses, or could simply ignore the consequences of distributing codesigned malware.
☞ An App Store developer could find a way to bypass Apple's oversight, or the oversight could fail due to human error.
Apple has so far failed to revoke the codesigning certificates of some known abusers, thereby diluting the value of Gatekeeper and the Developer ID program. These failures don't involve App Store products, however.
For the reasons given, App Store products, and—to a lesser extent—other applications recognized by Gatekeeper as signed, are safer than others, but they can't be considered absolutely safe. "Sandboxed" applications may prompt for access to private data, such as your contacts, or for access to the network. Think before granting that access. Sandbox security is based on user input. Never click through any request for authorization without thinking.
4. Starting with OS X 10.8.3, a third layer of protection has been added: a "Malware Removal Tool" (MRT). MRT runs automatically in the background when you update the OS. It checks for, and removes, malware that may have evaded the other protections via a Java exploit (see below.) MRT also runs when you install or update the Apple-supplied Java runtime (but not the Oracle runtime.) Like XProtect, MRT is effective against known threats, but not against unknown ones. It notifies you if it finds malware, but otherwise there's no user interface to MRT.
5. The built-in security features of OS X reduce the risk of malware attack, but they are not, and never will be, complete protection. Malware is a problem of human behavior, not machine behavior, and no technological fix alone is going to solve it. Trusting software to protect you will only make you more vulnerable.
The best defense is always going to be your own intelligence. With the possible exception of Java exploits, all known malware circulating on the Internet that affects a fully-updated installation of OS X 10.6 or later takes the form of so-called "Trojan horses," which can only have an effect if the victim is duped into running them. The threat therefore amounts to a battle of wits between you and Internet criminals. If you're better informed than they think you are, you'll win. That means, in practice, that you always stay within a safe harbor of computing practices. How do you know when you're leaving the safe harbor? Below are some warning signs of danger.
Software from an untrustworthy source
☞ Software with a corporate brand, such as Adobe Flash Player, doesn't come directly from the developer’s website. Do not trust an alert from any website to update Flash, or your browser, or any other software. A genuine alert that Flash is outdated and blocked is shown on this support page. Follow the instructions on the support page in that case. Otherwise, assume that the alert is fake and someone is trying to scam you into installing malware. If you see such alerts on more than one website, ask for instructions.
☞ Software of any kind is distributed via BitTorrent, or Usenet, or on a website that also distributes pirated music or movies.
☞ Rogue websites such as Softonic, Soft32, and CNET Download distribute free applications that have been packaged in a superfluous "installer."
☞ The software is advertised by means of spam or intrusive web ads. Any ad, on any site, that includes a direct link to a download should be ignored.
Software that is plainly illegal or does something illegal
☞ High-priced commercial software such as Photoshop is "cracked" or "free."
☞ An application helps you to infringe copyright, for instance by circumventing the copy protection on commercial software, or saving streamed media for reuse without permission. All "YouTube downloaders" are in this category, though not all are necessarily malicious.
Conditional or unsolicited offers from strangers
☞ A telephone caller or a web page tells you that you have a “virus” and offers to help you remove it. (Some reputable websites did legitimately warn visitors who were infected with the "DNSChanger" malware. That exception to this rule no longer applies.)
☞ A web site offers free content such as video or music, but to use it you must install a “codec,” “plug-in,” "player," "downloader," "extractor," or “certificate” that comes from that same site, or an unknown one.
☞ You win a prize in a contest you never entered.
☞ Someone on a message board such as this one is eager to help you, but only if you download an application of his choosing.
☞ A "FREE WI-FI !!!" network advertises itself in a public place such as an airport, but is not provided by the management.
☞ Anything online that you would expect to pay for is "free."
Unexpected events
☞ A file is downloaded automatically when you visit a web page, with no other action on your part. Delete any such file without opening it.
☞ You open what you think is a document and get an alert that it's "an application downloaded from the Internet." Click Cancel and delete the file. Even if you don't get the alert, you should still delete any file that isn't what you expected it to be.
☞ An application does something you don't expect, such as asking for permission to access your contacts, your location, or the Internet for no obvious reason.
☞ Software is attached to email that you didn't request, even if it comes (or seems to come) from someone you trust.
I don't say that leaving the safe harbor just once will necessarily result in disaster, but making a habit of it will weaken your defenses against malware attack. Any of the above scenarios should, at the very least, make you uncomfortable.
6. Java on the Web (not to be confused with JavaScript, to which it's not related, despite the similarity of the names) is a weak point in the security of any system. Java is, among other things, a platform for running complex applications in a web page, on the client. That was always a bad idea, and Java's developers have proven themselves incapable of implementing it without also creating a portal for malware to enter. Past Java exploits are the closest thing there has ever been to a Windows-style virus affecting OS X. Merely loading a page with malicious Java content could be harmful.
Fortunately, client-side Java on the Web is obsolete and mostly extinct. Only a few outmoded sites still use it. Try to hasten the process of extinction by avoiding those sites, if you have a choice. Forget about playing games or other non-essential uses of Java.
Java is not included in OS X 10.7 and later. Discrete Java installers are distributed by Apple and by Oracle (the developer of Java.) Don't use either one unless you need it. Most people don't. If Java is installed, disable it—not JavaScript—in your browsers.
Regardless of version, experience has shown that Java on the Web can't be trusted. If you must use a Java applet for a task on a specific site, enable Java only for that site in Safari. Never enable Java for a public website that carries third-party advertising. Use it only on well-known, login-protected, secure websites without ads. In Safari 6 or later, you'll see a padlock icon in the address bar when visiting a secure site.
Stay within the safe harbor, and you’ll be as safe from malware as you can practically be. The rest of this comment concerns what you should not do to protect yourself.
7. Never install any commercial "anti-virus" (AV) or "Internet security" products for the Mac, as they are all worse than useless. If you need to be able to detect Windows malware in your files, use one of the free security apps in the Mac App Store—nothing else.
Why shouldn't you use commercial AV products?
☞ To recognize malware, the software depends on a database of known threats, which is always at least a day out of date. This technique is a proven failure, as a major AV software vendor has admitted. Most attacks are "zero-day"—that is, previously unknown. Recognition-based AV does not defend against such attacks, and the enterprise IT industry is coming to the realization that traditional AV software is worthless.
☞ Its design is predicated on the nonexistent threat that malware may be injected at any time, anywhere in the file system. Malware is downloaded from the network; it doesn't materialize from nowhere. In order to meet that nonexistent threat, commercial AV software modifies or duplicates low-level functions of the operating system, which is a waste of resources and a common cause of instability, bugs, and poor performance.
☞ By modifying the operating system, the software may also create weaknesses that could be exploited by malware attackers.
☞ Most importantly, a false sense of security is dangerous.
8. An AV product from the App Store, such as "ClamXav," has the same drawback as the commercial suites of being always out of date, but it does not inject low-level code into the operating system. That doesn't mean it's entirely harmless. It may report email messages that have "phishing" links in the body, or Windows malware in attachments, as infected files, and offer to delete or move them. Doing so will corrupt the Mail database. The messages should be deleted from within the Mail application.
An AV app is not needed, and cannot be relied upon, for protection against OS X malware. It's useful, if at all, only for detecting Windows malware, and even for that use it's not really effective, because new Windows malware is emerging much faster than OS X malware.
Windows malware can't harm you directly (unless, of course, you use Windows.) Just don't pass it on to anyone else. A malicious attachment in email is usually easy to recognize by the name alone. An actual example:
London Terror Moovie.avi [124 spaces] Checked By Norton Antivirus.exe
You don't need software to tell you that's a Windows trojan. Software may be able to tell you which trojan it is, but who cares? In practice, there's no reason to use recognition software unless an organizational policy requires it. Windows malware is so widespread that you should assume it's in every email attachment until proven otherwise. Nevertheless, ClamXav or a similar product from the App Store may serve a purpose if it satisfies an ill-informed network administrator who says you must run some kind of AV application. It's free and it won't handicap the system.
The ClamXav developer won't try to "upsell" you to a paid version of the product. Other developers may do that. Don't be upsold. For one thing, you should not pay to protect Windows users from the consequences of their choice of computing platform. For another, a paid upgrade from a free app will probably have all the disadvantages mentioned in section 7.
9. It seems to be a common belief that the built-in Application Firewall acts as a barrier to infection, or prevents malware from functioning. It does neither. It blocks inbound connections to certain network services you're running, such as file sharing. It's disabled by default and you should leave it that way if you're behind a router on a private home or office network. Activate it only when you're on an untrusted network, for instance a public Wi-Fi hotspot, where you don't want to provide services. Disable any services you don't use in the Sharing preference pane. All are disabled by default.
10. As a Mac user, you don't have to live in fear that your computer may be infected every time you install software, read email, or visit a web page. But neither can you assume that you will always be safe from exploitation, no matter what you do. Navigating the Internet is like walking the streets of a big city. It can be as safe or as dangerous as you choose to make it. The greatest harm done by security software is precisely its selling point: it makes people feel safe. They may then feel safe enough to take risks from which the software doesn't protect them. Nothing can lessen the need for safe computing practices.

SICF Access for Web Dynpro Development

Developer wants access to SICF to be able to test any Web Dynpro Development. Currently no developer has access and Basis only gives access when requested - and only for short time. I believe developers should have access. Wondering how others have this setup. Thanks!

> If a developer creats an app via SE80 - which does the same in ICF for the service - then SICF access is required.
Are you sure? Or is the tcode check only appearing somewhere in a trace?
If that is true, then ICF service developers will anyway be able to start SICF directly. Please check the coding location of the check from the trace, if it is calling FM AUTHORITY_CHECK_TCODE (which I suspect it is...) then verify in SE97 that an SE80 developer can use (limited, coded...) SICF functionality from other contexts without starting it directly.
What you can also do is protect the ICF services using the authorization group concept (including those you are not using...). If the developer wants to use one (in a new development) then it should be released for them by granting them access to it (authorization object S_ICF_ADM in their role) for development work and then ideally object S_ICF added to the service user they are using for development as well. If they are developing the role for the application together with the application coding development (this is the ideal scenario in my opinion for a knowledgable developer) then give them that access as well in PFCG for the role they are developing.
I think it can safely be said that most developers can be trusted, but also to do stupid things though... and they enter their own user ID in the connection data..
That is a reality. If you trust them and train them and collaborate with them to improve security - then they will be your best friends and understand more about security as well (to protect themselves from their own user ID's...).
This is a very interesting topic. Thanks for raising it.
Cheers,
Julius
ps: I don't like posting links, because I see it as an insult to the person who asked the question as not having done a search and not knowing what they are talking about. But for the benefit of those who use the search and find this thread... please read this documention (or the one which is relevant for your release - I choose a reasonable release level...).
http://help.sap.com/saphelp_nw04s/helpdata/en/61/d93822a88e15489a9391f309767366/content.htm
Edited by: Julius Bussche on Mar 5, 2009 10:31 PM

Does the LabView support htaccess/htpasswd security for WebPages?

There is a server with LabView's executable which makes reports on the server folder.
Need to get access to the executable through RemotePanels and to html/txt/xls-reports through the same LabView WebServer.
One solution is to use LabView WebServer + Apache or +GServer (has no advantages over Apache).
But in this case we need to authentificate for 2 times: 1.Apache, 2.LabView WebServer.
G-Server
with cgi-scripts is not a solution because of there is a lot of text fields on panels and events
(too many) and NI recommends to use LabView embedded WebServer for panels, not a G-Server.
Has anybody a solution?

Please forgive me but I am unclear on what it is you are looking for. Can you please clarify?
I did a quick search on ni.com for htaccess and found the following two pages. Have you seen these yet and does this help at all?
KnowledgeBase 3FNERTVB: How to Setup Security for the G Server?
KnowledgeBase 4J1DPELC: Can I Enable G Web Server Authentication for My LabVIEW Remote Front Panel?
David_L | Certified LabVIEW Architect
LabVIEW Tools Network | LabVIEW Tools Network Developer Center

Inbound security for BPEL processes

Hello,
I am trying to enable Inbound security for BPEL processes. i made changes to message-handlers.xml as specified in the document.
However when i sent a test message using AXIS API, i am getting the below error.
Error while invoking inbound message handler.
An error has occurred while attempting to invoke the inbound message handler class "class com.collaxa.cube.security.Authenticator" for the message "". The exception reported was: Could not apply security [No username provided, security expects user]
I am using one of User Ids specified in system-jazn-data.xml and I can see that input soap message has a usernametoken . Any Inputs please?
Thanks

If you want to use the BPEL tool you can simulate some load using the initiate option. There is a checkbox where you can specify the load you want to perform.
Otherwise you need to use products such as Mercury (now HP) Load Runner. This is an expensive option but gives you very good output. The other option is to develop your own scripts to test the performance.
cheers
James

Implementing Security in web services developed using JAX WS approach

Hi ,
Our Organization has developed a Web service using JAX WS approach exposing EJB as EndPoint .This wsdl file URL is only used by third party companies that register with us (Means i want to say that this wsdl url is not world wide accessable).
Now we need to implement security for this service , please tell me what is the appropiate for doing so ??
Thank you in advance .
Waiting for your valuable suggestions .
Please help .

You can implement message level security in many ways. Some of the ways are
SAML
Digital certificates etc
You may have to work with your vendor specific API to achieve this. Take a look at one case study.
http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/webservices/library/ws-security.html
You will find lot of articles on google to implement message level security however my recommendation would be to get in touch with security expert.

Security for SOA and Web Services

Dipak Chopra's 09 Dec 04 "Security for SOA and Web Services" piece has been a terrific starter for me as I start to delve into this topic. Does SAP/the SDN plan to publish an SAP-specific roadmap to show the adherence to and adoption of these standards in NetWeaver? (Or maybe there is such a published roadmap that I am unaware of?)

Hi Randy
SAP follows and participates in Security and other Web services standards very closely as we recognize the opportunity they present our customers for developing solutions and integrating systems faster at lower cost.
However many of the standards are still in development and so are not quite yet ready for "prime time". This means that we can't really publish a "road map" as it would be continually changing. However, if you want an idea on which standards SAP thinks are important, please take a look at this presentation [1] which was delivered at the last Tech Ed.
David
[1] https://www.sdn.sap.com/irj/servlet/prt/portal/prtroot/com.sap.km.cm.docs/documents/a1-8-4/the impact of industry standards on sap netweaver.pdf

How to add security for Azure Cloud Service?

Hi,
We have build some API's in azure cloud service.
We want to add security for Azure Cloud Service.
How to add security for Azure Cloud Service?

Hi Santhosh,
You may add security for your API's by using:
Mutual certificate authentication
Using OAuth 2.0
Manage developer accounts
Regards,
Manu Rekhar

Is it suggested to use an additional layer of internet security such as ESET Cyber Security Pro - Internet Security for Mac

I just want to make sure I am as safe as possible with all the internet hacking that has been in the Media. I have a Mac Mini that was purchased in Aug. 2013. Is it suggested to use an additional layer of internet security such as ESET® Cyber Security Pro - Internet Security for Mac ???

Mac users often ask whether they should install "anti-virus" software. The answer usually given on ASC is "no." The answer is right, but it may give the wrong impression that there is no threat from what are loosely called "viruses." There is a threat, and you need to educate yourself about it.
1. This is a comment on what you should—and should not—do to protect yourself from malicious software ("malware") that circulates on the Internet and gets onto a computer as an unintended consequence of the user's actions. It does not apply to software, such as keystroke loggers, that may be installed deliberately by an intruder who has hands-on access to the computer, or who has been able to log in to it remotely. That threat is in a different category, and there's no easy way to defend against it.
The comment is long because the issue is complex. The key points are in sections 5, 6, and 10.
OS X now implements three layers of built-in protection specifically against malware, not counting runtime protections such as execute disable, sandboxing, system library randomization, and address space layout randomization that may also guard against other kinds of exploits.
2. All versions of OS X since 10.6.7 have been able to detect known Mac malware in downloaded files, and to block insecure web plugins. This feature is transparent to the user. Internally Apple calls it "XProtect."
The malware recognition database used by XProtect is automatically updated; however, you shouldn't rely on it, because the attackers are always at least a day ahead of the defenders.
The following caveats apply to XProtect:
☞ It can be bypassed by some third-party networking software, such as BitTorrent clients and Java applets.
☞ It only applies to software downloaded from the network. Software installed from a CD or other media is not checked.
As new versions of OS X are released, it's not clear whether Apple will indefinitely continue to maintain the XProtect database of older versions such as 10.6. The security of obsolete system versions may eventually be degraded. Security updates to the code of obsolete systems will stop being released at some point, and that may leave them open to other kinds of attack besides malware.
3. Starting with OS X 10.7.5, there has been a second layer of built-in malware protection, designated "Gatekeeper" by Apple. By default, applications and Installer packages downloaded from the network will only run if they're digitally signed by a developer with a certificate issued by Apple. Software certified in this way hasn't necessarily been tested by Apple, but you can be reasonably sure that it hasn't been modified by anyone other than the developer. His identity is known to Apple, so he could be held legally responsible if he distributed malware. That may not mean much if the developer lives in a country with a weak legal system (see below.)
Gatekeeper doesn't depend on a database of known malware. It has, however, the same limitations as XProtect, and in addition the following:
☞ It can easily be disabled or overridden by the user.
☞ A malware attacker could get control of a code-signing certificate under false pretenses, or could simply ignore the consequences of distributing codesigned malware.
☞ An App Store developer could find a way to bypass Apple's oversight, or the oversight could fail due to human error.
Apple has so far failed to revoke the codesigning certificates of some known abusers, thereby diluting the value of Gatekeeper and the Developer ID program. These failures don't involve App Store products, however.
For the reasons given, App Store products, and—to a lesser extent—other applications recognized by Gatekeeper as signed, are safer than others, but they can't be considered absolutely safe. "Sandboxed" applications may prompt for access to private data, such as your contacts, or for access to the network. Think before granting that access. Sandbox security is based on user input. Never click through any request for authorization without thinking.
4. Starting with OS X 10.8.3, a third layer of protection has been added: a "Malware Removal Tool" (MRT). MRT runs automatically in the background when you update the OS. It checks for, and removes, malware that may have evaded the other protections via a Java exploit (see below.) MRT also runs when you install or update the Apple-supplied Java runtime (but not the Oracle runtime.) Like XProtect, MRT is effective against known threats, but not against unknown ones. It notifies you if it finds malware, but otherwise there's no user interface to MRT.
5. The built-in security features of OS X reduce the risk of malware attack, but they are not, and never will be, complete protection. Malware is a problem of human behavior, and a technological fix is not going to solve it. Trusting software to protect you will only make you more vulnerable.
The best defense is always going to be your own intelligence. With the possible exception of Java exploits, all known malware circulating on the Internet that affects a fully-updated installation of OS X 10.6 or later takes the form of so-called "Trojan horses," which can only have an effect if the victim is duped into running them. The threat therefore amounts to a battle of wits between you and the scam artists. If you're smarter than they think you are, you'll win. That means, in practice, that you always stay within a safe harbor of computing practices. How do you know when you're leaving the safe harbor? Below are some warning signs of danger.
Software from an untrustworthy source
☞ Software of any kind is distributed via BitTorrent, or Usenet, or on a website that also distributes pirated music or movies.
☞ Software with a corporate brand, such as Adobe Flash Player, doesn't come directly from the developer’s website. Do not trust an alert from any website to update Flash, or your browser, or any other software.
☞ Rogue websites such as Softonic and CNET Download distribute free applications that have been packaged in a superfluous "installer."
☞ The software is advertised by means of spam or intrusive web ads. Any ad, on any site, that includes a direct link to a download should be ignored.
Software that is plainly illegal or does something illegal
☞ High-priced commercial software such as Photoshop is "cracked" or "free."
☞ An application helps you to infringe copyright, for instance by circumventing the copy protection on commercial software, or saving streamed media for reuse without permission.
Conditional or unsolicited offers from strangers
☞ A telephone caller or a web page tells you that you have a “virus” and offers to help you remove it. (Some reputable websites did legitimately warn visitors who were infected with the "DNSChanger" malware. That exception to this rule no longer applies.)
☞ A web site offers free content such as video or music, but to use it you must install a “codec,” “plug-in,” "player," "downloader," "extractor," or “certificate” that comes from that same site, or an unknown one.
☞ You win a prize in a contest you never entered.
☞ Someone on a message board such as this one is eager to help you, but only if you download an application of his choosing.
☞ A "FREE WI-FI !!!" network advertises itself in a public place such as an airport, but is not provided by the management.
☞ Anything online that you would expect to pay for is "free."
Unexpected events
☞ A file is downloaded automatically when you visit a web page, with no other action on your part. Delete any such file without opening it.
☞ You open what you think is a document and get an alert that it's "an application downloaded from the Internet." Click Cancel and delete the file. Even if you don't get the alert, you should still delete any file that isn't what you expected it to be.
☞ An application does something you don't expect, such as asking for permission to access your contacts, your location, or the Internet for no obvious reason.
☞ Software is attached to email that you didn't request, even if it comes (or seems to come) from someone you trust.
I don't say that leaving the safe harbor just once will necessarily result in disaster, but making a habit of it will weaken your defenses against malware attack. Any of the above scenarios should, at the very least, make you uncomfortable.
6. Java on the Web (not to be confused with JavaScript, to which it's not related, despite the similarity of the names) is a weak point in the security of any system. Java is, among other things, a platform for running complex applications in a web page, on the client. That was always a bad idea, and Java's developers have proven themselves incapable of implementing it without also creating a portal for malware to enter. Past Java exploits are the closest thing there has ever been to a Windows-style virus affecting OS X. Merely loading a page with malicious Java content could be harmful.
Fortunately, client-side Java on the Web is obsolete and mostly extinct. Only a few outmoded sites still use it. Try to hasten the process of extinction by avoiding those sites, if you have a choice. Forget about playing games or other non-essential uses of Java.
Java is not included in OS X 10.7 and later. Discrete Java installers are distributed by Apple and by Oracle (the developer of Java.) Don't use either one unless you need it. Most people don't. If Java is installed, disable it—not JavaScript—in your browsers.
Regardless of version, experience has shown that Java on the Web can't be trusted. If you must use a Java applet for a task on a specific site, enable Java only for that site in Safari. Never enable Java for a public website that carries third-party advertising. Use it only on well-known, login-protected, secure websites without ads. In Safari 6 or later, you'll see a lock icon in the address bar with the abbreviation "https" when visiting a secure site.
Stay within the safe harbor, and you’ll be as safe from malware as you can practically be. The rest of this comment concerns what you should not do to protect yourself.
7. Never install any commercial "anti-virus" (AV) or "Internet security" products for the Mac, as they are all worse than useless. If you need to be able to detect Windows malware in your files, use one of the free security apps in the Mac App Store—nothing else.
Why shouldn't you use commercial AV products?
☞ To recognize malware, the software depends on a database of known threats, which is always at least a day out of date. This technique is a proven failure, as a major AV software vendor has admitted. Most attacks are "zero-day"—that is, previously unknown. Recognition-based AV does not defend against such attacks, and the enterprise IT industry is coming to the realization that traditional AV software is worthless.
☞ Its design is predicated on the nonexistent threat that malware may be injected at any time, anywhere in the file system. Malware is downloaded from the network; it doesn't materialize from nowhere. In order to meet that nonexistent threat, commercial AV software modifies or duplicates low-level functions of the operating system, which is a waste of resources and a common cause of instability, bugs, and poor performance.
☞ By modifying the operating system, the software may also create weaknesses that could be exploited by malware attackers.
☞ Most importantly, a false sense of security is dangerous.
8. An AV product from the App Store, such as "ClamXav," has the same drawback as the commercial suites of being always out of date, but it does not inject low-level code into the operating system. That doesn't mean it's entirely harmless. It may report email messages that have "phishing" links in the body, or Windows malware in attachments, as infected files, and offer to delete or move them. Doing so will corrupt the Mail database. The messages should be deleted from within the Mail application.
An AV app is not needed, and cannot be relied upon, for protection against OS X malware. It's useful, if at all, only for detecting Windows malware, and even for that use it's not really effective, because new Windows malware is emerging much faster than OS X malware.
Windows malware can't harm you directly (unless, of course, you use Windows.) Just don't pass it on to anyone else. A malicious attachment in email is usually easy to recognize by the name alone. An actual example:
London Terror Moovie.avi [124 spaces] Checked By Norton Antivirus.exe
You don't need software to tell you that's a Windows trojan. Software may be able to tell you which trojan it is, but who cares? In practice, there's no reason to use recognition software unless an organizational policy requires it. Windows malware is so widespread that you should assume it's in everyemail attachment until proven otherwise. Nevertheless, ClamXav or a similar product from the App Store may serve a purpose if it satisfies an ill-informed network administrator who says you must run some kind of AV application. It's free and it won't handicap the system.
The ClamXav developer won't try to "upsell" you to a paid version of the product. Other developers may do that. Don't be upsold. For one thing, you should not pay to protect Windows users from the consequences of their choice of computing platform. For another, a paid upgrade from a free app will probably have all the disadvantages mentioned in section 7.
9. It seems to be a common belief that the built-in Application Firewall acts as a barrier to infection, or prevents malware from functioning. It does neither. It blocks inbound connections to certain network services you're running, such as file sharing. It's disabled by default and you should leave it that way if you're behind a router on a private home or office network. Activate it only when you're on an untrusted network, for instance a public Wi-Fi hotspot, where you don't want to provide services. Disable any services you don't use in the Sharing preference pane. All are disabled by default.
10. As a Mac user, you don't have to live in fear that your computer may be infected every time you install software, read email, or visit a web page. But neither can you assume that you will always be safe from exploitation, no matter what you do. Navigating the Internet is like walking the streets of a big city. It's as safe or as dangerous as you choose to make it. The greatest harm done by security software is precisely its selling point: it makes people feel safe. They may then feel safe enough to take risks from which the software doesn't protect them. Nothing can lessen the need for safe computing practices.

What Java compiler for Java Card development ?

What Java compiler and options should be used for Java Card development with the goal of generating correct, and (secondarily) small or/and fast code after conversion to Java Card bytecode using converter ?
In particular
- Is use of JDK 7 approved by Oracle for Java Card development? That would solve security problems associated with (the web components of the JRE of) some earlier JDK, including the latest JDK6. The JCDK 3.0.4 release notes states "+the commercial version of Java Development Kit (JDK software) version 6 Update 10 (JDK 6 Update 10) or later is required+, but that does not answer that question.
- Anyone had _bad_ experience (like incorrect or disastrous code) with the Java compiler bundled with Eclipse ? I have seen at least one case where org.eclipse.jdt.core_3.7.3.v20120119-1537.jar produced slightly more compact code than javac.
- Anyone had _bad_ experience with javac in jdk1.3 ? In an applet involving a "finally" clause, I've seen it generating more compact code than later javac (which in my test triplicated the code for the finally clause).

What Java compiler and options should be used for Java Card development with the goal of generating correct, and (secondarily) small or/and fast code after conversion to Java Card bytecode using converter ?-target -source may be required to generate compatible byte code. Depending on the CAP file converter being used debug information may also help. Remember that Java Card is a subset of the Java language (also there are short opcodes that Java doesn't have etc) so a lot of the work for optimisation is done by the converter or the JCRE. You can look at the JCA code generated to determine what works best for your applets. There are also some ways of stripping out dead code etc from JCA files (return statements after a throw etc) to reduce your code size. Most of the speed optimisations come from your code (avoiding context switches and unnecessary security/access checks).
The compactness of your Java Card binary may not be directly related to the size of your compiled Java code. It can depend on the converter you use and any optimisaitons the JCRE might try to do when the code is loaded.
- Is use of JDK 7 approved by Oracle for Java Card development? That would solve security problems associated with (the web components of the JRE of) some earlier JDK, including the latest JDK6. Java Card does not use any of the libraries from the JDK/JRE. All of the libraries are provided by the JCRE on the smartcard.
The JCDK 3.0.4 release notes states "+the commercial version of Java Development Kit (JDK software) version 6 Update 10 (JDK 6 Update 10) or later is required+, but that does not answer that question.Anything above JDK6u10 is supported. If you use Java 7 you may need to add a -source and -target flag when compiling.
- Anyone had _bad_ experience (like incorrect or disastrous code) with the Java compiler bundled with Eclipse ? I have seen at least one case where org.eclipse.jdt.core_3.7.3.v20120119-1537.jar produced slightly more compact code than javac.We generally use the Eclipse compiler as we find that we get more deterministic builds. When CAP files are sent for security review it is helpful to have the reviewer able to generate a CAP file that matches the one you sent to confirm the binary is what you say it is.
- Anyone had _bad_ experience with javac in jdk1.3 ? In an applet involving a "finally" clause, I've seen it generating more compact code than later javac (which in my test triplicated the code for the finally clause).We do not use anything less than Java 6 for compilation.
- Shane

Step for Publish a development created with Webdynpro for Java

Good Afternoon.
I am new in this of publish development in the portal.
We created a development with Webdynpro java using RFC. We want know what are the step for publish this development in the portal ESS?
The development work fine. But i don't know how to publish this in the portal.
What configurations i have that do In the part of ECC and in the part of portal.?.
Can someone help me?
Kind Regards-

Hi,
When i have that do configurations for the following paths:
Employee Self-Service>General Settings>Homepage for Self-Services-->Resources
Employee Self-Service>General Settings>Homepage for Self-Services-->Headers and Area Group Pages
Employee Self-Service>General Settings>Homepage for Self-Services-->Areas
Employee Self-Service>General Settings>Homepage for Self-Services-->Subareas
Employee Self-Service>General Settings>Homepage for Self-Services-->Services.
Kind Regards,

R/3 security for a BW developer

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