SQL Injection Discussion

Hello, I have found a lot of discussion about the SQL Injection.
Seems like it is very famous issue nowadays.
I am currently doing some findings on the SQL injection and hopefully this thread may give some benefits to everyone.
1. has SQLIA been resolved nowadays?
2. where SQLIA can be launched? is it only from the front-end of the website (eg. login form) or can also attack directly the database? if can, how it can be done? How the type of attack can be determined whether i is launched form the application or anywhere else?
3. Which is better? whether to prevent the SQLIA at the application layer or database layer?
My focus is to prevent the SQLIA in the web application itself for example by using data validation.
That's all for this post. Thank you so much.
Regards, hus..

SQL statements that use bind variables are not vulnerable to SQL injection attacks (well, not practically vulnerable). There is a small risk that if the database is unpatched someone might be able to exploit a buffer overflow in some Oracle-delivered function that your query is using but that's not a realistic threat scenario.
There is plenty of documentation available online. For example a Google search on "bind variable" "sql injection" returns as the top result this PDF- An Introduction to SQL Injection Attacks in Oracle which discusses bind variables in some detail. In the top 5 results is this Oracle documentation on avoiding SQL injection in PL/SQL which discusses using bind variables.
Justin

Similar Messages

Sql injection

What is SQL Injection?
SQL Injection is a way to attack the data in a database through a firewall protecting it. It is a method by which the parameters of a Web-based application are modified in order to change the SQL statements that are passed to a database to return data. For example, by adding a single quote (‘) to the parameters, it is possible to cause a second query to be executed with the first.
An attack against a database using SQL Injection could be motivated by two primary objectives:
1. To steal data from a database from which the data should not normally be available, or to obtain system configuration data that would allow an attack profile to be built. One example of the latter would be obtaining all of the database password hashes so that passwords can be brute-forced.
2. To gain access to an organisation’s host computers via the machine hosting the database. This can be done using package procedures and 3GL language extensions that allow O/S access.
There are many ways to use this technique on an Oracle system. This depends upon the language used or the API. The following are some languages, APIs and tools that can access an Oracle database and be part of a Web-based application.
* JSP
* ASP
* XML, XSL and XSQL
* Javascript
* VB, MFC, and other ODBC-based tools and APIs
* Portal, the older WebDB, and other Oracle Web-based applications and API’s
* Reports, discoverer, Oracle Applications
* 3- and 4GL-based languages such as C, OCI, Pro*C, and COBOL
* Perl and CGI scripts that access Oracle databases
* many more.
Any of the above applications, tools, and products could be used as a base from which to SQL inject an Oracle database. A few simple preconditions need to be in place first though. First and foremost amongst these is that dynamic SQL must be used in the application, tool, or product, otherwise SQL Injection is not possible.
The final important point not usually mentioned in discussions about SQL injection against any database including Oracle is that SQL injection is not just a Web-based problem. As is implied in the preceding paragraph, any application that allows a user to enter data that may eventually end up being executed as a piece of dynamic SQL can potentially be SQL injected. Of course, Web-based applications present the greatest risk, as anyone with a browser and an Internet connection can potentially access data they should not.
While second article of this series will include a much more in-depth discussion of how to protect against SQL injection attacks, there are a couple of brief notes that should be mentioned in this introductory section. Data held in Oracle databases should be protected from employees and others who have network access to applications that maintain that data. Those employees could be malicious or may simply want to read data they are not authorized to read. Readers should keep in mind that most threats to data held within databases come from authorized users.
Protecting against SQL Injection on Oracle-based systems is simple in principle and includes two basic stages. These are:
1. Audit the application code and change or remove the problems that allow injection to take place. (These problems will be discussed at greater length in the second part of this series.)
2. Enforce the principle of least privilege at the database level so that even if someone is able to SQL inject an application to steal data, they cannot see anymore data than the designer intended through any normal application interface.
The “Protection” section, which will be included in the second part of this series, will discuss details of how to apply some of these ideas specifically to Oracle-based applications.
[http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1644]
how oracle prevent sql injections?

mango_boy wrote:
damorgan wrote:
And they do so using bind variables
http://www.morganslibrary.org/reference/bindvars.html
and DBMS_ASSERT
http://www.morganslibrary.org/reference/dbms_assert.html
do you have any suggestion for mysql users??Yes. Install Oracle.

SQL Injection Produces "Wrong Name" Errors

Hi all,
By now, you're familiar with the SQL Injection attacks
floatin' around out there, but what has me puzzled is how my
ColdFusion servers are responding to them. For each SQL Injection
attempt, CF throws an application error; this is from my
APPLICATION.LOG:
"Error","jrpp-953","09/19/08","13:27:04",,"Application (wrong
name: com/ms/asp/Application) The specific sequence of files
included or processed is: D:\MySite\web\product.cfm "
I've seen others complaining about this on ColdFusion MX 6,
ColdFusion MX 7 and ColdFusion 8, but every discussion terminates
mysteriously without a solution. It's an evil conspiracy....
Any help is greatly appreciated.

Hello,
Were you able to solve this problem and how?
Thanks

I am using dreamweaver cs6 is it protected from various hacker attacks such as sql injection,xss,?

i mean if i built a site using php and sql using dreamweaver cs 6 ...will it be protected from various hacker attacks such as sql injection,xss,spoofed form input,etc..?? if it is not protected...tell me where can i learn to protect my website using php and sql....from all types of hacker attacks...help needed.... thank you..:)

A couple more comments.
To guard against most of these security risks, you have to completely sanitize any user input whether processed further on subsequent pages or added to a database. That complete sanitization usually involves stripping out any HTML/JavaScript, and blocking SQL-crashing equalities/inequalities.
You can get alot of information about these and other methods on the Dreamweaver AppDev forum -
http://forums.adobe.com/community/dreamweaver/dreamweaver_development?view=discussions
which is where most server-scripting topics are discussed.

Lightswitch Security, Protection against SQL Injection attacks etc.

Hi all,
I have been hunting around for some kind of documentation that explains how Lightwitch handles typical web application vunerabilities such as SQL injection attacks.
In the case of injection attacks it is my understanding the generated code will submit data to the database via names parameters to protect against such things but it would be good to have some official account of how Lightswitch handles relevant OWASP
issues to help provide assurance to businesses that by relying on a framework such as Lightswitch does not introduce security risks.
Is anyone aware of such documentation? I found this but it barely scratches the surface:
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/gg481776.aspx?cs-save-lang=1&cs-lang=vb#code-snippet-1
There is this which describes best practices but nothing to say that these practices are adopte within Lightswitch
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/gg481776.aspx?cs-save-lang=1&cs-lang=vb#code-snippet-1
Thanks for any help, I am amazed that it is so difficult to find?

LS is a tool built in top of other technologies including Entity Framework.
Here is a security doc about EF.
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/vstudio/cc716760(v=vs.100).aspx
LS uses Linq to Entities and therefore is not susceptible to SQL injection.
HTH,
Josh
PS... the only vulnerability that I'm aware of is when a desktop app is deployed as 2-tier instead of 3-tier. In that case, the web.config which contains connection strings is on the client machine, which is a risk. Here is a discussion related
to db security & 2 vs 3-tier.
https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/vstudio/en-US/93e035e0-0d2e-4405-a717-5b3207b3ccac/can-sql-server-application-roles-be-used-in-conjunction-with-lightswitch?forum=lightswitch

Web and Database Security - SQL Inject info

Web and Database Security - SQL Injection.
Here is a whitepaper on The Dangers of Dynamic Content (SQL Injection)
http://www.issadvisor.com/viewtopic.php?t=125
SQL Injection. 3 parts. The first part discusses the basics of how to test
web applications for SQL injection vulnerabilities. The second part goes into
the specifics of how to manually identify and test for SQL injection
vulnerabilities. And the third part describes how to exploit SQL injection to
retrieve data from the database.
http://www.issadvisor.com/viewtopic.php?t=123
Understanding this critical security issue, helps web developers that leverage
database must design and make their applications more secure.
Hopefully these two links are informative and useful. Please pass them on.

An APEX page can certainly be configured to not require authentication (that's pretty standard for the login/ registration page). There is no need for an "Oracle public password." There are accounts in the Oracle database that APEX uses but that no human needs to know the password for. If that's what you mean by "Oracle public password" then, yes, you do. But that would be the case no matter what authentication and authorization scheme you use in APEX.
A static IP address for your web server is likely a good idea. It's possible to have DNS work with dynamic IP addresses but that's probably not what you want.
Justin

SQL Injection, replace single quote with two single quotes?

Is replacing a single quote with two single quotes adequate
for eliminating
SQL injection attacks? This article (
http://www.devguru.com/features/kb/kb100206.asp
) offers that advice, and it
enabled me to allow users to search name fields in the
database that contain
single quotes.
I was advised to use "Paramaterized SQL" in an earlier post,
but I can't
understand the concept behind that method, and whether it
applies to
queries, writes, or both.

Then you can use both stored procedures and prepared
statements.
Both provide better protection than simply replacing
apostrophes.
Prepared statements are simple:
Set myCommand = Server.CreateObject("ADODB.Command")
...snip...
myCommand.CommandText = "INSERT INTO Users([Name], [Email])
VALUES (?, ?)"
...snip...
myCommand.Parameters.Append
myCommand.CreateParameter("@Name",200,1,50,Name)
myCommand.Parameters.Append
myCommand.CreateParameter("@Email",200,1,50,Email)
myCommand.Execute ,,128 'the ,,128 sets execution flags that
tell ADO not to
look for rows to be returned. This saves the expense of
creating a
recordset object you don't need.
Stored procedures are executed in a similar manner. DW can
help you with a
stored procedure through the "Command (Stored Procedure)"
server behavior.
You can see a full example of a prepared statement by looking
at DW's
recordset code after you've created a recordset using version
8.02.
"Mike Z" <[email protected]> wrote in message
news:eo5idq$3qr$[email protected]..
>I should have repeated this, I am using VBScript in ASP,
with an Access DB.
>

SQL Injection on CallableStatement

I will try to post this all in one line, as the tags are not working today. I know that one should use PreparedStatement over Statement to obviate the thread of a SQL injection attack. Is CallableStatement vulnerable as well? For reference, this would be running against an Oracle RDBMS. Thanks!
- Saish

I guess there is no hard-and-fast rule.Well, I guess the hard and fast rule is "only use
bound variables". If you've got a sane database
design then that shouldn't cause you any problems.
Dave.I agree. I was approaching the issue mainly from a security perspective in locking down a legacy system against SQL injection attacks. Using Eclipse, I was able to zero-in on usages of Statement fairly easily. But the more I looked into CallableStatement, the more I realized that I woud have to inspect each invocation manually. (Just in case someone did not bind variables or built a dynamic SQL string).
- Saish

SQL Injection and variable substitutions

Hello helpful forum, I'm trying to understand what really goes on "behind" the scenes
with the variable substitutions in order to protect from sql injections.
I'm using apex 3.0.0.00.20
The trickiest component seems to be a Report of type "pl/sql returning sql", since
multiple dynamic sql interpretations are done there.
consider the following innocent looking disaster:
DECLARE
l_out VARCHAR2(2000);
BEGIN
l_out := 'select * from test_injection t where t.name like ''%' || :NAME || '%''';
RETURN l_out;
END;
if NAME is a single quote the report will return:
failed to parse SQL query: ORA-00911: invalid character
which hints to the fact that NAME is not escaped, and you are in fact able to access db functions
as in: '||lower('S')||'
I also tried to put there a function that runs in a autonomous transaction to log its calls, and
I see that it's called five times for each request.
consider now the similar solution (notice the two single quotes):
DECLARE
l_out VARCHAR2(2000);
BEGIN
l_out := 'select * from test_injection t where t.name like ''%'' || :NAME || ''%''';
RETURN l_out;
END;
with this second example nothing of the above is possible.
So my theory (please confirm it or refute it) is that there is a first variable substitution done
at the pl/sql level (and in the second case :NAME is just a string so nothing is substituted).
Then the dynamic sql is executed and it returns the following string:
select * from test_injection t where t.name like '%' || :NAME || '%'
now another substitution is done (at an "APEX" level) and then query is finally executed to return
the rows to the report.
The tricky point seems to be that the first substitution doesn't escape the variable (hence the error
with the single quote), while the second substitution does.
Please let me know if this makes sense and what are the proper guidelines to avoid sql injection with
the different kinds of reports and components (SQL, pl/sql returning sql, processes, ...)
Thanks

Giovanni,
You should build report regions like this using the second method so that all bind variables (colon followed by name) appear in the resultant varchar2 variable, l_out in your example, which will then be parsed as the report query. This addresses not only the SQL injection problem but the shared-pool friendliness problem.
Scott

SQL Injection -- DBA role..

Hi all,
I'm working as a SQL Server DBA,Now a days we are facing issue with attacks(SQL Injection),most of attacks are taken care by Firewalls but still some attacks hitting Database.
As a DBA How to check whether database got effected
Please help me by providing hints and tips to analysis SQL injection.
Thanks in advance

There is no easy ways to detect sql injection. You should analyze activity against databases and work with developers to address it.
Basically, you can capture sql_completed/rpc_completed events in XEvent or SQL Trace and review them. Anything, which is not parameterized, could be the subject of injection attach (it depends on Client Code and implementation).
As the side note, script below provides you the list of the databases together with number of cached execution plans that were used just once. SQL Injection targets non-parameterized queries. So the databases with large number of single-used plans are more
likely to be affected. In any case, do not rely on output much - large number of single-used plans could be just the sign of bad design rather than being affected. As I said, you need to review client app code just to be sure.
select
epa.value as [DB ID],
db_name(convert(int,epa.value)) as [DB Name],
count(*) as [Single Use Plans]
from
sys.dm_exec_cached_plans p
cross apply sys.dm_exec_plan_attributes(plan_handle) AS epa
where
p.usecounts = 1 and
p.objtype in ('Adhoc','Prepared') and
epa.attribute = 'dbid'
group by
epa.value
option (recompile)
Thank you!
Dmitri V. Korotkevitch (MVP, MCM, MCPD)
My blog: http://aboutsqlserver.com

Sql injection update signature

hi,
we are currently comparing cisco ips to tippingpoint, i have a cisco ips in front and tippingpoint in the back, so we are checking if cisco ips is missing on a lot of stuff , and currently it is missing on SQL injection attacks and cross scripting, which seems to be the weak point in cisco ips, its missing a lot on sql injection signatures, i mean why a simple update/set command does not have a signature ?

Thank you for your reply, do you know how to get in contact with the ips signature engineers at Cisco , i would like to share my comparaison with them as well as an attack that is passing all sql injection signature containing update but with u%pdate and the sql database is interpreting it as a normal update.

SQL Injection Blocker

Hello all-
I've got a server with a huge number of ColdFusion templates
(over 10,000) which I really need to protect agains SQL Injection.
I know that CFQUERYPARAM is the best way to do this. I'd love
to do it that way, but with so many pages, and so many queries it
would take weeks/months to fix the queries, then test to make sure
I didn't screw something up.
So, I've come up with a plan that I wanted to get some input
on.
Currently, I have a page on my server that is included in
almost every page that runs. It is a simple page that I can modify
to change the status of my systems in the event of a database
changeover, or some other sort of failure. (The pages still run,
but no updating is allowed, only reading)
Okay, so on this page which is always included, I was
thinking about analyzing the variables that come over. I was
thinking about looking for things that looked like a SQL injection
attack and blocking the page from running.
I wanted to know if this would work- anyone have ideas? This
would be great because I could protect the entire server in about
an hour. But, I don't want to give myself a false sense of security
if this won't really do the job.

First, here are some simple things you can do to protect all
pages before you follow the other advice and plans in this thread:
In CF administrator, click on your datasources and then the
"Advanced" button.
There you will uncheck all but the read and stored procedure
and (possibly) write permissions. "Drop", "Create", etc., are
definite no-nos here.
If you haven't already, make one data source read-permissions
only and refactor your code to use it everywhere except for
carefully segregated updates, inserts and deletes.
Now, in SQL Server itself, remove all permissions from the
users that CF uses except for data_reader and (selectively) data
writer and exec permissions on any procedures or functions you use.
In SQL server, setup at least two CF users. One, should have
only the data_reader permission (plus any read-only stored
procedures).
Find articles, such as this one:
http://www.sqlservercentral.com/columnists/bknight/10securingyoursqlserver.asp,
and follow their advice, start with locking down xp_cmdshell.
These measures require little or no CF code changes but will
block all but the most determined and skilled hackers. You still
need to follow Adam's advice though.
BTW, Dan is very wrong, ALL DB's are vulnerable to SQL
injection.
SQL server is not even the most vulnerable anymore (Studies
show that Oracle now has that "honor").

SQL injection protection help

In trying to help another user, I was reminded of a problem I
face
often. Trying to create a DW recordset using an IN clause (I
think this
got broken in the 8.0.2 update and seems to still be broken
in CS3).
I create a string held in a variable like this:
$ids = (1,5,9,23,6)
My advanced recordset is this:
SELECT * FROM tbl WHERE id IN varIds
Then I set the variable parameters to type=text,
default=(-1), and
runtime to $ids.
The generated SQL doesn;t work because DW puts single quotes
around my
variable and the SQL query becomes invalid. DW creates this:
SELECT * FROM tbl WHERE id IN '(1,5,9,23,6)'
It should be:
SELECT * FROM tbl WHERE id IN (1,5,9,23,6)
So, I edited the SWITCH block at the top of the document to
include a
"custom" type, which is the same as the TEXT type but without
the single
quotes.
case "custom":
$theValue = ($theValue != "") ? $theValue : "NULL";
break;
Then in my SQL statement, I manually changed "text" to
"custom".
This work fine, but does that open me up to SQL injection or
other bad
stuff?
Alec Fehl, MCSE, A+, ACE, ACI
Adobe Community Expert
AUTHOR:
Microsoft Office 2007 PowerPoint: Comprehensive Course
(Labyrinth
Publications)
Welcome to Web Design and HTML (Labyrinth Publications)
CO-AUTHOR:
Microsoft Office 2007: Essentials (Labyrinth Publications)
Computer Concepts and Vista (Labyrinth Publications)
Mike Meyers' A+ Guide to Managing and Troubleshooting PCs
(McGraw-Hill)
Internet Systems and Applications (EMC Paradigm)

It looks like you're using PHP ... to protect from SQL
injections I always
do this:
$query = "SELECT * FROM tbl WHERE col='%s' AND col2 IN
(%d,%d)"
$query = sprintf($query,"val",34,23);
$result = mysql_query($query);
This method ensures that if a user puts "DELETE FROM tbl" in
an input
field, it will not cause any deletions, instead the words
'DELETE FROM tbl'
will be inserted. Check out sprintf in the PHP manual - good
stuff!
One thing to remember about SQL injection, the injected SQL
has to be
entered somehow by the end-user (usually with a form); I may
be wrong, but
this sql statement looks like it is contained entirely within
your scripts
(i.e. it isn't getting getting a user-generated value to
build any part of
the SQL statement). Again, I'm guessing here - but it looks
that way.
Alex
"Alec Fehl" <[email protected]> wrote in message
news:[email protected]...
> In trying to help another user, I was reminded of a
problem I face often.
> Trying to create a DW recordset using an IN clause (I
think this got
> broken in the 8.0.2 update and seems to still be broken
in CS3).
>
> I create a string held in a variable like this:
> $ids = (1,5,9,23,6)
>
> My advanced recordset is this:
>
> SELECT * FROM tbl WHERE id IN varIds
>
> Then I set the variable parameters to type=text,
default=(-1), and runtime
> to $ids.
>
> The generated SQL doesn;t work because DW puts single
quotes around my
> variable and the SQL query becomes invalid. DW creates
this:
>
> SELECT * FROM tbl WHERE id IN '(1,5,9,23,6)'
>
> It should be:
>
> SELECT * FROM tbl WHERE id IN (1,5,9,23,6)
>
> So, I edited the SWITCH block at the top of the document
to include a
> "custom" type, which is the same as the TEXT type but
without the single
> quotes.
> case "custom":
> $theValue = ($theValue != "") ? $theValue : "NULL";
> break;
> Then in my SQL statement, I manually changed "text" to
"custom".
>
> This work fine, but does that open me up to SQL
injection or other bad
> stuff?
>
>
> --
> Alec Fehl, MCSE, A+, ACE, ACI
> Adobe Community Expert
>
> AUTHOR:
> Microsoft Office 2007 PowerPoint: Comprehensive Course
(Labyrinth
> Publications)
> Welcome to Web Design and HTML (Labyrinth Publications)
>
> CO-AUTHOR:
> Microsoft Office 2007: Essentials (Labyrinth
Publications)
> Computer Concepts and Vista (Labyrinth Publications)
> Mike Meyers' A+ Guide to Managing and Troubleshooting
PCs (McGraw-Hill)
> Internet Systems and Applications (EMC Paradigm)

SQL Injection when using Search by Example on a View Object

It seems that the SQL queries generated by "Search by Example" pattern (When you drop a view object as a Search Form) are not using bind parameters, and will be vulnerable to SQL injection attacks. This pattern is very handy and could be very useful to create search pages. Is there a way to avoid SQL Injection and still use this feature in ADF?
Chandresh

Hi,
from a training slide developed by Duncan Mills:
When the user is in Find mode and enters some information, he or she is constructing a ViewCriteria row. Each attribute in the View object exists in this row and any values that the user enters into the fields are mapped into these attributes.
In most circumstances, you will only ever have one criteria row, although the developer can allow multiple rows if the Create operation is called during Find mode.
To parse the entered query values, you need to look at each row, and then at each attribute. Calling getAttribute() returns the value the user entered (if any) for that field. You can then pass that string to a filter routine (shown in the next slide), which inspects this value for errors.
The filter routine can then change the example value if required and reset the criteria.
import java.util.regex.Matcher;
import java.util.regex.Pattern;
protected String detectInjection(String criteria) {
boolean reject = false;
String testPattern =       "^(>=|<=|=<|=>|<|>|<>|!=|=|BETWEEN|IN|LIKE|IS)";
String testCriteria = criteria.trim().toUpperCase();
    if (testCriteria != null && testCriteria.length() > 0) {
      Pattern pattern = Pattern.compile(testPattern);
      Matcher matcher = pattern.matcher(testCriteria);
      if (matcher.find())
        reject = true;
    return reject?null:criteria;
}Frank

SQL injection hacking

Hello all,
Someone is telling me that a site of mine is vulnerable to a
hacking
technique called "SQL injection". They cited a URL such as
http://www.mydomain.com/gallery.cfm?VarCatID=29
as an example.
I Googled SQL injection, and found a lot of information,
which I'm in the
midst of reading.
What I really want to know is, how serious a risk is this?
Should I be
taking action, and if so, what?
Aren't there millions of sites that use that type of URL
string?? Are they
all unsafe too?
Patty Ayers | www.WebDevBiz.com
Free Articles on the Business of Web Development
Web Design Contract, Estimate Request Form, Estimate
Worksheet

Thank you, Tom!
Patty Ayers | www.WebDevBiz.com
Free Articles on the Business of Web Development
Web Design Contract, Estimate Request Form, Estimate
Worksheet
"Tom Muck" <[email protected]> wrote in
message
news:ecuu0f$dbn$[email protected]..
> If you are passing an integer on a querystring, make
sure you validate
> that an integer is being passed, either by using a
cfparm, cfqueryparam,
> or by using the val() function on the passed querystring
variable:
>
> <cfquery name="blah" datasource="#mydsn#">
> SELECT * FROM mytable WHERE catid =
> <cfqueryparam cfsqltype="cf_sql_integer"
value="#url.VarCatID#">
> </cfquery>
>
> The DW 8.0.2 update changed the way that DW does this so
injection is no
> longer a concern.
>
> --
> --
> Tom Muck
> co-author Dreamweaver MX 2004: The Complete Reference
>
http://www.tom-muck.com/
>
> Cartweaver Development Team
>
http://www.cartweaver.com
>
> Extending Knowledge Daily
>
http://www.communitymx.com/
>
>
> "P@tty Ayers"
<[email protected]> wrote in message
> news:ecut8j$cg6$[email protected]..
>> Hello all,
>>
>> Someone is telling me that a site of mine is
vulnerable to a hacking
>> technique called "SQL injection". They cited a URL
such as
>>
http://www.mydomain.com/gallery.cfm?VarCatID=29
as an example.
>>
>> I Googled SQL injection, and found a lot of
information, which I'm in the
>> midst of reading.
>>
>> What I really want to know is, how serious a risk is
this? Should I be
>> taking action, and if so, what?
>>
>> Aren't there millions of sites that use that type of
URL string?? Are
>> they all unsafe too?
>>
>>
>> --
>> Patty Ayers | www.WebDevBiz.com
>> Free Articles on the Business of Web Development
>> Web Design Contract, Estimate Request Form, Estimate
Worksheet
>> --
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>

SQL Injection Discussion

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