How can I use oracle function to decode the encode value

Question

Hi everybody,
If the data is encode value how can I decode this value

Answer 1

DBMS_OBFUSCATION_TOOLKIT
DBMS_OBFUSCATION_TOOLKIT allows an application to encrypt data using either the Data Encryption Standard (DES) or the Triple DES algorithms.
The Data Encryption Standard (DES), also known as the Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA) by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and DEA-1 by the International Standards Organization (ISO), has been a worldwide encryption standard for over 20 years. The banking industry has also adopted DES-based standards for transactions between private financial institutions, and between financial institutions and private individuals. DES will eventually be replaced by a new Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
DES is a symmetric key cipher; that is, the same key is used to encrypt data as well as decrypt data. DES encrypts data in 64-bit blocks using a 56-bit key. The DES algorithm ignores 8 bits of the 64-bit key that is supplied; however, developers must supply a 64-bit key to the algorithm.
Triple DES (3DES) is a far stronger cipher than DES; the resulting ciphertext (encrypted data) is much harder to break using an exhaustive search: 2**112 or 2**168 attempts instead of 2**56 attempts. Triple DES is also not as vulnerable to certain types of cryptanalysis as is DES. DES procedures are as follows:
DESEncrypt Procedure
DESDecrypt Procedure
Oracle installs this package in the SYS schema. You can then grant package access to existing users and roles as needed. The package also grants access to the PUBLIC role so no explicit grant needs to be done.
This chapter discusses the following topics:
Overview of Key Management
Summary of DBMS_OBFUSCATION Subprograms
Overview of Key Management
Key management, including both generation and secure storage of cryptographic keys, is one of the most important aspects of encryption. If keys are poorly chosen or stored improperly, then it is far easier for a malefactor to break the encryption. Rather than using an exhaustive key search attack (that is, cycling through all the possible keys in hopes of finding the correct decryption key), cryptanalysts typically seek weaknesses in the choice of keys, or the way in which keys are stored.
Key generation is an important aspect of encryption. Typically, keys are generated automatically through a random-number generator. Provided that the random number generation is cryptographically secure, this can be an acceptable form of key generation. However, if random numbers are not cryptographically secure, but have elements of predictability, the security of the encryption may be easily compromised.
The DBMS_OBFUSCATION_TOOLKIT package does not generate encryption keys nor does it maintain them. Care must be taken by the application developer to ensure the secure generation and storage of encryption keys used with this package. Furthermore, the encryption and decryption done by the DBMS_OBFUSCATION_TOOLKIT takes place on the server, not the client. If the key is passed over the connection between the client and the server, the connection must be protected using Oracle Advanced Security; otherwise the key is vulnerable to capture over the wire.
Key storage is one of the most important, yet difficult aspects of encryption and one of the hardest to manage properly. To recover data encrypted with a symmetric key, the key must be accessible to the application or user seeking to decrypt data. The key needs to be easy enough to retrieve that users can access encrypted data when they need to without significant performance degradation. The key also needs to be secure enough that it is not easily recoverable by an unauthorized user trying to access encrypted data he is not supposed to see.
The three options available to a developer are:
Store the key in the database
Store the key in the operating system
Have the user manage the key
Storing the Key in the Database
Storing the keys in the database cannot always provide bullet-proof security if you are trying to protect data against the DBA accessing encrypted data (since an all-privileged DBA can access tables containing encryption keys), but it can provide security against the casual snooper, or against someone compromising the database files on the operating system. Furthermore, the security you can obtain by storing keys in the database does not have to be bullet-proof in order to be extremely useful.
For example, suppose you want to encrypt an employee's social security number, one of the columns in table EMP. You could encrypt each employee's SSN using a key which is stored in a separate column in EMP. However, anyone with SELECT access on the EMP table could retrieve the encryption key and decrypt the matching social security number. Alternatively, you could store the encryption keys in another table, and use a package to retrieve the correct key for the encrypted data item, based on a primary key-foreign key relationship between the tables.
A developer could envelope both the DBMS_OBFUSCATION_TOOLKIT package and the procedure to retrieve the encryption keys supplied to the package. Furthermore, the encryption key itself could be transformed in some way (for example, XORed with the foreign key to the EMP table) so that the key itself is not stored in easily recoverable form.
Oracle recommends using the wrap utility of PL/SQL to obfuscate the code within a PL/SQL package itself that does the encryption. That prevents people from breaking the encryption by looking at the PL/SQL code that handles keys, calls encrypting routines, and so on. In other words, use the wrap utility to obfuscate the PL/SQL packages themselves. This scheme is secure enough to prevent users with SELECT access to EMP from reading unencrypted sensitive data, and a DBA from easily retrieving encryption keys and using them to decrypt data in the EMP table. It can be made more secure by changing encryption keys regularly, or having a better key storage algorithm (so the keys themselves are encrypted, for example).
Storing the Key in the Operating System
Storing keys in the operating system (that is, in a flat file) is another option. With Oracle8i you can make callouts from PL/SQL, which you could use to retrieve encryption keys. If you store keys in the O/S and make callouts to retrieve the keys, the security of your encrypted data is only as secure as the protection of the key file on the O/S. Of course, a user retrieving keys from the operating system would have to be able to either access the Oracle database files (to decrypt encrypted data), or be able to gain access to the table in which the encrypted data is stored as a legitimate user.
User-Supplied Keys
If you ask a user to supply the key, it is crucial that you use network encryption, such as that provided by Oracle Advanced Security, so the key is not passed from client to server in the clear. The user must remember the key, or your data is nonrecoverable.
http://download-west.oracle.com/docs/cd/B10501_01/appdev.920/a96612/d_obtool.htm#ARPLS028
Joel P�rez