SQL Injection Help

Hi there I have created a site and I am told that I should
protect my self against SQL Injection attacks. I have created the
site using Dreamweaver and dont know if it creates code with this
in mind. Can anyone suggest what to do?
Mally

Similar Messages

SQL injection protection help

In trying to help another user, I was reminded of a problem I
face
often. Trying to create a DW recordset using an IN clause (I
think this
got broken in the 8.0.2 update and seems to still be broken
in CS3).
I create a string held in a variable like this:
$ids = (1,5,9,23,6)
My advanced recordset is this:
SELECT * FROM tbl WHERE id IN varIds
Then I set the variable parameters to type=text,
default=(-1), and
runtime to $ids.
The generated SQL doesn;t work because DW puts single quotes
around my
variable and the SQL query becomes invalid. DW creates this:
SELECT * FROM tbl WHERE id IN '(1,5,9,23,6)'
It should be:
SELECT * FROM tbl WHERE id IN (1,5,9,23,6)
So, I edited the SWITCH block at the top of the document to
include a
"custom" type, which is the same as the TEXT type but without
the single
quotes.
case "custom":
$theValue = ($theValue != "") ? $theValue : "NULL";
break;
Then in my SQL statement, I manually changed "text" to
"custom".
This work fine, but does that open me up to SQL injection or
other bad
stuff?
Alec Fehl, MCSE, A+, ACE, ACI
Adobe Community Expert
AUTHOR:
Microsoft Office 2007 PowerPoint: Comprehensive Course
(Labyrinth
Publications)
Welcome to Web Design and HTML (Labyrinth Publications)
CO-AUTHOR:
Microsoft Office 2007: Essentials (Labyrinth Publications)
Computer Concepts and Vista (Labyrinth Publications)
Mike Meyers' A+ Guide to Managing and Troubleshooting PCs
(McGraw-Hill)
Internet Systems and Applications (EMC Paradigm)

It looks like you're using PHP ... to protect from SQL
injections I always
do this:
$query = "SELECT * FROM tbl WHERE col='%s' AND col2 IN
(%d,%d)"
$query = sprintf($query,"val",34,23);
$result = mysql_query($query);
This method ensures that if a user puts "DELETE FROM tbl" in
an input
field, it will not cause any deletions, instead the words
'DELETE FROM tbl'
will be inserted. Check out sprintf in the PHP manual - good
stuff!
One thing to remember about SQL injection, the injected SQL
has to be
entered somehow by the end-user (usually with a form); I may
be wrong, but
this sql statement looks like it is contained entirely within
your scripts
(i.e. it isn't getting getting a user-generated value to
build any part of
the SQL statement). Again, I'm guessing here - but it looks
that way.
Alex
"Alec Fehl" <[email protected]> wrote in message
news:[email protected]...
> In trying to help another user, I was reminded of a
problem I face often.
> Trying to create a DW recordset using an IN clause (I
think this got
> broken in the 8.0.2 update and seems to still be broken
in CS3).
>
> I create a string held in a variable like this:
> $ids = (1,5,9,23,6)
>
> My advanced recordset is this:
>
> SELECT * FROM tbl WHERE id IN varIds
>
> Then I set the variable parameters to type=text,
default=(-1), and runtime
> to $ids.
>
> The generated SQL doesn;t work because DW puts single
quotes around my
> variable and the SQL query becomes invalid. DW creates
this:
>
> SELECT * FROM tbl WHERE id IN '(1,5,9,23,6)'
>
> It should be:
>
> SELECT * FROM tbl WHERE id IN (1,5,9,23,6)
>
> So, I edited the SWITCH block at the top of the document
to include a
> "custom" type, which is the same as the TEXT type but
without the single
> quotes.
> case "custom":
> $theValue = ($theValue != "") ? $theValue : "NULL";
> break;
> Then in my SQL statement, I manually changed "text" to
"custom".
>
> This work fine, but does that open me up to SQL
injection or other bad
> stuff?
>
>
> --
> Alec Fehl, MCSE, A+, ACE, ACI
> Adobe Community Expert
>
> AUTHOR:
> Microsoft Office 2007 PowerPoint: Comprehensive Course
(Labyrinth
> Publications)
> Welcome to Web Design and HTML (Labyrinth Publications)
>
> CO-AUTHOR:
> Microsoft Office 2007: Essentials (Labyrinth
Publications)
> Computer Concepts and Vista (Labyrinth Publications)
> Mike Meyers' A+ Guide to Managing and Troubleshooting
PCs (McGraw-Hill)
> Internet Systems and Applications (EMC Paradigm)

Sql injection attack - need help changing ASP code

Our web server was attacked yesterday by SQL injection. So I
quickly learned about the holes in the code that was generated by
Dreamweaver MX 2004.
I found the help article on the Adobe website to fix the ASP
code; however I need more information for my particular case. I
don't know how to get my cursor type and location settings into the
new code.
MY ORIGINAL CODE
<%
Dim Recordset1
Dim Recordset1_numRows
Set Recordset1 = Server.CreateObject("ADODB.Recordset")
Recordset1.ActiveConnection = MM_Oncology_STRING
Recordset1.Source = "SELECT * FROM dbo.Oncology_Dir WHERE
Oncology_ID = " + Replace(Recordset1__MMColParam, "'", "''") + ""
Recordset1.CursorType = 0
Recordset1.CursorLocation = 3
Recordset1.LockType = 1
Recordset1.Open()
Recordset1_numRows = 0
%>
THE NEW CODE, WHICH NEEDS TO BE FIXED TO REFLECT CURSOR TYPE
AND LOCATION ABOVE.
<%
Dim Recordset1
Dim Recordset1_cmd
Dim Recordset1_numRows
Set Recordset1_cmd = Server.CreateObject ("ADODB.Command")
Recordset1_cmd.ActiveConnection = MM_Oncology_STRING
Recordset1_cmd.CommandText = "SELECT * FROM dbo.Oncology_Dir
WHERE Oncology_ID = ?"
Recordset1_cmd.Prepared = true
Recordset1_cmd.Parameters.Append
Recordset1_cmd.CreateParameter("param1", 5, 1, -1,
Recordset1__MMColParam) ' adDouble
Set Recordset1 = Recordset1_cmd.Execute
Recordset1_numRows = 0
%>
What exactly is the 5,1,-1 in the code above?
Any help would be very much appreciated as my ASP page
(although secured from SQL injection) is not working properly.
Thanks,
--Jen
--Jen

The new snippet is not vulnerable to SQL injection. It uses a
command
object and actual defined parameters, so you're safe. You
cannot change the
cursor type or location on that object.
"jennday" <[email protected]> wrote in
message
news:f85omh$ngg$[email protected]..
> Our web server was attacked yesterday by SQL injection.
So I quickly
> learned
> about the holes in the code that was generated by
Dreamweaver MX 2004.
> I found the help article on the Adobe website to fix the
ASP code; however
> I
> need more information for my particular case. I don't
know how to get my
> cursor type and location settings into the new code.

SQL Injection, replace single quote with two single quotes?

Is replacing a single quote with two single quotes adequate
for eliminating
SQL injection attacks? This article (
http://www.devguru.com/features/kb/kb100206.asp
) offers that advice, and it
enabled me to allow users to search name fields in the
database that contain
single quotes.
I was advised to use "Paramaterized SQL" in an earlier post,
but I can't
understand the concept behind that method, and whether it
applies to
queries, writes, or both.

Then you can use both stored procedures and prepared
statements.
Both provide better protection than simply replacing
apostrophes.
Prepared statements are simple:
Set myCommand = Server.CreateObject("ADODB.Command")
...snip...
myCommand.CommandText = "INSERT INTO Users([Name], [Email])
VALUES (?, ?)"
...snip...
myCommand.Parameters.Append
myCommand.CreateParameter("@Name",200,1,50,Name)
myCommand.Parameters.Append
myCommand.CreateParameter("@Email",200,1,50,Email)
myCommand.Execute ,,128 'the ,,128 sets execution flags that
tell ADO not to
look for rows to be returned. This saves the expense of
creating a
recordset object you don't need.
Stored procedures are executed in a similar manner. DW can
help you with a
stored procedure through the "Command (Stored Procedure)"
server behavior.
You can see a full example of a prepared statement by looking
at DW's
recordset code after you've created a recordset using version
8.02.
"Mike Z" <[email protected]> wrote in message
news:eo5idq$3qr$[email protected]..
>I should have repeated this, I am using VBScript in ASP,
with an Access DB.
>

SQL Injection and variable substitutions

Hello helpful forum, I'm trying to understand what really goes on "behind" the scenes
with the variable substitutions in order to protect from sql injections.
I'm using apex 3.0.0.00.20
The trickiest component seems to be a Report of type "pl/sql returning sql", since
multiple dynamic sql interpretations are done there.
consider the following innocent looking disaster:
DECLARE
l_out VARCHAR2(2000);
BEGIN
l_out := 'select * from test_injection t where t.name like ''%' || :NAME || '%''';
RETURN l_out;
END;
if NAME is a single quote the report will return:
failed to parse SQL query: ORA-00911: invalid character
which hints to the fact that NAME is not escaped, and you are in fact able to access db functions
as in: '||lower('S')||'
I also tried to put there a function that runs in a autonomous transaction to log its calls, and
I see that it's called five times for each request.
consider now the similar solution (notice the two single quotes):
DECLARE
l_out VARCHAR2(2000);
BEGIN
l_out := 'select * from test_injection t where t.name like ''%'' || :NAME || ''%''';
RETURN l_out;
END;
with this second example nothing of the above is possible.
So my theory (please confirm it or refute it) is that there is a first variable substitution done
at the pl/sql level (and in the second case :NAME is just a string so nothing is substituted).
Then the dynamic sql is executed and it returns the following string:
select * from test_injection t where t.name like '%' || :NAME || '%'
now another substitution is done (at an "APEX" level) and then query is finally executed to return
the rows to the report.
The tricky point seems to be that the first substitution doesn't escape the variable (hence the error
with the single quote), while the second substitution does.
Please let me know if this makes sense and what are the proper guidelines to avoid sql injection with
the different kinds of reports and components (SQL, pl/sql returning sql, processes, ...)
Thanks

Giovanni,
You should build report regions like this using the second method so that all bind variables (colon followed by name) appear in the resultant varchar2 variable, l_out in your example, which will then be parsed as the report query. This addresses not only the SQL injection problem but the shared-pool friendliness problem.
Scott

SQL Injection -- DBA role..

Hi all,
I'm working as a SQL Server DBA,Now a days we are facing issue with attacks(SQL Injection),most of attacks are taken care by Firewalls but still some attacks hitting Database.
As a DBA How to check whether database got effected
Please help me by providing hints and tips to analysis SQL injection.
Thanks in advance

There is no easy ways to detect sql injection. You should analyze activity against databases and work with developers to address it.
Basically, you can capture sql_completed/rpc_completed events in XEvent or SQL Trace and review them. Anything, which is not parameterized, could be the subject of injection attach (it depends on Client Code and implementation).
As the side note, script below provides you the list of the databases together with number of cached execution plans that were used just once. SQL Injection targets non-parameterized queries. So the databases with large number of single-used plans are more
likely to be affected. In any case, do not rely on output much - large number of single-used plans could be just the sign of bad design rather than being affected. As I said, you need to review client app code just to be sure.
select
epa.value as [DB ID],
db_name(convert(int,epa.value)) as [DB Name],
count(*) as [Single Use Plans]
from
sys.dm_exec_cached_plans p
cross apply sys.dm_exec_plan_attributes(plan_handle) AS epa
where
p.usecounts = 1 and
p.objtype in ('Adhoc','Prepared') and
epa.attribute = 'dbid'
group by
epa.value
option (recompile)
Thank you!
Dmitri V. Korotkevitch (MVP, MCM, MCPD)
My blog: http://aboutsqlserver.com

SQL Injection concerns

I have been studying sql injection attacks and the
mysql_real_escape function.
I read the adobe technote about sql injection and it noted
that Dreamweaver 8.0 incorporates anti-sql injection code to
prevent attacks and it specifically refers to Add, Delete, and
Update; Filtered Recordsets, and Login User server behaviors. Can
anyone please confirm this to put my mind at ease?
The Search form and results page uses a filtered recordset,
so can I presume that it is guarded from attack?
Can you tell me of any areas that I need to add anti-sql
injection code myself?
Thank you so much for your help!

EviePhillips wrote:
> The code on this second page (the one where the form
posts to) ECHOs the form
> variables. Do I need to enter the
mysql_real_escape_string around each of the
> ECHOed posted form variables?
No, mysql_real_escape_string() is used only when inserting
user input
values into a database. You cannot use it without a database
connection.
However, you should pass the values to htmlentitities()
before
displaying them in your page. You can do this by accessing
the Format
menu in the Dynamic Text dialog box. After using the Bindings
panel to
insert the value, switch to the Server Behaviors panel, and
double-click
the Dynamic Text entry to open the dialog box.
> I am then going to use the ADD Record server behavior to
add the data to my
> database from this page, which based on your counsel is
fully protected from
> sql injection.
>
> You are very kind for sharing your knowledge!
> EP
>
David Powers, Adobe Community Expert
Author, "The Essential Guide to Dreamweaver CS4",
"PHP Solutions" & "PHP Object-Oriented Solutions"
http://foundationphp.com/

SQL Injection & CF code Attacks

One thing I've noticed with sites using CF is that many, many
programmers do not take into account SQL Injection and CF Form/URL
variable attacks. I've seen SO many CF pages that blow up when the
input varies in the slightest, displaying CF error messages,
datasources, variable names, etc.
Seems not enough programmers use CFTRY/CFCATCH or even know
about it. I've seen where SQL table names and datasources were
being passed in a URL!! It's frightening
Interested in everyone's BEST PRACTICES to avoid these type
of attacks.
I'll start it off with a few I use:
Use CFTRY / CFCATCH.
ALWAYS set the maxlength value on form input text boxes and
make sure the value matches the corresponding column length in your
DB. If you do not, someone can enter a huge amount of data in the
field, causing your CF routine or DB to choke.
Scope all variables, URL, Form, etc.
Use numbers/integers whenever possible for URL variable
values.
Avoid using varchar as the data type in your stored
procedures for passed URL or Form variables. Use INT instead.
Validate user input using CF before passing to your SQL, etc.
queries. Test for allowed/disallowed characters, blanks, length of
input value, etc.
Use stored procedures whenever possible.
Don't make URL or Form variable names too descriptive. ex.
?m=100 is better than ?memberID=100

In addition to the things listed above, you should never
expect the values sent from any form submission to be 100% as they
are coded. There are tons of programs out there that can be used to
intercept and alter the submitted data before it hits your server.
It is a slow process, but we are locking down any and all form
variables not just type="text" and textarea's.
If a user has the ability to alter submitted data, they can
change the values for all types of form fields (hidden, radio,
checkbox, select, button, etc...). A lot of our old code did not
take that into consideration and simply allowed the value entered
from a "predefind" (hard coded value) form type (radio, checkbox,
etc...) directly into the database without a check.
Another step is to turn off "Enable Robust Exception
Information" in the CF Administrator. This step will help in not
giving an attacker the complete SQL statement being used in your
code. Note: This is a recomended practice for all production CF
servers as it is, but it never hurts to say it. CFTRY/CFCATCH
blocks work as well to hid that info, but neither way will
prevent an attack.
You also can not rely on client side JavaScript for
validation.
CR

SQL Injection - cfqueryparam and other techniques to stop abuse?

We have been having a lot of issues with SQL injection lately and so we are trying various methods to secure the data better.
First off we have been utlizing cfqueryparam on the queries that are being hit. I am also optimizing the data tables so that more maxlengths are in place.
What else can be done to improve security? I have looked up everything and anything on the internet and keep seeing the cfqueryparam.
Does changing the variables or table names make any difference? We are trying that, but I want to make sure it is not a waste of our time.
Thanks for any other suggestions.

CFqueryparam is a good fist step, though you should note that it will not protect some queries. For example if you have a sort by or order by that is dynamic, cfqueryparam wont help in that case. You will need to review data and validate for that.
You should also be checking for XSS vulnarabilities.
http://www.12robots.com/index.cfm/2008/8/4/Persistent-XSS-Attacks-and-countermeausures-in- ColdFusion
The blog above has a great number of CF sercurity related posts.
Pete Freitag has a nice security scanner that will look at your CF server and highlight any missing patches and some other issues
http://www.petefreitag.com/item/721.cfm
There are some open source projects that will also filter out common sql injection and xss attacks on a code level.
http://portcullis.riaforge.org/
Finally there are several conferences in the CF world coming up, and all surely have some security sessions. You may want to attend.

XML Validation using java for SQL Injection and script validation

I have an input coming from xml file.
I have to read that input and validate the input against sql injections and scripts.
I require help now how to read this xml data and validate against the above two options.
I am a java developer.
in this context what is marshelling?

http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/library/x-javaxmlvalidapi.html?ca=dgr-lnxw07Java-XML-Val
http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.5.0/docs/api/javax/xml/validation/package-summary.html
The following code validates the xml against a xml schema
// define the type of schema - we use W3C:
String schemaLang = "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema";
SchemaFactory factory = SchemaFactory.newInstance(schemaLang);
Schema schema = factory.newSchema(new StreamSource("sample.xsd"));
Validator validator = schema.newValidator();
// at last perform validation:
validator.validate(new StreamSource("sample.xml"));Message was edited by:
haishai

[ask] about oracle sql injection and escalation

Hello,i'm student , i'm studying oracle,now i want to research about oracle sql injection,i had read some tuttorial such as *'Hacking Oracle From Web,Advanced SQL Injection In Oracle Databases,Oracle Hacker HandBook ...'* but when i try to demo on localserver (11.0.1.6) but not run,and this is my demo
-- first,i created table users
create table users (name nvarchar2(50),pass nvarchar2(50))
-- then i created procedure with system user
create or replace procedure system.adduser(u nvarchar2,p nvarchar2)
as
begin
insert into users values(u,p);
end;
-- grant execute privilege to oc user
grant execute on adduser to oc
-- login with user oc and create a procedure
create or replace procedure sqli
as
begin
execute immediate 'grant dba to oc';
end;
-- and then,i run system's procedure
declare
begin
system.adduser('admin','admin'' ; execute immediate ''declare begin sqli() end;');
end;
i hope oracle master help me to i can understand and improving my knowledge
Thanks

The best forum for this is probably Forum Home » Java » SQLJ/JDBC
Presumably you are refering to oracle.sql.TIMESTAMP. While this is intended to (and does) correspond to java.sql.Timestamp it can't be a subclass because it needs to be a subclass of oracle.sql.Datum.

SQL injection and SQLFury

We have recently had an SQL injection attack on our site. The web form in question was calling a second cfm with a post command. The second cfm did the actually db insert. After extensive research and revamping of the web form I believed that I had shut it down rather convincingly. I did the following to secure the form:
- implemented the cfqueryparam tag on all applicable fields being entered in the form
- introduced a hidden, random numeric variable for verification before completing the insert; it tests for its existence and if it is numeric
- consolidated the two cfms into one page so the entry and insert are done in one cfm (to eliminate injection going directly thru insert cfm)
However, I am still getting intermittent injection errors into my MS SQL table. I don't believe it is getting in through the revised web form and am at a loss as to how it's getting through.
I am now at the point that I am looking for a utility that will scan through my site or specific pages to identify SQL injection vulnerabilties. I found something called SQLFury and downloaded it; however, there is literally no documentation with it and I have no idea how to run it. I've researched the web and found no assistance on how to use this utility. Is anyone familiar with this utility or does anyone know of any other utility that will assist with validating ColdFusion methods?
Any assistance would be very much appreciated.

Ian:
Thanks for the information. The utility is helpful and confirmed for me that my page was secure from SQL injection. The additional insight you provided has lead me to discover that my issue was not an SQL injection, but a Cross Scripting attack. A web vulnerability utility from Acunetix helped me determine that.
Thanks again,
...Wes

SQL injection embeded .js file to execute CF hack

I am a programmer sent to investigate suspicious activity at
a client's web application. I cannot attach a file in case of
infection potential. The Coldfusion code is open to SQL injection
attack which is how we believe the Apache web server became
infected. Upon investigation we found javascript files which had
been written with CFML code programatically scripted to fit within
a .js javascript file and write and read data from the server.
Has ANYONE seen this type of attack before? I cannot disclose
the client or specific data as we are under a NDA (Non-Disclosure
Agreement), however, I need help of other Coldfusion programmers to
fully understand this attack. Has anyone seen CFML code programmed
into a .js javascript file and run by calling the .js javascript
file before?
We have found japanese or chinese language within the code
and within files on the server. The client states they have NOT
installed any language packs or anything referencing other
languages than English. There have been japanese characters found
on the database server. There are hundreds of .js and .xml files on
the server which reference japanese. Furthermore, we have found
many XML files on the server,but the client does not use .xml so
these .xml files would then be foreign and potentially
programatically scripted by the server launching code to write
these files under the un-knowing eyes of the client.
So we need to understand the limits or potential threats:
1. Can CFML scripting be embedded into a .js javascript file
2. If database parameters are not locked, what are the
possible attacks available to SQL injection
Any help would be appreciated.
Thank you in advance.
Alex Dove

1. Only if the server is set to parse a .js file as CFML
2. A lot!
http://www.forta.com/blog/index.cfm/2008/7/22/For-Goodness-Sake-Use-CFQUERYPARAM-Already
http://www.forta.com/blog/index.cfm/2008/7/23/Hacker-Webzine-Recommends-Use-Of-CFQUERYPARA M
Ken Ford
Adobe Community Expert - Dreamweaver/ColdFusion
Fordwebs, LLC
http://www.fordwebs.com
"ajdove" <[email protected]> wrote in
message news:[email protected]...
>
> I am a programmer sent to investigate suspicious
activity at a client's web
> application. I cannot attach a file in case of infection
potential. The
> Coldfusion code is open to SQL injection attack which is
how we believe the
> Apache web server became infected. Upon investigation we
found javascript
> files which had been written with CFML code
programatically scripted to fit
> within a .js javascript file and write and read data
from the server.
>
> Has ANYONE seen this type of attack before? I cannot
disclose the client or
> specific data as we are under a NDA (Non-Disclosure
Agreement), however, I need
> help of other Coldfusion programmers to fully understand
this attack. Has
> anyone seen CFML code programmed into a .js javascript
file and run by calling
> the .js javascript file before?
>
> We have found japanese or chinese language within the
code and within files on
> the server. The client states they have NOT installed
any language packs or
> anything referencing other languages than English. There
have been japanese
> characters found on the database server. There are
hundreds of .js and .xml
> files on the server which reference japanese.
Furthermore, we have found many
> XML files on the server,but the client does not use .xml
so these .xml files
> would then be foreign and potentially programatically
scripted by the server
> launching code to write these files under the un-knowing
eyes of the client.
>
> So we need to understand the limits or potential
threats:
> 1. Can CFML scripting be embedded into a .js javascript
file
> 2. If database parameters are not locked, what are the
possible attacks
> available to SQL injection
>
> Any help would be appreciated.
> Thank you in advance.
> Alex Dove
>
>

Sql injection character fields

Is it true that with MSSQL in the background, character fields can't be used for sql injection?
A)   One source says that in MSSQL single quotes are escaped into double quotes.
B)   Another source says that " SQL injection (within ColdFusion apps) is really only an issue with non textual fields. If a text value is tampered with you'll end up with tampered text, but that text will all be part of the core string (within quotes) passed as a value, and will therefore not be executed as separate statements. Numbers, on the other hand, are not enclosed within quotes, and so extraneous text can be tampered "
Questions about A):   How does escaping 's with "s help, by making string literals in MSSQL not valid?
                                How could A) above be true when names like O'Mally are being stored with a single quote ?
Questions about B)    Does it mean code like DELETE * FROM atable would just be stored as a string and not execute ?
                                If so, is that accurate ?

To actually answer your question's.
A) A single quote in SQL is a comment. To store a single quote as DATA one has to escape it by doubling it. So to store O'Mally it would be passed as o''Mally.
The simple SQL injection attack is to end a number value with a random value, that is followed with a ; to end the SQL statment and then another statement can be run, this is then followed by a single quote to comment out any other SQL in the original statement. ColdFusion automatically escapes single quotes in text fields in most situations, so this is harder to do with text fields, but not impossible.

SQL Injection Ver 2

Hello
I've just installed HTMLDB ver 2 into a new install of 10.2.0.1.0 (taken off OTN)and wanted to have a look at generating reports mentioned in the documentation using SQL Injection. When I click on SQL Injection I get the following message:
"SQL Injection analysis is not supported with your current database release version. It is only available for Oracle release 10.2 or higher"
Do I need to switch something else on for HTMLDB to recognise the version of the database?
Any help greatly appreciated
Regards
Pync

Pync,
I'm afraid the message is a bit misleading. The packages required from Oracle (in addition to a 10.2 database) have not been distributed yet). See also our release notes on this topic:
http://download-west.oracle.com/docs/cd/B19306_01/relnotes.102/b16374/toc.htm#CCHJAGDJ
Sergio

SQL Injection Help

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