Sudo has a big security hole in 10.5.2

I noticed that Leopard does NOT require a password when invoking something under sudo if you are in the /etc/sudoers file. This is different than any other *nix I have ever seen. Even Tiger required a password each time sudo was invoked. This opens a pretty big hole in Leopard. All someone has to do is get into your system as a sudoer and all bets are off.

Sterling Garwood wrote:
I noticed that Leopard does NOT require a password when invoking something under sudo if you are in the /etc/sudoers file.
Not on any Leopard that I have seen. A user in the sudoers file must enter his password to use sudo. That 's how it has always been in all version of OS X. If that's not the case on your Mac then something is seriously broken.

Similar Messages

  • Big Security Hole - Seesion ID Anonyous User Registration

    Hi,
    This is a serious security vulnerability with IdM Anonymous Registration. When a new user is trying to register through IdM on the anonymous user registration, the session id generated has a pattern which can be easily hijacked by attackers to retrieve the data entered in the forms.
    The following are the urls which are been generated in different sessions for new user registration.
    https://domain.com/idm/user/anonWorkItemEdit.jsp?id=*%23ID%23D728DF8F73C051F4%3A51EF2C64%3A11BE5FE3A73%3A-4596*
    https://domain.com/idm/user/anonWorkItemEdit.jsp?id=*%23ID%23D728DF8F73C051F4%3A51EF2C64%3A11BE5FE3A73%3A-4590*
    https://domain.com/idm/user/anonWorkItemEdit.jsp?id=*%23ID%23D728DF8F73C051F4%3A51EF2C64%3A11BE5FE3A73%3A-4589*
    Please suggest how to over come or generate random Session ids.

    Usually this refers to the workflow or workitem id. I think there is no security issue here. It is a standard practice that you invoke a workflow for anonymous registration or any anonymous process. Then in the workflow you have to implement approvals and validations so that no weird user gets an account. Apart from that this should have an entry in AnonymousUserTasks configuration. Any workflow in this configuration file should have strong validations and approvals implemented.

  • How to repair security holes and viruses

    My phone keeps saying it has bout 13 security holes and maybe some viruses

    Do you have a security app like one of the following that could be generating that message?
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  • New plugin security hole - would dynamic versioning help?

    We use Plug-In to deploy a large applet to many customers.
    Sun issued Alert Notification 101749 recently about another hole in Plug-In that can let
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    Checked the Plug-In docs again and read up on "dynamic versioning" where one sets the CLSID to 8AD9C840-044E-11D1-B3E9-00805F499D93.
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    Ok, now I'm not sure what's going on.
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    So at least it now works according to the documentation.
    Still seems like there's no way to handle needing to upgrade to _08 other than updating all the affected html pages.
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  • MS Office secretly connects to my Mac and scans my activity. How??? Security hole? Exploitable by hackers?

    I have a strange problem. All by itself it's not so serious, but it concerns me that it reveals a security hole which can be exploited by hackers.
    I may be over-reacting, so any reassurance or explanation would be appreciated.
    Here's the situation:
    I have a MacBook Pro running OSX 10.6.5. I also have a new MacBook Air also running 10.6.5. I recently used Migration Assistant to move all my applications from the MacBook Pro to the MacBook Air. The migration worked fine with one very troubling exception.
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    HOWEVER...if I have my MacBook Pro open and running MS Office on it, and then I simultaneously open my Air and try to launch MS Office, I get an error message that says
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    An office program is being used by Apple Mac. Your installation exceeds the number of installations permitted by the license agreement."
    However, if I then "Quit" MS Office on the Pro, and then try to launch it on the Air, I don't get the error message, and it works as normal. The same thing happens if I switch computers -- if it's running on the Air first, then I can't launch it on the Pro. Basically, only one of the computers can run MS Office at any one time.
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    I'm not an expert on networks and sharing and connectivity and all that, so excuse me if I use inaccurate terminology, but...:
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    I find this pretty disturbing. How in the world does the MS Office on one computer even know that the other computer exists? Furthermore, how does it know that the other computer is on and running? And lastly and more importantly, how does it know which programs are running on the other computer?
    One extra detail: in order to try to diagnose this odd behavior, I installed a program called "Little Snitch" which monitors all network activity and notifies the user whenever any malware programs or other sneaky behind-the-scens apps try to send data over your connection without your knowledge. Little Snitch seems to work great but when I test the problem after installing it, Little Snitch did not even detect or report that MS Office was doing any surreptitious network snooping. So whatever MS Office is doing, it's doing it pretty sneakily.
    Here is my worry: Could a hacker somehow exploit this capability of MS Office to monitor activity on my computer without my being aware of it? Or could someone re-adapt this snooping code from MS Office for more nefarious purposes?
    Or am I completely misapprehending the situation somehow?
    Any  reassurance or explanation would be greatly appreciated! Thanks.

    But my question is: How does the software do that?
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    then what's preventing less ethical coders from deploying similar but more sinister malware with the same capability?
    Nothing. Any vendor of any software, from a one person shareware or freeware app to a company the size of Apple, Microsoft or Adobe could sneak in damaging code. Any company that wants to stay in business though would never allow it.
    In a typical software company (particularly larger ones), you have not only the people who write the code, but also system analysts who review the code looking for flaws or anything else that shouldn't be there.
    Now I have the fear that if I'm using a wifi hotspot in a cafe or wherever, someone else with hacking skills on that same hotspot could basically see what I'm doing on my computer, without my knowledge.
    The software to pry (they hope undetected) into other folks' computers on an open network like that has been around for years. That's why you at least need to have your firewall enabled when using a wifi hotspot.

  • Possible Login Screen Security Hole in Lion?

    I think that I have found a glitch in the login screen in Lion that allows a user to hack in to an account without a password! It appears to occur on Macbooks with OS X Lion and here is how to reproduce it:
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    Wait for your Mac to start up and you should see the same screen you saw (like the image above.)
    Click in the battery/time/wifi signal/etc. area in the top right corner without mousing over the courner.
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    The login screen should reappear! (Odd, isn't it?)
    Now, mouseover the bottom-left corner and hold esc as soon as the screen turns completely dark. If sucessful, you should see your screensaver show up. While holding esc, move your mouse around towards the bottom-right corner. You should see your cursor over top of the "wheel of doom".
    The screen should flicker and you have hacked in to your account! Funny, isn't it?
    You should see finder over top of your desktop if you located finder correctly in step 7! Cool?
    If you are not sucessful, restart the entire process from step 4 and skip steps 7-8. If it doesn't work out for you after a few attemps, give up! Let's not waste any time on hacking in to an account (unless you are a hacker.)
    Is it just me or can anyone else reproduce this? If it occurs (or not), please list your Macbook's specs and details in a reply.

    jonathan_2005 wrote:
    One of the options in the security panel permits a user to require that a username and password be entered to login once the screen saver locks your account.
    The option is "Require password to wake this computer from sleep or screen saver"
    Although one would assume that the credentials required to wake the computer is the username/password of the account that was being used when the computer went into sleep mode or the screen saver.
    Never assume
    WRONG!!! Anyone with an account on the machine can enter their username/password and wake the computer and voila that user now has control of the machine as the former user. That's right you guessed it HUGE security hole.
    Anyone with a standard user account? Are you quite sure?
    Anyone thinking that they can wake away from their machine and have the screen saver or sleep mode protect their account after a specified period of time is sadly mistaken. Anyone with an account on the machine can enter their own username and password and drop right into your account right where you left off.
    I never think that way. A more secure lock is ensured by using the screen lock feature of the keychain.
    Can you believe this stuff?
    Not sure what stuff you refer to.
    No warning, no release note to tell you of such a poorly designed "security" option.
    Would you believe that anyone can access your computer? Stolen computers are regularly started up without much problem.
    Apple please fix what must have been an oversight or at least tell people about this intentional design BEFORE they find anyone can wake the computer and become you as a user.
    You are writing to other users like yourself here, not Apple.
    I also presume you are new to the Mac world.

  • Can you confirm a security hole in file sharing?

    I have found a very annoying security hole, and I wonder if it is unique to my setup. I have my mini set up with file sharing turned on. It has 5 accounts, one administrator, rest ordinary users. My login for the administrative user on my laptop is the same as on the mini. I have not turned on "Back to my Mac."
    From my laptop I navigate to the mini using either (a) the network panel in finder, (b) the local IP (afp://192.168.0.xxx), or the global IP (afp://64.xxx.xxx.xxx). (My router is set up to forward the appropriate ports to the mini's local IP). I mount the administrative user's home directory under apple file sharing. Now I have full access to these files. I DO NOT SAVE THE PASSWORD IN KEYCHAIN. All this is as it should be.
    Now I eject the administrator disk.
    From now on (until I reboot my laptop), I can mount that same disk without a password!
    Can someone confirm?

    {quote:title=William Lloyd wrote:}This is not a security hole.{quote}
    While I can understand that some may consider Kerberos automagically creating what is essentially a keychain without the users express knowledge or consent a "feature", I definitely consider it a bug and a huge security hole.
    The kerberos ticket should not live longer then the user is actually connected to the machine. Currently, if the user clicks the Disconnect button the Kerberos ticket lives on and any future connections to that server will user that ticket. This is not what users (especially novice to intermediate) would expect. If the user clicks the Disconnect button, then they would expect that they are completely disconnected and any further connections to that server would require authentication. Otherwise they leave their machine wide open, hense the security hole.
    The other thing that makes this so nasty is that if the OS decides not to use kerberos, for whatever reason, the behavior is different. It behaves as the user would expect. Clicking Disconnect does completely disconnect you from the server and any future connections will require authentication. So at a minimum there is a dangerous inconsistency in behavior between when the OS uses Kerberos and when it doesn't. That, at a minimum, should be fixed.

  • IGS: Vulnerability "security hole in level 3"

    Hi!
    We are using SAP ERP 6.0 system with an ingetrated IGS 7.0
    We already changed IGS according to sap note 896400 to the version 7.00 (Patch 15)
    When we run scan on demand we get the following information: 
    A security hole in level 3 was found at server ServerX.
    Vulnerability-Level [highest]: 3
    Vulnerability-Level [highest counted]: 0
    Vulnerability Details
    Date: Sun 10 May 2009  1:26:13 MET
    Vuln: 300803
    Vulnerability: SAPXPG Remote OS Command Execution at sysnr 3
    ToDo: Set up a project to implement access restriction rules to RFC programs
    with the 'secinfo' and 'reginfo' (only available in SAP Netweaver) mechanism
    CertRef: M906071, SAP 30/08
    Tool Reference: proprietary CERT and IPINS scanner
    Comment:
    Counted in: 2009-07
    Monitor:
    Date: Sun 10 May 2009  1:26:17 MET
    Vuln#: 100806
    Vulnerability: External Server Registration is possible at sysnr 3
    ToDo: Secure remote registration of RFC programs (only possible in SAP Basis
    7.00 and later)
    CertRef: M906071
    Tool Reference: proprietary CERT and IPINS scanner
    Comment:
    Counted in: 2009-07
    Monitor:
    Date: Sun 10 May 2009  1:26:17 MET
    Vuln#: 101802
    Vulnerability: IGS HTTP Administration is enabled and this version has
    reported vulnerabilities at sysnr 3
    ToDo: Upgrade to a higher patch level, i.e., for BC-FES-IGS 6.40 Patch Level
    17 or higher and for  BC-FES-IGS 7.00 Patch Level 07 or higher
    CertRef: SAP 34/09
    Tool Reference: proprietary CERT and IPINS scanner
    Comment:
    Counted in: 2009-07
    Monitor:
    End of Vulnerability Details
    Question:
    What we have to do to avoid s security holein level 3?
    Thank you very much!
    regards

    Do you solved tye probllem below. ???  Can you help me.
    I have the same problem.
    What the format of secinfo, reginfo and what value to to profile gw/reg_no_conn_info ??
    Thanks,
    Vulnerability Details
    Date: Sun 10 May 2009 1:26:13 MET
    Vuln: 300803
    Vulnerability: SAPXPG Remote OS Command Execution at sysnr 3
    ToDo: Set up a project to implement access restriction rules to RFC programs
    with the 'secinfo' and 'reginfo' (only available in SAP Netweaver) mechanism
    CertRef: M906071, SAP 30/08
    Tool Reference: proprietary CERT and IPINS scanner
    Comment:
    Counted in: 2009-07
    Monitor:

  • IGS: Vulnerability (security hole in level 3 was found)

    Hi!
    We are using SAP ERP 6.0 system with an ingetrated IGS 7.0
    We already changed IGS according to sap note 896400 to the version 7.00 (Patch 15)
    When we run scan on demand we get the following information: 
    A security hole in level 3 was found at server ServerX.
    Vulnerability-Level [highest]: 3
    Vulnerability-Level [highest counted]: 0
    Vulnerability Details
    Date: Sun 10 May 2009  1:26:13 MET
    Vuln: 300803
    Vulnerability: SAPXPG Remote OS Command Execution at sysnr 3
    ToDo: Set up a project to implement access restriction rules to RFC programs
    with the 'secinfo' and 'reginfo' (only available in SAP Netweaver) mechanism
    CertRef: M906071, SAP 30/08
    Tool Reference: proprietary CERT and IPINS scanner
    Comment:
    Counted in: 2009-07
    Monitor:
    Date: Sun 10 May 2009  1:26:17 MET
    Vuln#: 100806
    Vulnerability: External Server Registration is possible at sysnr 3
    ToDo: Secure remote registration of RFC programs (only possible in SAP Basis
    7.00 and later)
    CertRef: M906071
    Tool Reference: proprietary CERT and IPINS scanner
    Comment:
    Counted in: 2009-07
    Monitor:
    Date: Sun 10 May 2009  1:26:17 MET
    Vuln#: 101802
    Vulnerability: IGS HTTP Administration is enabled and this version has
    reported vulnerabilities at sysnr 3
    ToDo: Upgrade to a higher patch level, i.e., for BC-FES-IGS 6.40 Patch Level
    17 or higher and for  BC-FES-IGS 7.00 Patch Level 07 or higher
    CertRef: SAP 34/09
    Tool Reference: proprietary CERT and IPINS scanner
    Comment:
    Counted in: 2009-07
    Monitor:
    End of Vulnerability Details
    Question:
    What we have to do to avoid s security holein level 3?
    Thank you very much!
    regards

    Do you solved tye probllem below. ???  Can you help me.
    I have the same problem.
    What the format of secinfo, reginfo and what value to to profile gw/reg_no_conn_info ??
    Thanks,
    Vulnerability Details
    Date: Sun 10 May 2009 1:26:13 MET
    Vuln: 300803
    Vulnerability: SAPXPG Remote OS Command Execution at sysnr 3
    ToDo: Set up a project to implement access restriction rules to RFC programs
    with the 'secinfo' and 'reginfo' (only available in SAP Netweaver) mechanism
    CertRef: M906071, SAP 30/08
    Tool Reference: proprietary CERT and IPINS scanner
    Comment:
    Counted in: 2009-07
    Monitor:

  • HUGE SECURITY HOLE IN LOGIN FROM SCREEN SAVER

    One of the options in the security panel permits a user to require that a username and password be entered to login once the screen saver locks your account.
    The option is "Require password to wake this computer from sleep or screen saver"
    Although one would assume that the credentials required to wake the computer is the username/password of the account that was being used when the computer went into sleep mode or the screen saver. WRONG!!! Anyone with an account on the machine can enter their username/password and wake the computer and voila that user now has control of the machine as the former user. That's right you guessed it HUGE security hole.
    Anyone thinking that they can wake away from their machine and have the screen saver or sleep mode protect their account after a specified period of time is sadly mistaken. Anyone with an account on the machine can enter their own username and password and drop right into your account right where you left off.
    Can you believe this stuff? No warning, no release note to tell you of such a poorly designed "security" option.
    Apple please fix what must have been an oversight or at least tell people about this intentional design BEFORE they find anyone can wake the computer and become you as a user.
    Thanks,
    JH

    jonathan_2005 wrote:
    One of the options in the security panel permits a user to require that a username and password be entered to login once the screen saver locks your account.
    The option is "Require password to wake this computer from sleep or screen saver"
    Although one would assume that the credentials required to wake the computer is the username/password of the account that was being used when the computer went into sleep mode or the screen saver.
    Never assume
    WRONG!!! Anyone with an account on the machine can enter their username/password and wake the computer and voila that user now has control of the machine as the former user. That's right you guessed it HUGE security hole.
    Anyone with a standard user account? Are you quite sure?
    Anyone thinking that they can wake away from their machine and have the screen saver or sleep mode protect their account after a specified period of time is sadly mistaken. Anyone with an account on the machine can enter their own username and password and drop right into your account right where you left off.
    I never think that way. A more secure lock is ensured by using the screen lock feature of the keychain.
    Can you believe this stuff?
    Not sure what stuff you refer to.
    No warning, no release note to tell you of such a poorly designed "security" option.
    Would you believe that anyone can access your computer? Stolen computers are regularly started up without much problem.
    Apple please fix what must have been an oversight or at least tell people about this intentional design BEFORE they find anyone can wake the computer and become you as a user.
    You are writing to other users like yourself here, not Apple.
    I also presume you are new to the Mac world.

  • Potential Security Hole with 802.1x and Voice VLANs?

    I have been looking at 802.1x and Voice VLANs and I can see what I think is a bit of a security hole.
    If a user has no authentication details to gain access via 802.1x - i.e. they have not been given a User ID or the PC doesn't have a certificate etc. If they attach a PC to a switchport that is configured with a Voice VLAN (or disconnect an IP Phone and plug the PC direct into the switchport) they can easily see via packet sniffing the CDP packets that will contain the Voice VLAN ID. They can then easily create a Tagged Virtual NIC (via the NIC utilities or driver etc) with the Voice VLAN 802.1q Tag. Assuming DHCP is enabled for the Voice VLAN they will get assigned an IP address and have access to the IP network. I appreciate the VLAN can be locked down at the Layer-3 level with ACL's so any 'non-voice related' traffic is blocked but in this scenario the user has sucessfully bypassed 802.1x authentication and gain access to the network?
    Has anyone done any research into this potential security hole?
    Thanks
    Andy

    Thanks for the reply. To be honest we would normally deploy some or all of the measures you list but these don't around the issue of being able to easily bypass having to authenticate via 802.1x.
    As I said I think this is a hole but don't see any solutions at the moment except 802.1x on the IP Phone, although at the moment you can't do this with Voice VLANs?
    Andy

  • Adobe Flash security hole

    As we all now, there's a huge security hole in flash. It's not a question, what to upgrade urgently in 32-bit systems, but the crap company Adobe didn't provide us a 64bit version of this new flash beta. The question is: In 64bit systems wouldn't it be better to package the nspluginwrappered nonsecholed version of flash? Or would it be too difficult, and it would even need a wiki entry? And from about when will be secure packages of flash will be available from arch repositories?

    berbae wrote:It's not clear to me why nspluginwrapper would be needed, because there is in AUR the package lib32-flashplugin-prerelease 10.1.53.64-8, which has less dependencies.
    Cannot that package work on x86_64 arch without nspluginwrapper, if all the needed lib32 libraries are installed ?
    Please can someone give me explanations, thanks.
    Already try that one. In short: it doesn't work.
    Apparently, 64bit Firefox could not recognize 32bit plugin, even if all the necessary lib32 packages are installed, which is why we need nspluginwrapper to act as a "middle man" between Firefox and Flash (someone please correct me if I'm wrong on this).
    Anyway, don't let the huge dependency list scares you, both nspluginwrapper-debian and nspluginwrapper-flash-prerelease combined requires roughly the same dependencies as lib32-flashplugin, it's just that PKGBUILD of nspluginwrapper-debian listed all dependencies, while lib32-flashplugin only list the highest level ones.
    If you don't believe me, try issuing the following command (which is the dependencies of lib32-flashplugin):
    lib32-libxt lib32-gtk2 lib32-nss lib32-curl
    and take note that it pulls in roughly the same number of packages that nspluginwrapper-debian package requires.
    Last edited by zodmaner (2010-06-14 11:31:44)

  • SQ02 Infoset - security hole - authority

    Hi,
    I have heard, that SQ02 (creating Infosets) has several security holes (regarding authorizations). Does anybody know about it and could specify these holes?
    Thanks
    Markus

    HI,
    When u create an infoset, you attach user group to the infoset. In user group, you specify multiple users that can have access to your infoset and query.
    So these multiple users can have access to ur infoset and then can change the code.
    But if you restrict the authorisation to users and not allow them to change or create queries using ur infoset.
    object S_QUERY Revokes authorization to change or create queries for a specific user.
    Hope this will help u.
    Reward points if its helpful
    Thanks,
    Vijay

  • SQ02 Infoset - security hole

    Hi,
    I have heard, that SQ02 (creating Infosets) has several security holes (regarding authority). Does anybody know about it and could specify these holes?
    Thanks
    Markus

    Hi
    Steps on how to proceed to create a Query:
    ADHOC QUERY
    A query can be created to extract information from master records  i.e  Infotypes.  For example, by creating a query , the data relating to an employee contained in various Infotypes can be extracted.
    Proceedure :  
    Decide on  the various Infotypes we  want to make the query.  Decide on the area where we  want to query  i.e  Global area or Standard area.  Standard area is client specific and globel area will include all clients.
    Menu : HR – PM – Admn -  Information System -  Adhoc Query
    Select area standard and select the  user group already created
    Creation of new query  :  
    TC SQ03  -  Select Environment – Select Standard Area -  Enter  --  If new user group is to be created, enter name of the user group, click on create and enter necessary information and  exit after saving
    TC SQ02  -  Enter name of the Infoset – Create – enter name of Infoset -  Data source -- >  Table join by basis table – give name of table e.g  pa0000 -  Enter -  Click on insert table if we  want to include more tables – give name of table one by one and after finishing,  place cursor on the joining lines and right click to delete unwanted relationships  - check  - and go back  - field groups  -  include all table fields  - click on generate button   -  go out
    TC SQ03  -  Select user group  -   eg.  Payroll
    Infoset  - Enter name of newly created Infoset 
    Assign users and Infosets  -  Assign infosets  -  put tick on payroll  - save and go back
    TC  PAAH  -  Expand the nodes and put tick on relevant fields depending upon necessity
    Save the query  by giving the same name as infoset for easyness..
    Use
    The InfoSet Query is designed for reporting on data stored in flat tables. It is particularly useful for reporting on joins for master data and joins for ODS objects.
    Prerequisites
    You must take the following steps before you can create Infoset queries:
    ·        Set up Roles for the InfoSet Query
    ·        Process Classic InfoSets and Assign Roles
    Procedure
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    Reward all helpfull answers
    Regards
    Pavan

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