Pacman vulnerable to MITM attacks?

Hello fellow archers,
I was wondering if pacman's security model could compete with the ubuntu/debian one (signed .deb packages), so I glimpsed at /etc/pacman.d/* and am currently a bit shocked since all I could see were possibly insecure http/ftp URLs.
I am German, and not the only one becoming increasingly paranoid because our minister of the interior is carelessly trying to push his agenda of new surveillance methods. (Trying to stay politically neutral in here... check the [cruel] Google translation for "Bundestrojaner" if you're interested in what might be in store for Germany.)
So.. if pacman is checking for new sources from http/ftp servers without using any SSL/TLS or the like, wouldn't it be fairly easy for a government controlling the local ISPs (or even a roommate ARP-spoofing the LAN) to get me to download & install / upgrade to a package containing malware/spyware/a (government-or-whatever)-sponsored trojan?
The md5sums in the PKGBUILDs are in no way increasing my security if the PKGBUILD itself is tainted.
What are your thoughts on this? Hopefully I am wrong here.

Thanks for the replies. Apparently, you're also very much interested in a more secure arch package management.
Well, we guys usually are very security-aware, aren't we? Speaking for myself, I use FTPS/IMAP+SSL/SSL as much as possible, use CACert SSL certificates for my webserver, and have only LUKS/dm-crypt encrypted partitions (except for /boot). Plus all unique long + cruel passwords.
I'm stating this to make all of you aware that all of these measures are in vain if our package manager is vulnerable to MITM.
_nalle: This might have been brought up before. In fact, I didn't even care to look. As long as this problem persists, from my POV there's no issue devs should be made more aware of than this.
Lone_Wolf: Just avoiding DNS will not help much if anything. In the LAN scenario, you're - basically - able to ARP spoof IPs; and in case your ISP is, well, trying or forced to help your government, I'm sure it'd be possible for them to filter your packets being sent for a specific IP and reroute them to a local "mirror" of their own.
slubman: Nice idea for a workaround. In my opinion, this could prevent your local roommate from messing with your pacman upgrades. Still: in the worse (worst case?) scenario that your GOV.&ISP are working against you, I don't think this would help much. I'm quite sure that they will be able to obtain a valid cert from one of the large commercial CAs for whatever domain they please if they require it. The problem is curl only checking for the presence of any valid&trusted cert and not for a specific trusted cert.
Finally, Lone_Wolf, the approach you describe sounds very doable. Using either CAcert or creating a new CA for arch also seems like the right thing to do.
I hope some more devs will comment on this and come up with a roadmap soon.

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    Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.1h (Affected 1.0.1g, 1.0.1f, 1.0.1e, 1.0.1d, 1.0.1c, 1.0.1b, 1.0.1a, 1.0.1)
    Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.0m (Affected 1.0.0l, 1.0.0k, 1.0.0j, 1.0.0i, 1.0.0g, 1.0.0f, 1.0.0e, 1.0.0d, 1.0.0c, 1.0.0b, 1.0.0a, 1.0.0)
    Fixed in OpenSSL 0.9.8za (Affected 0.9.8y, 0.9.8x, 0.9.8w, 0.9.8v, 0.9.8u, 0.9.8t, 0.9.8s, 0.9.8r, 0.9.8q, 0.9.8p, 0.9.8o, 0.9.8n, 0.9.8m, 0.9.8l, 0.9.8k, 0.9.8j, 0.9.8i, 0.9.8h, 0.9.8g, 0.9.8f, 0.9.8e, 0.9.8d, 0.9.8c, 0.9.8b, 0.9.8a, 0.9.8)
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